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Thesis Abstract 
TITLE: Humanitarian War in Theory and Practice: A 
 Case Study of the NATO Intervention in Kosovo 
This thesis aims to test and refine the theory of humanitarian war through the 
medium of a case study of the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Key 
research questions include: Is ‘humanitarian war’ a contradiction in terms? To 
what extent can military force be an appropriate and effective instrument for 
solving or averting humanitarian crises and ensuring respect for human rights? Is 
the concept, as some critics argue, too easily abused by powerful states seeking to 
justify wars fought for self-interested reasons?  
      The thesis will look at the arguments of both proponents and critics of the 
concept of humanitarian war. The aim is to provide an immanent critique of the 
theory, judging it on its own terms; therefore when the arguments of critics are 
considered, the main emphasis will be on critics who come from within the liberal 
spectrum, rather than on realists or communitarians. It will examine the theory in 
terms of its three aspects- the jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum- with 
the aim of taking a ‘longer view’ of intervention than is often the case in the 
existing literature, viewing it not as a discrete event but as part of a complex long-
term process. 
       The case of Kosovo was chosen as a recent intervention that has often been 
cited as a good example of a humanitarian war, and one which most proponents of 
the concept supported, at least in principle. 
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 Introduction 
The idea of ‘Humanitarian War’- of the use of military force to defend the human 
rights of oppressed groups, to force an oppressive regime to change its policies or 
to avert a humanitarian catastrophe- has gained considerable currency in the study 
of international relations in the period since the end of the Cold War. The concept 
is, however, an extremely controversial one- indeed, it may be regarded as being 
doubly contested. Firstly, it is contested from outside the liberal tradition of 
international relations theory, by communitarians who argue that ‘human rights’ 
are culturally specific to the West and by realists who argue that state sovereignty 
should not be violated on grounds of humanitarianism- because moral action is 
only truly possible within the state, not in the anarchical global society, and 
because a right to humanitarian intervention would be abused by unscrupulous 
governments acting in their own interest. 
     More intriguing, however, is the debate that is occurring within the liberal and 
progressive spectrum. Some scholars have argued that the rise of the idea of 
‘humanitarian war’ marks a positive development- even the creation of a new 
system of international relations, in which “power is used to do justice” (Michael 
Glennon)1- replacing the old system, under which justice was always trumped by 
order. Others, however, remain sceptical. They argue that military force is too 
destructive and undiscriminating an instrument to be used for humanitarian ends; 
                                                 
1
 M. Glennon, ‘The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just International Law’, Foreign Affairs 
Vol.78/3 (May/Jun 1999), p.6 
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that the idea of humanitarian war merely serves to legitimise war; that forcible 
intervention by outsiders is only likely to exacerbate internal conflicts rather than 
solve them; and that the concept is far too easily abused by powerful states to 
serve their own ends. Fundamentally, they argue that ‘humanitarian war’ is a 
contradiction in terms. 
     The intention of this thesis is to provide a contribution to these debates within 
the liberal and progressive spectrum by analysing and evaluating the theory of 
humanitarian war though the medium of a case study. The case chosen is the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo of March-June 1999. 
    The intention of this thesis is to provide an immanent critique of the theory of 
humanitarian war, judging it largely on its own terms, to see whether it lives up to 
its own claims. Therefore, when the various schools of  criticism of the idea of  
humanitarian war are considered, the main emphasis will be on those critics who 
accept the basic liberal principles of human rights, rather than on those critics who 
come from outside the liberal tradition (for example, communitarians, who reject 
the universality of human rights, and classical realists who reject even the 
possibility of morality playing a role in international relations). 
     A single case study approach has been adopted in part because most existing 
studies of humanitarian war consist of fairly brief examinations of multiple cases, 
and it was felt that, despite the potential drawbacks of studying only one case 
(these matters will be explored in more detail in Chapter Two), the gain in depth 
would enable a greater contribution.  The reasons why the Kosovo intervention 
was chosen as the case to will, again, be looked at more fully in Chapter Two. 
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However, it may be worth making some preliminary remarks here on the special 
peculiarities of this war which make it particularly appropriate for use as a case 
study in a thesis such as this.  
      When the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation launched air strikes against 
Serbia in March 1999, justifying this as an action to avert a humanitarian 
catastrophe in the province of Kosovo, many hailed this as the first true 
humanitarian war. The debate over the Kosovo conflict mirrored the broader 
debate over humanitarian war, with supporters praising NATO for implementing 
its noble values by force, while opponents argued that the intervention was making 
the situation worse or that humanitarian rhetoric was being used as a cover for 
state interests. A prominent supporter described the conflict as “the first war that 
has not been waged in the name of ‘national interests’ but rather in the name of 
principles and values” (Vaclav Havel)2, while an opponent called it  “an epilogue 
to another ‘Low and Dishonest Decade’” (Ken Booth).3 
      The NATO intervention in Kosovo marked an important milestone in the 
history of humanitarian intervention as it was the first time that a full-scale 
military intervention against a functioning sovereign state had won a significant 
degree of international support specifically as a humanitarian war. Though the 
intervention was neither authorised nor officially endorsed by the UN Security 
Council, when Russia and China introduced a resolution condemning the bombing 
it was defeated by 12 votes to 3. In all of the main previous cases that have been 
                                                 
2
 V. Havel, cit. in R. Falk, ‘Kosovo, World Order and the Future of International Law’, American 
Journal of International Law Vol.93/4 (1999), p.848 
3
 From title of article in K. Booth ed. The Kosovo Tragedy: the Human Rights Dimensions, 
London, Frank Cass, 2001 
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widely cited in international relations literature as examples of humanitarian war, 
either the intervening power officially justified its actions on the grounds of self-
defence rather than humanitarian concern (as with India’s invasion of Pakistan in 
1971, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978-9 and Tanzania’s invasion of 
Uganda at the same time), or else intervention took place in a ‘failed state’ where 
there was no legitimate governing authority, so questions of sovereignty did not 
arise (as with the US intervention in Somalia in 1992-3). 
      In contrast, in the case of the Kosovo intervention spokesmen for the NATO 
powers consistently cited the humanitarian aims and motives for their actions. 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair said of NATO’s intervention that “we are 
fighting for a world where dictators are no longer able to visit horrific punishments 
on their own peoples.... We are fighting not for territory but for values. For a new 
internationalism where the brutal repression of whole ethnic groups will no longer 
be tolerated.”4 
     Therefore, the war in Kosovo provides the best single piece of evidence for 
those who argue that a right to humanitarian intervention may now be said to have 
become accepted in international customary law. This debate is a long-standing 
one, and the answer is still by no means clear-cut, but with the war in Kosovo, the 
momentum of the debate did seem to shift in favour of those arguing that the right 
to humanitarian intervention did exist (although that momentum may since have 
been reversed by the Iraq war). 
     This thesis will not attempt to touch on the very involved- and, at the time of 
writing, probably unanswerable- legal question of whether the right to 
                                                 
4
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humanitarian intervention exists. Rather, it has a normative focus; it deals with the 
question of whether a right to forcible humanitarian intervention should exist, and 
what the consequences of the use of such a right are likely to be. 
    Another major aim of this thesis is to examine a case of humanitarian war from 
a long-term perspective (or at least, longer than is the case in much of the existing 
literature), taking into account not only the military intervention itself, but its 
aftermath and events preceding it- in both cases, over a timescale of several years. 
In most existing examinations of humanitarian intervention, the timescale 
employed tends to be fairly restricted; the events immediately preceding an 
intervention are looked at, and sometimes the immediate aftermath, but in general 
the focus is very much on the intervention as a discrete event. In particular, though 
some theorists are beginning to examine the issue of jus post bellum, the question 
of what should happen after an intervention has not been touched on to any great 
degree, despite its obvious importance (consider the widespread condemnation of 
the disastrous aftermath of the Iraq war and the failure of the US government to 
draw up a coherent plan for what should happen after its forces had overthrown the 
Hussein regime). Equally, it will be argued in this project that the conventional 
understanding of the jus ad bellum in cases of humanitarian intervention is not 
sufficently complex. The existing literature concentrates on the actions of 
intervening powers, aiming to arrive at a list of criteria for when it may be 
legitimate for them to use military force to prevent or end a humanitarian crisis. 
Where intervention occurs in an internal conflict, as was the case in Kosovo, the 
two conflicts- the civil war and the international intervention- tend to be viewed as 
 - 5 -
separate.  The actors directly involved in the crisis- whether those seen as 
responsible for it or those made to suffer by it- tend to be viewed as ‘villains’ and 
‘victims’ who must be stopped or saved. The ‘victims’ in particular tend to be 
viewed in a rather passive way. This thesis will aim to take a more rounded view 
of the events preceding an intervention, showing how the prospect of a military 
intervention occurring in the future can have an impact on the strategies pursued 
by actors in an internal conflict. The aim, then, is to show how military 
intervention by outsiders is only a part of a complex and long-term process in 
which the strategies pursued by all of the actors involved can each be influenced 
by the strategies pursued by other actors. 
           For primary materials, this thesis relies mainly on media reports and on the 
documentary evidence, drawn from such sources as government and parliamentary 
reports, reports by international organisations such as the UN and OSCE, and by 
international NGOs such as the Red Cross, Human Rights Watch (an organisation 
supportive in principle of the idea of humanitarian intervention, and hence 
concerned to ensure that it is not abused) and the International Crisis Group.  
    Chapter One sets out the theoretical background to the project. It begins by 
providing an overview of the historical and ethical background of humanitarian 
war. The main body of the chapter is concerned with the details of the theory 
itself, attempting to draw out from the literature a composite set of jus ad bellum, 
jus in bello and jus post bellum criteria for a legitimate humanitarian war that 
might be acceptable to most theorists in the area. It then details the arguments of 
five schools of critics of the concept; these will be used as countertheories when 
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we come to the case study. The section on jus post bellum will of necessity be less 
definitive as much less theoretical work has been done on the matter of what 
intervening powers should do after the military phase of their action is over, 
compared to the issues of what they should do before or during it. Therefore in the 
area of jus post bellum the aim will be to set out a tentative list of possible 
positions on this issue,  rather than a solid list of criteria. 
     Chapter Two has two parts. The first section sets out the methodological 
approach used in the project and establishes the reasons for choosing a single case 
study approach rather than the multiple-case approaches that are more commonly 
used in studies on this subject. The second section lists the main conflicts in recent 
history that have been cited in at least some quarters as examples of humanitarian 
war, in an attempt to show the reasons why the NATO intervention in Kosovo was 
chosen as the case study over all of these other possible examples. 
     Chapter Three consists of a case history of the development of the conflict in 
Kosovo prior to the NATO intervention, with detailed coverage beginning from 
the time of  Milosevic’s rise to power in the late 1980s. It concentrates mainly on 
internal events, although the actions of outsiders are mentioned where these had an 
impact on the strategies pursued by the internal actors in the conflict. It will be 
seen that this impact was considerable. 
      Chapter Four deals with the international prehistory of the conflict, attempting 
to fit Kosovo to the set of jus ad bellum criteria for a humanitarian war arrived at 
in Chapter One- particularly those of ‘last resort’, ‘supreme emergency’ and 
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‘humanitarian motives’- and to see what the case tells us about how these criteria 
relate to reality. 
      Chapter Five deals with the course and conduct of the intervention itself- 
between the launching of the first bombing raids on 24 March and the signing of 
the Paris Peace Accords in early June- and its relation to the established criteria for 
jus in bello. Sections in the chapter will focus on the most controversial elements 
of the methods used by NATO- for example, the bombing of a Serbian TV station 
and the use of cluster munitions- and on the debate over whether NATO should 
have used ground forces rather than relying purely on aerial bombing.  
     Chapter Six deals with the aftermath of the military intervention in Kosovo, the 
main focus being on the period between the end of the bombing and the riots of 
March 2004, with briefer coverage of more recent events up to the time of writing. 
These events will be related to the concept of jus post bellum  in an attempt to 
draw out lessons for this important but currently under-theorised aspect of 
humanitarian intervention. 
 
 Chapter One 
UThe Theory of Humanitarian War 
r a 
ter will then move on to a 
 
Adam Roberts describes “humanitarian war” as “an oxymoron which may yet 
become a reality”.1  The phrase itself is a relatively new 
one- it has only really entered the lexicon of international relations theory in the 
past decade, although the idea of humanitarian intervention has been around for 
much longer. This concept itself grows out of a particularly ancient tradition: that 
of Just War theory, which has been around, in one form or another, for well ove
thousand years. 
      The aim of this chapter is to explore and analyse the theory of ‘humanitarian 
war’. This will be done firstly by situating the concept in its wider theoretical and 
ethical framework. This will require not only an analysis of Just War theory, but 
also an exploration of the wider liberal and human-rights traditions of ethics in 
international relations, which have produced the idea that morality has a place in 
warfare. Having established this background, the chap
close analysis of the theory of humanitarian war itself. 
      It will be seen that, although there are some disagreements among theorists- 
for example, with regard to the importance of motive in assessing the legitimacy of 
intervention- in general, theorists are in broad agreement on the criteria for a 
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legitimate humanitarian war. The problem, then, for this thesis lies not in defining 
the ideal of humanitarian war but in evaluating it. To this end, this chapter will 
also detail the arguments of the leading critics of the theory. This criticism comes 
from many quarters- for example, from realists who reject the relevance of moral 
standards to foreign policy, from communitarians who doubt the universal 
applicability of liberal ideals of human rights, and from pragmatists who argue that 
the idea collapses under the weight of its own contradictions. However, as stated 
in the Introduction, the intention of this study is essentially to evaluate the theory 
of humanitarian war on its own terms: i.e. by accepting the fundamental 
assumptions of the liberal tradition. Therefore, although criticisms from outside 
this tradition- for example, those based on the argument that the concept of 
‘human rights’ is a fundamentally Western construct with no validity across 
cultures- will be noted at the appropriate point, they will not be dealt with at length 
as they do not form an important part of the argument of this project. Most 
attention will be paid to criticisms from a liberal or ‘hedged realist’ point of view- 
that is, from theorists who accept such liberal nostrums as the value of basic 
human rights and the possiblility of judging state action in moral terms. It will be 
found that, even with these restrictions, one can still find a number of powerful 
lines of critique of the whole idea of fighting wars in the name of the protection of 
                                                                                                                                      
human rights. 
      Conventional Just War theory has two parts: the jus ad bellum, (justice of war), 
which deals with questions of what the appropriate reasons are for justifying the 
1
 A. Roberts, ‘Humanitarian War’: Military Intervention and Human Rights’, International Affairs 
Vol.69/3 (1993), p.429 
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use of military force, and the jus in bello, (‘justice in war’) which concerns the 
rules of conduct for belligerents. Both of these will be dealt with in this chapter, 
but it will be argued that to be complete, the theory of humanitarian war also 
quires a third element: the jus post bellum (justice after war). re
 
      1.1 The Wider Background: Ethics and International Relations 
The concept of humanitarian war belongs firmly within the liberal tradition of 
international ethics, although it is a highly contested idea even among liberals. 
Indeed, Smith argues that the predominant strand in the liberal tradition has been 
that of noninterventionists who believe that freedom is best promoted by example 
rather than force.2 But all of the main theorists of humanitarian war argue their 
case from a fundamentally liberal (or social constructivist) standpoint. Therefore, 
in order to fully understand the concept, it is necessarily to at least briefly explore 
                                                
the ethical background to the liberal approach to IR. 
      Central to the liberal tradition of international ethics are ideas of human rights- 
usually understood in a negative sense, as rights of liberty against the state- and of 
the authority of reason.3 From these is argued that it is possible to judge the actions 
of states in terms of moral standards arrived at through reason, and in some 
measure to regulate the actions of states in order to promote and ensure the 
protection of human rights worldwide. The existence of such rights is typically 
taken as given; rights are seen as morally fundamental, their protection to be 
 
2
 M. Smith, ‘Liberalism and International Reform’, in T. Nardin & D. Mapel, eds. Traditions of 
International Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.213 
3
 T. Mapel & D. Nardin, ‘Convergence and Divergence in International Ethics’, in Ibid p.313 
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observed as a matter of course rather than as an occasion for gratitude. In  the 
liberal view, these ideals are placed above the concept of state sovereignty, the 
main organising principle of the Westphalian state system. Although most liberals 
do not wish to abolish states- largely because of their fears of the potential 
coercive power of a single world state- they believe that, at least in some measure, 
ty to the liberal tradition- the ‘morality of states’.4 I will deal with this issue 
                                                
their actions can and should be subject to regulation. 
      The significance of these founding principles can easily be understood by 
comparing them with the founding principles of the rival realist tradition. Though 
their reasons differ, theorists from the various schools of realism agree that the 
first principle of international politics is that of the sovereignty of states; this takes 
precedence over moral judgements of their actions. At least, this is how the realist 
position is usually presented in liberal literature. Some realists would argue that 
this is a caricature, and that realism is merely  based on a different kind of morality 
morali
later. 
     Under the classical realist view, as espoused most famously by Machiavelli and 
Hobbes, there is no morality in foreign policy. The idea that the exercise of reason 
can produce a more peaceful global order is rejected, since a powerful state may 
‘reason’, entirely correctly, that it in its interests to subjugate other states: “Reason 
may as easily enlarge the realm of the dominion of an imperial self, as mitigate 
expansive desires in the interests of the harmony of the whole” (Niebuhr).5 States 
exist within a completely anarchic system; a Hobbesian state of nature, the result 
 
4
 C. Thomas, ‘The Pragmatic Case Against Intervention’, in I. Forbes & M. Hoffman, eds. Political 
Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention, London, Macmillan, 1993, p.92 
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of which is a constant struggle for power, fuelled by “competition”, “diffidence”, 
and “glory”.6 Morgenthau writes that “foreign policy, like all politics, is in its 
essence a struggle for power, waged by sovereign nations for national 
advantage…. By its very nature this struggle is never ended, because the lust for 
power, and the fear of it, is never stilled.”7  The nature of the system therefore 
absolves states of any moral duties whatsoever. There is no distinction between 
‘just’ and ‘unjust’ wars; immoral acts are not merely permissible but positively 
required,8 since any state whose rulers attempt to live by moral standards will 
simply not survive. Machiavelli argues that it is impossible for a prince to be both 
good and successful, so he must be prepared to do evil: it is, however, important 
that he should avoid the bad reputation attached to vices.9 Therefore, morals are 
only of use in an instrumental sense; a Machiavellian prince pretends to be acting 
morally in order to reassure his followers, thus adopting a policy of deceit and 
            
hypocrisy.10  
      The idea that morality in IR is of purely instrumental importance has endured 
as a strand in modern realism. For example, Henry Kissinger argued that the real 
aim of the ‘human rights’ policy of the Carter administration- supposedly an 
attempt to inject morality into foreign policy- was “to give the American people, 
after the traumas of Vietnam and Watergate, a renewed sense of the basic decency 
                                                                                                                          
nd Possibilities of Ethical International 
onal Interest: A CriticalExamination of American Foreign 
64 
nguin, 1961, p.50 
5
 Niebuhr in J. Donnelly, ‘Twentieth Century Realism’, in Nardin & Mapel op.cit. pp.92-3 
6
 S. Hoffmann, Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits a
Politics, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1981, p.11 
7
 H. Morgenthau, In Defense of the Nati
Policy, London, Macmillan, 1951, p.92 
8
 S. Forde, ‘Classical Realism’, in Nardin & Mapel op.cit. p.
9
 N. Machiavelli, The Prince, London, Pe
10
 Forde in Nardin & Mapel op.cit. p.69 
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of this country.”11 Mertus makes a similar point in more convoluted language by 
describing the use by the US of human rights language as a “bait and switch 
tactic…. Politicians champion human rights in order to induce desired behaviour 
rected are seriously injurious to our interests, 
                                                
in others and to nurture a positive self-image.”12 
     If any state were ever to adopt in good faith a genuine policy of human rights 
promotion, then it would be doomed to fail, since human rights violations result 
from ineradicable flaws in human nature- understood by realists as essentially 
egoistic- and are unlikely ever to end. The best that can be hoped for is for states to 
follow a rational and prudent course in pursuit of their own self-interest.13 George 
Kennan writes of US foreign policy in this context that, since the primary 
obligation of government “is to the interests of the national society it represents, 
not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may 
experience”14, humanitarian interventions “can be formally defensible only if the 
practices against which they are di
rather than just our sensibilities.”15 
      On this view, there is no reason for a state to be ashamed about acting only in 
its own self-interest. Indeed, that is the only sane course to pursue, since any 
attempts by a state to base foreign policy on universalist moral precepts are bound 
to end in failure, and to have serious adverse consequences for that state. This 
leads some to doubt the idea that morals are even of instrumental importance. 
 
11
 Kissinger cit. in Donnelly in Ibid pp.103-4 
12
 J. Mertus, ‘Bait and Switch? Human Rights and US Foreign Policy’, Foreign Policy in Focus 
Policy Report, Mar 2004, http://www.fpif.org/papers/2004/rights.html  
13
 Donnelly in Nardin & Mapel op.cit. p.93 
14
 G. Kennan, ‘Morality and Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs Vol.64 (2), 1985-6, p. 206 
 Ibid p.209 15
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Morgenthau and Kennan agree that it is best for a government to be open about the 
fact that it is acting in its own self-interest rather than relying on moral rhetoric to 
justify its actions, as the latter course may lead to unexpected complications. 
Morgenthau gives the example of the Truman doctrine, formulated by the US 
government to justify providing aid to anti-Communist forces in Greece and 
Turkey in the late 1940s. Morgenthau argues that the US should have justified 
these operations as being in its own national interest. Instead Truman relied on 
universal moral principles- supporting democracy against tyranny- which meant he 
committed the US to the onerous task of resisting Communist expansion at any 
time, anywhere in the world- even in places that had no strategic importance for 
the US. He concludes that a moral approach to foreign policy puts into jeopardy 
“the objective, be it moral or political, for which the political action is being 
undertaken.”16 Kennan states similarly that “where measures taken by foreign 
governments affect adversely American interests rather than just American moral 
sensibilities, protests and retaliation are obviously in order; but they should be 
international ‘state of war’ that is not the permanent reality- and... to follow its 
                              
carried forward frankly for what they are, and not allowed to masquerade under 
the mantle of moral principle.”17 
      Liberals reject this view on two grounds; one normative, the other empirical. 
They argue firstly that the extreme realist view is unacceptable since it leads to 
absolute moral nihilism18; secondly, that “it is based on a conception of 
                   
16
 Morgenthau op.cit. pp.115-6 
17
 Kennan loc.cit. p.211 
18
 L. McCarthy, ‘International Anarchy, Realism and Non-Intervention’, in Forbes & Hoffman 
op.cit. p.87 
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precepts could turn international politics into such a state of war, and leave little 
room for improvement.” (Stanley Hoffmann)19 “Most of the time,” argues, Brown, 
“international law is effective, the underlying institutional fabric of international 
life holds together.”20 This does not mean that the system is perfect, nor that states 
always act altruistically; but “the norms and practices of international society 
mandate enlightened, rather than narrow, self-interest”, and “an ethical dimension 
to foreign policy...is actually part of what is involved in the very idea of 
membership in international society.”21 In  The Law of Peoples, a classic statement 
of the liberal view of international ethics, John Rawls argues that world politics 
has fundamentally changed since the days of classical realists like Thucydides, 
Machiavelli and Hobbes, partly due to the rise of ideas of social reform and also 
due to the growth of commerce, which creates a more interdependent world and 
                                                
therefore tends to encourage peace by increasing the costs of war.22 
      Rawls, like other liberals, sets great store in the idea of ‘democratic peace’; the 
argument that the spread of liberal democratic regimes should make war less and 
less likely, since it can be empirically shown that settled libera democracies do not 
go to war against each other.23 From this it is argued that liberal states do not act in 
the way that realists postulate, seeking dominance and glory, since they are 
 
19
 Hoffmann op.cit. p.191 
20
 C. Brown, ‘Ethics, Interests and Foreign Policy’, in K. Smith & M. Light, eds. Ethics and 
Foreign Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.52 
21
 Ibid pp.25-6 
22
 J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1999, p.47 
23
 Ibid p.51 Of course, the mere fact that there is a correlation between democratic systems of 
government and peaceful relations between these governments does not prove that the one causes 
the other. Until recently, it could also be empirically shown that states with at least one 
McDonald’s outlet within their borders never went to war with each other, producing the so-called 
‘Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention’ (associated with Thomas Friedman, the columnist 
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“satisfied peoples” with “nothing to go to war about”- except when their existence 
is threatened by an “outlaw state”.24 One can argue about the extent to which the 
‘democratic peace’ thesis actually holds true in the real world- a number of Cold 
War-era interventions by the United States in Latin American countries such as 
Guatemala, Chile and Nicaragua could be seen as invalidating the argument, 
depending on how one defines a liberal democracy (and how one defines a war). 
And a realist might argue the converse- following Rousseau, who believed that 
even a state with the most just internal arrangements might engage in an 
aggressive war, and that increasing commerce was more likely to promote 
competition and conflict between states than it was to lead to greater cooperation. 
But this argument is still seen as  providing important ballast for the liberal 
                                                                                                                                      
position.25 
     It is the case that many self-styled realists do not accept what Brown describes 
as ‘pop realism’- the idea that states only ever act in a self-interested fashion.26 
The more nuanced realist view, that morals have a place in international politics if 
they do not conflict with the interests of power, or that morals are “operative but 
not controlling” (Thompson), has been called “hedged realism”.27 Other realists 
adopt a moral standpoint themselves, basing their support for the sovereignty 
principle on the idea of the “morality of states”. On this view, which can be dated 
back to Hobbes, only a social contract can make moral action possible; and social 
and world-class windbag). This theory was, however, disproved by the war in Kosovo: the NATO 
bombing took place despite the presence of a McDonald’s in Belgrade.  
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contracts only exist at the state level. Therefore states have a moral duty to 
preserve their own existence above all else. Modern-day adherents of this thesis 
tend to adopt a ulilitarian position, arguing that the state is the only real common 
value in international politics, and that “experience suggests that the morality of 
states does not result in any greater hardship to people than the international 
moralities which have been propounded during this century.”28 Liberals attack 
these arguments as being self-contradictory- attempting to defend on moral 
grounds the rejection of moral standards- or incoherent. Attempting to defend state 
sovereignty on the grounds of the ‘morality of states’ runs up against the obvious 
problem of how this applies to those states where the government flouts every 
conceivable moral code. Are such states entitled to sovereignty? If they are not, 
this makes the realist point of view virtually indistinguishable from the liberal one; 
and if they are, the whole idea of the state as a moral entity would seem to 
collapse.  
      The other main line of attack on the liberal ethical tradition has come from 
those who see liberal values as culturally specific and non-applicable to societies 
outside the West. In the field of international relations theory, this argument is 
reflected in the debate between liberal ‘cosmopolitans’, who argue that ethical 
principles must apply to all human beings equally, and ‘communitarians’, who 
“argue that the category ‘human’ is meaningless and that concrete categories such 
as ‘liberal’, ‘Muslim’, ‘American’ or ‘Slavic’ have far more content and should 
                                                 
28
 C. Thomas, ‘The Pragmatic Case Against Intervention’, in Forbes & Hoffman op.cit. p.92 
 - 18 -
thus be accorded ethical superiority.”29 On this argument, the universalisation of 
liberal values is either undesirable- since there is no means of knowing a priori that 
ely accept 
                                                
liberal values are superior to all other traditions30- or else simply unenforceable.  
      Many liberals accept, at least in some measure, that, in Sutch’s words, “there is 
nothing in the logic of ethical theory that requires that we ignore the existent 
plurality of political and ethical value-systems”31, and that, given this plurality, a 
cosmopolitan liberal utopia is in any case impossible in the international system as 
it currently stands. Hence liberal theorists have expended considerable effort in 
producing an ethical project for international relations that would be acceptable to- 
to use Rawls’s term- “reasonable non-liberal peoples”. This is done by reducing 
the liberal list of human rights to a minimalist set of basic rights which can be seen 
as genuinely universal while still being meaningful- that is, they are “sufficiently 
extensive to ensure that their universal realisation would safeguard a basic level of 
decency in all societies; and they are sufficiently restricted so ensure that they do 
not upset national and cultural sensibilities.”32 Rawls expends considerable effort 
in showing how what he calls a “decent hierarchical society”33 would fre
a system of international law in which such basic rights were protected. 
      In recent times, liberal accounts of international ethics have tended to be 
characterised by an optimism that the liberal project is, if still far from being 
realised, at least in the process of being accepted. Perhaps historically, as 
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Hoffmann has said, “international affairs have been the nemesis of liberalism”; the 
international system has proved very resistant to reform.34 But there are signs, it is 
said, that this is changing. The increase in the number of libera democratic 
governments is itself a good thing, since this should lead to less conflict, for 
reasons stated above. But more than that, liberal optimists discern that “there has 
developed within sovereign states a realm that may now be legitimately scrutinised 
by other sovereign states.”35 That is, the cloak of sovereignty is no longer so 
opaque as to allow a state to get away with violating basic human rights without 
facing criticism, or indeed action, from other states. Just what forms this action can 
legitimately take, and how effective it is likely to be, are central questions to the 
debate over humanitarian intervention- and, as will be seen later, even liberals are 
deeply divided on these issues. But before moving on to a direct discussion of the 
question of intervention, it would be wise to say a few words about Just War 
eory. th
 
      1.2 The Justice of Injustice: Just War Theory 
Before exploring the subject of Just War theory, it should be noted that, although 
most theorists of humanitarian intervention see themselves as working within the 
Just War tradition, there are at least a few who deny the relevance of these theories 
to their work. Frost, for example, argues that “humanitarian intervention is not best 
understood as an action which fits into theories of just warfare”, since it does not 
inherently involve states. Instead, humanitarian intervention “is undertaken by 
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rights holders seeking to protect fellow rights holders”- they may use states to 
achieve this end, but such states are only acting on behalf of global civil society.36 
However, this view does not seem to be particularly convincing. Firstly, however 
much the autonomy and power of the state is being eroded in the modern world, 
states and alliances of states are still the essential actors in the instigation and 
conduct of warfare: ‘global civil society’ does not yet have an army. In any case, 
even if one accepts Frost’s contention that humanitarian warfare is conducted on 
behalf of non-state actors, there seems to be no reason why the tenets of Just War 
theory should only apply to states. Rawls, in The Law of Peoples, treats ‘peoples’ 
rather than states as the key actors in his scheme of international order, but sees no 
problem in arguing that ‘peoples’ are bound by the rules of just warfare.37 In any 
case, having made his argument, Frost then goes on to list a series of criteria for 
humanitarian intervention, which with one exception- discussed below- do not 
differ greatly from those arrived at by theorists expressly working from within the 
Just War tradition. So, for practical purposes, the distinction can be regarded as 
                                                
unimportant. 
      If the idea of a humanitarian war seems strange at first hearing, then the term 
“Just War” appears equally oxymoronic. Even if fought with the best of intentions 
and with the most advanced technology, war remains unavoidably an unjust 
activity in terms of its impact on individuals. There is no act more unjust than the 
killing of innocent people, and this occurs routinely in war; indeed, in most of the 
wars in the second half of the twentieth Century, civilian deaths far outnumbered 
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military deaths. Wells points out that the notion of the “Just War” is essentially an 
attempt to show that under some circumstances it is ‘just’ to perform immoral acts 
and to contribute to evil consequences- thus indicating an inherent contradiction.38  
     But, puzzling and possibly incoherent as it may be, the term is an ancient one; 
the idea of the ‘Just War’ was around long before International Relations was 
established as a discipline. Philosophising on the morality of conflict can be traced 
back at least as far as St. Augustine in the 6th century AD. The subject was at first 
treated as a question of religious philosophy, but it was still some 400 years ago 
that political and legal scholars first began to establish a secular version of the 
‘Just War’ doctrine. It would not be relevant here- nor is there the space available- 
to provide a narrative history of the development of Just War doctrine. However, 
since the basic tenets of the theory have remained relatively unchanged over time, 
the contributions of some of the early theorists are worth mentioning; particularly 
those of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645).Grotius removed the subject from its previous 
grounding in theology by arguing that war could not justly be made against those 
who refused to accept Christianity.39 He also established one of the basic 
principles of the doctrine- that of noncombatant immunity. He argued that 
noncombatants are almost certainly ‘innocent’ in terms of responsibility for any 
given conflict, that harming them does no good and that sparing them may be 
practically useful as it creates an appearance of humanity and compassion40 
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(evidence that the concept of perception management in war- a major and much-
remarked upon feature of the Kosovo conflict- is by no means a recent invention). 
      In the last thirty years, Just War theorising has enjoyed something of a 
renaissance, with theorists such as Michael Walzer formulating contemporary Just 
War doctrines. This development can be ascribed partly to the Vietnam War, 
which led to a huge upsurge of liberal agonising in American academic circles 
over the rights and wrongs of that particular conflict- and therefore, by extension, 
over the morality of war in general.41 Another important factor has been the rise of 
the mass media, and particularly the virtual universalisation of TV ownership in 
Western states. Whatever the imperfections of war coverage on television, and 
however sanitised and distorted the picture provided has tended to be, TV has- to 
use the usual cliché- “brought the horrors of war into people’s homes”.  Thereby it 
has produced a growth in humanitarian public sentiment, a factor of which 
governments have been forced to take note. There is of course nothing remotely 
new about governments seeking to obtain the ‘moral high ground’ in any given 
concept in order to ensure popular approval; but the message now has to be more 
sophisticated than it once was. 
      In its modern form, Just War theory has been largely secularised. Though some 
contemporary work still does come from a religious standpoint, the concept has 
been effectively adopted by liberals, so that its tenets reflect the liberal ethical 
tradition in IR. But Just War theory has from its early days faced criticism from 
those who argue that war is too inherently unjust an activity for it ever to be 
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‘justified’. Perhaps the most prominent such critic was Immanuel Kant, according 
to whom “the concept of international right becomes meaningless if interpreted as 
a right to go to war. For this would make it a right to determine what is lawful not 
by means of universally valid external laws, but by one-sided maxims backed up 
by physical force.”42 For Kant, the ultimate aim was to abolish war altogether as 
an instrument of politics. So while, on a case-by-case basis, one might reluctantly 
conclude that a particular war was either necessary or excusable, no war can ever 
be called ‘just’; and one should never attempt to legitimise concept of war in the 
way that Just War theory does. The recent renaissance of the theory has also 
provoked a Kantian backlash from scholars such as Ken Booth, who criticises Just 
Wars for, among other things, honouring and legitimising war, promoting 
militarisation and feeding self-righteousness.43 
      The other main strand of criticism has come from realists, who- reflecting the 
view  of morals as only being of instrumental importance in IR- have tended to see 
Just War theories merely as ways of cloaking the pursuit of state self-interest. 
They are “scarcely distinguishable from mere ideologies the purpose of which is to 
provide a spurious justification for almost any use of force.”44 
 
      1.2.1 The Key Tenets of Just War Theory 
Although there has unsurprisingly been considerable change and controversy over 
the detail of the theory (for example, over what exceptions there might be to the 
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principle of noncombatant immunity), the basic principles of Just War theory have 
not changed much over the centuries. The first of these is that any war, to be called 
just, must be justified twice. The first justification takes place in terms of the 
reasons the states involved have for going to war (the jus ad bellum or ‘justice of 
war’); and the second in terms of the means they use to fight the war (the jus in 
bello or ‘justice in war’).45 This dichotomy will be used in this thesis to provide a 
structure for the case study. But there will be added to these a third justification, 
the jus post bellum or justice after war, which, it will be argued, should be added 
to the usual two- at least in the case of humanitarian wars. 
 
     1.3 The Jus ad Bellum 
Just War theorists generally posit three acceptable reasons for going to war: self-
defence, response to aggression and humanitarian intervention.46 The first two are 
uncontroversial, at least in principle  (unless one rejects the whole concept of the 
state system), being just as acceptable to realists as they are to liberals. Both have 
been enshrined in the UN Charter. This project, however, deals with the third 
justification. This has always been highly controversial; because, unlike the first 
two, it involves the violation of the key organising principle of the modern 
international system: state sovereignty. 
      At around the same time that religion was losing its place at the core of Just 
War theory, the emergence of the Westphalian state system saw sovereignty 
replace theology as the organising principle of international relations. The norm- 
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in theory anyway- was now that one state should not interfere in the affairs of 
another. So, a key question for theorists became, whether there any circumstances 
under which the principle of non-intervention could be justly overridden- and if so, 
what were they? As the controversy over Kosovo illustrates, this question remains 
a central one in IR.   
 
      1.3.1 Humanitarian Intervention 
Humanitarian intervention is defined by Ian Brownlie as “the threat or use of 
armed force by a state, a belligerent community, or an international organisation, 
with the object of protecting human rights”.47 The term was first used by Edward 
Hall in 1880, though the history of the concept goes back much further.48 
‘Solidarist’ international theorists (to use Wheeler’s term) argue that “states that 
massively violate human rights should forfeit their right to be treated as legitimate 
sovereigns, thereby morally entitling other states to use force to stop the 
oppression”.49 The case for the necessity of humanitarian intervention rests on the 
moral idea that extreme abuse of human rights creates a right- or even, perhaps, a 
duty- of response from the international community, and that, if necessary, states 
must be prepared to back up their values with military force. In the simplest and 
most common formation of the argument, one cannot ‘do nothing’ when faced 
with suffering which it is within one’s power to alleviate.50 
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      A distinction should be made here between ‘humanitarian intervention’, which 
can encompass a whole range of operations, including quite small-scale ones, 
which seek to use- or in some cases,  merely threaten to use- military force in 
some form for a humanitarian end; and ‘humanitarian war’, which involves the 
full-scale application of military might. The latter is the strongest form of the 
former, and thus its most problematic and controversial formulation- which is why 
it is of particular interest as a phenomenon. 
      Theorists disagree over some of the details of what should constitute a 
legitimate humanitarian intervention. However, the various theoretical works on 
this concept show many elements of commonality. In general, when dealing with 
the basic criteria for a legitimate humanitarian intervention, the various works in 
this area produce lists that are very similar, although there are wide differences 
over how some of these criteria are to be interpreted. Therefore, the aim of the 
following section is to produce a composite list of criteria for a legitimate 
humanitarian intervention, drawn from a number of different sources, which would 
be generally accepted by most theorists in this area. Where there is a significant 
degree of disagreement, this will be noted. 
     As would be expected, the established criteria for a legitimate humanitarian war 
are influenced by the Just War tradition, and contain many elements that are 
common also to ‘Just Wars’ fought in self-defence or in response to aggression 
(for example, the requirement for force to be a ‘last resort’). There are some 
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features, however, that are unique to the theory of humanitarian war; for example, 
a state fighting a war in self-defence is not required to seek wide international 
backing before it does so, but theorists often make this a requirement for 
humanitarian wars. 
     The first generally-accepted criterion is that intervention should be restricted to 
cases of particularly extreme abuse of human rights- in Walzer’s phrase, acts “that 
shock the moral conscience of mankind”.51 These would include such acts as 
genocide, state-sponsored mass murder, mass population expulsions and state 
breakdown.52 Vincent advocates restricting humanitarian intervention to those 
cases where “basic rights”- those rights without which no others can be enjoyed, 
such as the right to life and to subsistence- are being denied.53 These are the 
minimal ‘basic rights’ which, as we saw earlier, liberals argue can and should be 
protected even by decent non-liberal societies. 
      This point of view is not universally accepted. Chesterman notes that some 
theorists adopt the position that intervention can be justified merely on the basis of 
the target government not being a liberal democracy. Michael Reisman, for 
example, has argued that undemocratic states have no right to sovereignty since 
“traditional concepts of sovereignty (are) being replaced by a ‘popular 
sovereignty’ vested in the individual citizens of a state.”54 Therefore intervention 
to institute or restore democracy cannot be a violation of sovereignty given that by 
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their very existence, authoritarian governments are  violating  popular 
sovereignty.55  
     However, the majority of theorists do not go this far. Given the difficulty of 
assessing which governments should be considered liberal democracies and which 
should not, a right of pro-democratic intervention would be exceptionally open to 
abuse, and could potentially allow states to go to war simply because they objected 
to the ideology of another government.56 Certainly when in the 1980s the US 
government proclaimed a right to pro-democratic intervention under the ‘Reagan 
doctrine’, it was applied in a highly selective fashion, being directed against 
“Soviet-supported” governments such as Grenada but not against right-wing 
dictatorships.57 To further illustrate the slipperiness of the idea, the Reagan 
administration argued that it was promoting democracy in its proxy war against the 
Sandinista government in Nicaragua: a government which some who did not share 
Reagan’s ideological position regarded as closer to being a democracy than many 
of the US’s Latin American allies. So, as it is a minority position among theorists, 
arguments over the right to pro-democratic intervention will not be addressed at 
great length in this thesis. 
     Some who adopt the more restrictive position on when intervention can be 
legitimate have argued that humanitarian intervention should be treated as an 
exception, reserved for rare cases, and thus outside the ordinary rules and 
conventions of international law.58 However, abuses of human rights- even 
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extreme abuses- are depressingly common, so common in some countries as “to 
seem almost like facts of nature”59- so even on the most restrictive basis, there are 
likely to be  many possible cases where humanitarian intervention potentially 
could be justified. Clearly, then, it is not enough to avoid the issue by regarding 
humanitarian intervention as somehow outside ordinary custom and calculation. 
Some criteria for judging intervention need to be found. 
      The idea that force can only be used as a “last resort” is a widely accepted 
criterion for all Just Wars, and thus also occurs in lists of criteria for humanitarian 
intervention. The idea has been criticised, since it can never be known for certain 
that the “last resort” has been reached- there is always the possibility, extremely 
remote as it may be in some cases, that more negotiation might bring results. 
Walzer states that “the notion of lastness is cautionary” rather than to be taken 
absolutely literally- war is said to be the last resort because of the “unpredictable, 
unexpected, unintended and unavoidable horrors it regularly brings”- therefore one 
should always be warned to look hard for alternatives before waging it.60 Waiting 
for the “last resort” can mean that intervention does not take place until it is too 
late to stop the abuses. This leads to extremely difficult questions over the 
circumstances in which it might be possible to justify pre-emptive intervention. 
Wheeler suggests that it is “too demanding to require politicians to exhaust all 
peaceful remedies: rather, what is required is that they are confident that they have 
explored all avenues that are likely to prove successful in stopping the violence.”61 
This, unfortunately, is a rather weak formulation, given that politicians who for 
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their own reasons desire war with another state may perhaps persuade themselves 
that all avenues have been explored when in fact they have not been. Perhaps the 
first ‘they’ in Wheeler’s formulation should be changed to a “we”. 
      One theoretical dissident should be mentioned here. In place of the ‘last resort’ 
criterion, Mervyn Frost- who, as has been mentioned, professes to work from 
outside the ‘Just War’ tradition- makes the argument that, in any given case, “what 
kind of intervention would be justified depends of the severity of the infringements 
of basic rights”. Severe infringements justify a military response; lesser violations 
would justify lighter forms of intervention such as sanctions.62 This argument is 
strange since there have certainly been instances of even the most severely abusive 
governments being overthrown or persuaded to change their ways without military 
intervention- apartheid South Africa would be one obvious example. It would 
seem very difficult to justify war, even in the presence of extreme abuses of basic 
rights, where a real possibility exists that these abuses can be ended by peaceful 
means. Equally it is possible to imagine a case of a government which is only 
committing moderate abuses, but which is so firmly entrenched in power and so 
resistant to persuasion that there might be no means other than war of improving 
the situation. Therefore Frost’s criterion does not seem to stand up. 
      It is also sometimes argued that the motives of the intervening power or 
powers must be humanitarian rather than self-interested. The International Law 
Association, when drafting a protocol for judging the legality of armed 
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intervention, included a requirement that the “primary goal” be humanitarian.63 
This controversy relates to the divide in ethical theory between consequentialists, 
who argue that the moral acceptability of an action should be judged mainly in 
terms of its consequences, and deontologists (such as Kant) who argue that 
motives are more important. (This is not necessarily an absolute divide. Under 
some circumstances one might argue that motives are important because they tend 
to have a strong impact on outcomes. This may well be true of humanitarian 
intervention, particularly as with respect to the jus post bellum- as we will see in 
later chapters.) 
     Liberalism has historically tended to straddle both sides of the divide64, but 
theorists of humanitarian intervention theorists tend to adopt the consequentialist 
view, arguing that whether an intervention leads to an acceptably humanitarian 
outcome is more important than the motives, humanitarian or otherwise, of those 
who conducted it. One suspects that this is largely because there are virtually no 
historical examples of genuinely non-self-interested intervention taking place. 
Even in the historical examples most often cited as the ‘best cases’ of 
humanitarian intervention, the intervening government has always had some self-
interested motive for its actions. For example, India’s intervention in Bangladesh 
(then East Pakistan) in 1971 was conducted with the aim of weakening Pakistan as 
well as of helping the Bangladeshis.65 Walzer attempts to solve this problem by 
stating that intervention must take place in order to allow the oppressed to achieve 
their purpose (ie the intervening power must not claim any prerogative over them 
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once hostilities have ceased)66; Ramsbotham and Woodhouse by stating that the 
interests of the intervenors must at least not be incompatible with the humanitarian 
purpose.67 
      A fourth condition might be loosely termed ‘proportionality’. This term can 
encompass a number of different concepts. It is often interpreted as a requirement 
for a reasonable expectation that the intervention will produce a “surplus of good 
over harm”. That is, that the damage caused by the use of force will probably be 
less than the gravity of the human rights violations that would have occurred if 
intervention had not taken place.68 This criterion has been criticised for being 
excessively uncertain, as there are so many imponderables involved that, as 
Wheeler admits, “even if intervention produces a surplus of good over harm, it 
will never be known whether non-violent alternatives might have achieved the 
same result at less cost.”69 No-one can be sure in advance that more lives will be 
saved that will be lost. 
      ‘Proportionality’, though it is listed among the accepted criteria for the jus ad 
bellum in a humanitarian war, is also used to refer to concepts that have more to do 
with the jus in bello and the jus post bellum, such as the idea that a humanitarian 
intervention must be limited in purpose, for example merely to rescuing the 
victims of oppression, not to imposing a long-term settlement.  
      Another criterion which is usually taken to apply to ‘Just Wars’ in general is 
that of “reasonable expectation of victory”. This is largely self-explanatory: 
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decisionmakers must believe (and, presumably, must be able to persuade others) 
that the use of force is likely to produce a humanitarian outcome. 
      The final main criterion which is frequently mentioned in the literature is that 
of “due authority”. A humanitarian intervention should win international support, 
or at least acquiescence- and, ideally, should gain authorisation from the UN 
Security Council. Unilateral intervention is permitted, if at all, only if the Council 
is for some reason unable or unwilling to act.70 If UN authorisation cannot be 
obtained, then it is preferable for an intervention to be undertaken by a regional 
organisation rather than a single power. This requirement for international support, 
it is argued, should help to keep a single state from abusing the concept of 
humanitarian intervention for its own ends; although a problem arises if a 
superpower is able to browbeat its allies into offering support against their better 
judgement. 
      Some other, more minor, conditions are added by individual theorists. Frost, 
for example, adds requirements that intervening powers should avoid 
propagandising, and that "care should be taken not to label the entire people or 
ethnic groups as the enemy, but only specific, named people". This is because it is, 
he argues, political leaders of 'outlaw states' who are responsible for human rights 
violations, not ordinary civilians.71 These leaders and their henchmen are the ones 
who should be demonised. 
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      1.3.2 Critics of Humanitarian Intervention 
The concept of humanitarian intervention remains a highly controversial one. 
Three main lines of criticism of the concept can be discerned: communitarian 
criticism, realist criticism and criticism from within the liberal tradition. 
      The communitarian view of international relations rejects the concept of 
universal human rights, believing the human rights tradition to be purely Western 
in origin and application; this, for obvious reasons, leads directly to a rejection of 
the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. This critique is related to realism in 
that both question ideas of moral universalism. For reasons already stated, this 
project will not attempt to deal in depth with this particular line of critique. 
      Realist critics argue that allowing the right of humanitarian intervention erodes 
the fundamental principle of non-intervention, which, they argue, “has not served 
badly as an ordering principle of international relations.”72 Although adhering to 
non-intervention means that at times serious abuses of human rights must be left 
unpunished, the principle at least helps to limit the number of wars and ensures 
respect for different societies. Hedley Bull writes that “the basic compact of 
coexistence between states, expressed in the exchange of recognition of sovereign 
jurisdictions, implies a conspiracy of silence entered into by governments about 
the rights and duties of their respective citizens”- therefore ideas of universal 
human rights are subversive of this compact if any attempt is made to enforce 
them.73 From this point of view, realism- which is often caricatured as the doctrine 
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of war, amorally justifying the use of state power- becomes instead the doctrine of 
peace, seeking to limit the legitimate use of military force to cases of self-defence. 
Liberals, popularly regarded as seekers of peace, instead stand accused of eroding 
legal and doctrinal safeguards against the use of force, and thereby making war 
more likely. 
     As we have seen, realist international relations theory suggests that foreign 
policy is driven more by  national interest and power calculations rather than by 
ethical concerns. Thus, from this point of view, there can be little utility in 
granting a 'right' of humanitarian intervention, since states would only rarely, if 
ever, choose to exercise such a right in good faith. As F.E. Smith put it: “In theory 
no doubt it is regrettable that international law should prohibit... the suppression of 
outrage, but in practice the number of national Don Quixotes is not found to be 
considerable.”74 
      The concept, it is argued, is merely likely to be abused by powerful states 
using it to serve their own ends. It clearly has been abused in the past: some of the 
most blatant acts of aggression in history have been justified on humanitarian 
grounds, Hitler’s occupation of Bohemia and Moravia (ostensibly an intervention 
to protect the rights of the Sudeten Germans from “assaults on life and liberty” by 
the “intolerable terroristic regime of Czechoslovakia”)75 being the most famous 
example. More recently, the war in Iraq has been widely cited as a case of the 
concept being abused. Humanitarian grounds formed only a part of the 
justification given at the time of the invasion, but have been more frequently cited 
                                                 
74
 Smith cit. in Chesterman op.cit. p.38 
75
 Ibid p.26 
 - 36 -
since as the other justifications for the war have collapsed. Some theorists (eg 
Michael Ignatieff) did view Iraq as a legitimate humanitarian war, but probably the 
majority view, even at the time of the invasion, was that this was not the case, 
since, though the Hussein regime was undeniably brutal, there was no imminent or 
ongoing humanitarian crisis in Iraq in 2003.76 Walzer states that the Iraq war was 
unjustified as a humanitarian intervention since the regime’s most serious crimes 
had occurred more than a decade before the invasion, and the Kurds- who had 
been the main targets of the massacres of the 1980s and early 1990s- had already 
been fairly well protected by the enforcement of no-fly zones.77   Kenneth Roth, 
the director of Human Rights Watch, warned in 2004 that the war in Iraq could 
taint calls for humanitarian war in the future.78    
      Chesterman states that that seeking to give states a right of humanitarian 
intervention addresses the wrong problem because it suggests that states are too 
reluctant to intervene, when in fact they are only too willing to intervene on all 
kinds of dubious bases. Louis Henkin puts the core of the ‘realist’ case against 
humanitarian intervention in succinct fashion when he states that: “pressures 
eroding the prohibition on the use of force are deplorable... even ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ can too readily be used as the occasion or pretext for aggression. 
Violations of human rights are indeed all too common, and if it were permissible 
to remedy them by external use of force, there would be no law to forbid the use of 
force by almost any state against any other.” From this Henkin concludes that 
humanitarian intervention “should be sharply limited to actions the purpose of 
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which is unambiguous and limited, for example, to release hostages or execute 
other emergency evacuations.”79 It could be added that when such operations have 
been conducted- at least when involving citizens of the intervening state, as is 
usually the case- they have tended to be considered as justified under the right to 
self-defence granted by the UN Charter, rather than as cases of humanitarian 
intervention. 
      Those first two schools of criticism clearly involve non-liberal assumptions 
about international ethics. However, many liberals, who accept the importance of 
human rights and see no problem in principle with placing moral values above the 
rule of non-intervention, have still nevertheless had serious doubts about- or 
rejected outright- the legitimacy of the idea of forceful humanitarian intervention. 
There are again three main lines of criticism from within the liberal tradition. The 
first involves the view that humanitarian intervention is unacceptable in principle 
since it denies to a people the right of self-determination; the second argues that 
humanitarian intervention is undesirable on pragmatic grounds, since, however 
well-intentioned such interventions might be, they are usually counterproductive in 
their effects; and the third consists of the argument that military force is too 
destructive and undiscriminating an instrument to be legitimately used to further 
humanitarian ends. 
       The theorist most often cited with regard to the first line of criticism 
mentioned above is indeed a renowned liberal: John Stuart Mill. Mill argued that 
intervention was necessarily wrong since it negated the right to self-determination, 
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which he defined as the right of a people “to become free by their own efforts”.80 
Kant adopts a similar position in his Fifth Principle for Perpetual Peace when he 
says that intervening in an internal conflict is “a violation of the rights of an 
independent people which is merely struggling with its internal ills.”81 
      Mill's argument- which is based on the idea that political freedom depends on 
the existence of individual virtue and which seems to imply that those who suffer 
violation of their rights bring it upon themselves through their own weakness- 
sounds excessively harsh to modern ears. But we will see later in this project that 
there is a serious critique of humanitarian intervention to be made on the grounds 
that it removes incentives for local groups to negotiate a solution to a conflict by 
themselves, and may indeed provide encouragement for representatives of the 
perceived ‘victims’ in a conflict to escalate it in order to provoke outside 
intervention. It is also the case that humanitarian intervention involves the 
imposition of an artificial conclusion to a conflict by outsiders who may or may 
not have a clear idea of the hows and whys of that conflict. The humanitarian 
rhetoric of political leaders and journalists- and, sometimes, of academic theorists- 
tends to label one side in a conflict as ‘victims’ and the other as ‘villains’, which 
may not always reflect the true situation.  
      Some other liberals criticise humanitarian intervention on pragmatic grounds, 
arguing that although intervention by force to protect human rights may be an 
attractive idea to those who wish to salve their consciences, it is unlikely to do 
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much good in the long term. This critique has a long history: in 1854, Bright, 
speaking of British foreign policy, argued that “the past events of our history have 
taught us that the intervention of this country in European wars is not only 
unnecessary, but calamitous....We have left Europe at least as much in chains as 
before a single effort was made to rescue her from tyranny.”82  Among 
contemporary theorists, Booth argues that “the desire to ‘do something’ has to be 
tempered by the knowledge that not only may it not be possible to ‘solve’ a 
historic military conflict by a short and dramatic military intervention, but that it 
may well make matters worse”.83 Intervention by outsiders cannot by itself address 
the underlying causes of a conflict; it most, it can deal with the immediate 
symptoms and provide a better environment for longer-term attempts to deal with 
the causes. Even that cannot be relied upon. By destroying infrastructure and 
exacerbating divisions between warring groups, military intervention in an internal 
conflict may only serve to further stoke mutual hatred. This is one reason why, as 
stated above, some humanitarian intervention theorists make it a condition of a 
legitimate intervention that there should be no demonisation of entire peoples, but 
only of individuals.84 However, critics argue that, in the heated atmosphere of war, 
such conditions are unlikely to be fulfilled. Even if governments are careful, as is 
usually the case nowadays, to say that their argument is with the leader of the 
offending state rather than with his people, media commentators often are not so 
scrupulous. 
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      A related potential danger is that excessive moral certainty may cause states to 
rush to war in cases where peaceful methods might still have borne fruit. In an 
article decrying “the new craze for humanitarian intervention”, Jonathan Steele 
argues that “if a conflict is projected as a struggle against evildoers, then there is 
not a moment to lose. Delay itself becomes a form of moral appeasement and 
wickedness.”85                                             
      Critics can provide many examples of the sad effects of misplaced moralism in 
international relations. One of the most compelling would be that of the Versailles 
Conference, where the Allied powers- led by Woodrow Wilson, a convinced 
liberal interventionist- decided that Germany bore the moral guilt for causing the 
First World War and that she should therefore be punished.86 Even a seemingly 
successful intervention may in fact only produce a short-term settlement, while the 
resentments that it creates may serve to further reduce the prospect of a long-term 
solution- mutual ethnic hatreds may be inflamed, or the ‘liberated’ population may 
become resentful at being left dependent on those who ‘saved’ them. Moreover, it 
is argued, interventions promote self-righteousness in the states that conduct them. 
Once a state has convinced itself that its own foreign policy is impeccably moral, 
it will no longer be able to see that other states may have decent and defensible 
reasons for opposing it. Morgenthau warned in the 1950s of how this attitude had 
come to infect US foreign policy: “Since American foreign policy is by definition 
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selfless and moral, the foreign policies of nations opposing it are by definition 
selfish and immoral.”87 
      Indeed, if one accepts Booth's argument that Just Wars legitimise war and 
promote militarisation, the effects may be even more wide-ranging. A 
humanitarian war which is perceived as having been successful may well 
encourage states to pursue more such wars- and, perhaps, to resort to force with 
less reluctance than before. To quote A.J. Muste: “The problem after a war is with 
the victor. He thinks he has just proved that war and violence pay.”88  
      The final line of critique of which we shall treat in this chapter concerns the 
nature of force itself. Critics such as Ken Booth and Richard Falk argue that 
military force can never (or hardly ever) be an appropriate instrument for 
achieving humanitarian objectives; it is too destructive and unjust in its effects. 
Even modern precision weapons do not make it possible to fight a ‘clean’ war; 
and, however good the intentions of the intentions of the intervenors, the one thing 
that can be said with near-certainty before an intervention begins is that a 
considerable number of innocent civilians will end up dead. This might be 
acceptable if the number of innocent deaths is significantly less than would have 
occurred without an intervention, distasteful as such counting games are; but such 
things cannot be known in advance, and are often virtually impossible to judge 
even in retrospect. On top of this, ‘humane’ critics argue, if an intervention is not 
immediately successful, the powers involved will likely be forced to turn to 
harsher and harsher tactics until they end up closely resembling their supposedly 
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evil opponents. The ultimate tyranny in war, says Walzer, is that resistors of 
aggression are forced to imitate, and perhaps even to exceed, the brutality of the 
aggressor in order to win. General Sherman made this point with stark simplicity 
when he said that “war is hell.”89 If this is so, then the inherent contradiction in the 
phrase ‘humanitarian war’ is too deep to be reconciled. 
      And yet despite this, critics argue, the military option is dangerously seductive. 
It seems to provide a neat and dramatic solution to humanitarian crises, free from 
the lengthy and complex negotiations, possibly involving messy compromises, that 
are associated with attempts to find diplomatic solutions. Steele argues that, 
particularly in the modern TV age, “political negotiations are…inherently dull, if 
not irrelevant, compared to the visual drama of war.”90 
      Another element of this critique has to do with the principle of impartiality that 
has traditionally governed the work of those involved in humanitarian aid. For 
example, the founding principles of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
include impartiality (“It (the ICRC) makes no discrimination as to nationality, 
race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavours only to relieve 
suffering”) and neutrality (the ICRC “may not take sides in hostilities” under any 
circumstances).91  Humanitarian wars, some argue, tend to violate these principles 
in the manner in which they are justified and fought. Governments, says former 
aid worker Tony Vaux, “are much less concerned than aid agencies about 
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impartiality. They intervene, on one hand, and demonise on the other…. 
Politicians can only cope with situations where there is a winner and a loser, a 
right and a wrong”.92 The result is that, in humanitarian wars- as we have seen- 
outsiders arbitrarily divide up populations into those who are seen as deserving 
help and those seen as being responsible, actively or tacitly, for atrocities, and  
help is handed out according to ethnicity rather than need. Humanitarian crises are 
rarely so morally simple. Pictet says of the Red Cross principles that “ a man who 
follows this arduous path (of neutrality) will discover that it is rare in a 
controversy to find that one party is completely right and the other is completely 
wrong. He will sense the futility of the reasons commonly invoked to launch one 
nation into war against another. In this respect it is reasonable to say that neutrality 
constitutes a first step towards peace.”93 
 
      1.4 The Jus in Bello 
The in bello aspect of ‘Just War’ has often been ignored by humanitarian 
intervention theorists. Roberts states that “in the long history of legal debates 
about humanitarian intervention, there has been a consistent failure to address 
directly the question of the methods used in such interventions.”94 And yet 
humanitarian interventions, because of their declared moral purpose, should surely 
be expected to abide by even more stringent in bello criteria than other types of 
war. A state that is fighting to defend its very existence may be permitted the odd 
divergence from pure chivalry. Indeed, this is expressly permitted in secular Just 
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War doctrines by the so-called ‘supreme emergency exemption’, which entitles a 
state to suspend the usual ban on direct attacks on civilians if it is facing an 
imminent danger of “an unusual and horrifying” kind.95 A state which is fighting 
“for principles and values” should- even if only for reasons of PR- be sure that its 
methods don't start to look indistinguishable from those of its perfidious opponent.  
     The concept of jus in bello centres around the idea that “just wars are limited 
wars”.96 Its most important principle is that of noncombatant immunity. Soldiers 
forfeit their rights to life and liberty in war simply by being soldiers (though this 
stipulation can lead to difficult dilemmas if the soldiers are conscripts). But 
civilians retain their rights, and the belligerent forces are obliged to take at least 
some care not to harm them- even if this involves increasing the risks of casualties 
among their own soldiers.97 Attacks on purely civilian targets are thus prohibited. 
      There are differing schools of thought over the extent to which noncombatant 
immunity should apply. The doctrine of ‘double effect’ holds that harm to civilians 
is permissible as long as it occurs only as an unintended consequence of an 
otherwise acceptable military action, pursued with good intentions- and as long as 
the action is sufficiently effective to compensate for the harm done. However, 
while ‘double effect’ was easy enough to apply in the Middle Ages, when weapon 
technology was primitive, wars were fought by sieges and pitched ground battles 
and civilians could remain largely as spectators unless military leaders specifically 
                                                                                                                                      
94
 Roberts cit. in Wheeler op.cit. p.36 
95
 Walzer (1992) op.cit. pp.251-3 
96
 Ibid p.xvii 
97
 Ibid p.151 
 - 45 -
chose to harm them, it is highly problematic when applied to today's conflicts.98 
When innocent lives are lost due to, for example, a ‘smart’ missile going astray, 
this is usually described by those who are waging the war as being no more than 
an unfortunate mistake, since there was no intention to harm civilians. But the 
military decisionmakers were well aware beforehand that such events do occur, 
but still chose to launch the raid; so can they be absolved completely of guilt? In 
an attempt to resolve this problem, Walzer adds the condition that the perpetrator 
seeks to minimise such unintended effects as far as possible, even to the extent of 
“accepting costs to himself.”99 Whether perpetrators will in practice actually be 
willing to do this is another matter; and if the realist conception of state behaviour 
is even partially correct it would seem logical to expect that those fighting wars 
will be less willing to accept costs to themselves if they are fighting for morals 
rather than concrete interests. 
      The incomplete nature of noncombatant immunity is one factor which leads 
critics to reject the idea of describing a war as ‘just’. Critics also commonly make 
the argument that the very idea of a just war negates the concept of jus in bello. 
Just wars are moral crusades, and as such have to be won at any cost: thus they 
tend to be needlessly extended in the search for total victory.100 The ‘forces of 
good’ may, in their search for victory, adopt methods little different from those of 
the ‘forces of evil’: but they will justify every atrocity by pointing out that they are 
fighting for a noble cause. The temptation may arise to excuse the inflicting of 
civilian casualties by the use of arguments of collective guilt, demonising whole 
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populations because of the actions of their leaders. Something like this did in fact 
occur during the intervention in Kosovo. Politicians or official spokesmen always 
insisted that NATO’s argument was with Milosevic, not the population of Serbia; 
but some media pundits described the Serbs as ‘Milosevic’s Willing 
Executioners’, stating that their failure to protest strongly enough against the 
atrocities committed by the government forces made them collectively guilty- and 
therefore, by inference, unworthy of full protection as civilians.101  Referring to the 
application of just war doctrines to nuclear deterrence, Wells concludes that “today 
it is hard to imagine what an unjustly fought war would look like that is not 
already exhibited in the just variety....Today the just war justifies Armageddon if 
our hearts be pure, and that is to justify too much.”102 
 
      1.5 The Jus Post Bellum 
The question of what should happen after a war has taken place is not explicitly 
addressed in the mainstream tradition of Just War theory. This is presumably 
partly because the types of war that have historically been most likely to be 
regarded as ‘just’- those which are fought in self-defence or in response to 
aggression- have as their central aim a restoration of the status quo ante before the 
specific disturbance to the balance of power took place. The aggressor is hopefully 
defeated, and then things- at least in theory- return to normal.103 
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      In practice this is not entirely true. Those fighting wars justified on the grounds 
of self-defence or  response to aggression do at times judge it necessary- in order 
to ensure that the aggression does not recur- to conduct a military occupation of 
the territory of the aggressor state once that state has been defeated. That 
occupation may be for a prolonged period. In the case most often regarded as a 
paradigmatic example of a Just War- World War II- Germany and Japan were both 
occupied by the Allied powers for some years afterwards, and at the behest of the 
Allies drastic changes were made in the political systems of both countries. 
However, despite such cases, the idea of the status quo ante has continued to 
exercise a hold on theoretical accounts of Just War. 
      This kind of thinking feeds through into the widely-espoused idea- noted 
above in the section on the jus ad bellum criterion of ‘proportionality’- that 
humanitarian interventions should be short-term, focused on achieving a specific 
and limited objective and not on imposing any long-term settlement. This 
produces, for example, Arend and Beck’s requirement that a humanitarian 
intervention must involve no regime change and no prolonged military presence 
by the intervening state or states in the target state.104 Frost shares this view, 
describing humanitarian intervention as “short-term and instrumental”, adding that 
ideas of “victory” and “the enemy” therefore are out of place in such 
circumstances.105 Some consider this formation to be excessively restrictive, and 
would allow regime change and occupation in extreme circumstances; but at least 
at present, this remains a minority view. 
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      The idea of humanitarian intervention as short-term and limited in its 
objectives may well be tenable in cases where the intervention itself is small-scale 
and limited and designed to achieve a very specific goal. But when it is applied to 
operations involving the full-scale use of military might- as has increasingly been 
the case in recent years- some serious problems arise. Firstly, even if a 
humanitarian war is successful in achieving its stated objectives, along the way it 
will inevitably cause serious destruction, not only in terms of civilian casualties 
but in terms of damage to the infrastructure and economy of the area in which the 
military action takes place. The intervenors, however, do not suffer the 
consequences of their actions: these are borne by the people of the target state. 
Kennan concludes from this that when “we” (referring to the US government) 
proclaim our right to launch a humanitarian war against another state, “we are 
demanding, in efect, a species of veto power over those of their practices that we 
dislike, while denying responsibility for whatever may flow from the acceptance 
of our demands.”106 Surely, then, intervening powers must at the very least bear 
responsibility for providing the money to repair whatever damage they have 
inflicted in the course of the fighting.  
     Then there is the question of the damage that will have been inflicted by the 
perpetrators of the human rights abuses that prompted the war. Particularly since, 
more often than not, the most severe cases of human rights abuse occur in states 
that are economically weak (and such states tend to be the targets of humanitarian 
wars, since an authoritarian but strong state- such as, say, modern China- makes 
too difficult an enemy), the situation for the population of a humanitarian warzone 
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in the aftermath of the conflict is unlikely to be very good. If, say, a group of 
people are liberated from a brutal dictatorship but are then left to fend for 
themselves in a state that has had its infrastructure ravaged by war and so is 
completely unable to support itself economically, this would not seem to be a 
legitimate conclusion to a war fought on the grounds of promoting human rights. 
Classical liberals who believe in the ‘democratic peace’ thesis may hope that 
merely setting up elected governments  and encouraging free-market reforms in 
post-conflict states should automatically lead those states towards peace and 
prosperity; but as Paris has pointed out, the evidence of history contradicts this.107 
Liberalising economic reforms, though they may be desirable in the long run 
(depending on which school of economic theory one favours), can undoubtedly 
have serious destabilising effects in the short run. The experience of 1980s 
Yugoslavia, where market reforms set the separate republics competing against 
each other for diminishing resources, hence contributing to the situation that 
caused the eventual breakup of the federation, illustrates this.108 Equally, elections, 
when held in the inflamed and unstable atmosphere that usually exists in the 
aftermath of a war- perhaps with members of the  ‘victorious’ group hoping for 
revenge while the defeated nurse their grievances- can also be destabilising. In 
such an atmosphere, moderate peace-loving politicians are unlikely to flourish.109  
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     Even if one takes an extremely restrictive view of human rights as consisting 
purely of the classic liberal ‘negative freedoms’- freedom of speech, freedom of 
religion, etc- these freedoms are unlikely to prove sustainable in a state that has 
been ravaged by war unless some serious rebuilding work is undertaken. In the 
absence of such work, the most likely result of the war will be a classic ‘failed 
state’ of the Somalia variety- not the sort of outcome that theorists of humanitarian 
war would wish for.  
      Equally, if a humanitarian war is successful in averting an immediate crisis, 
but fighting then resumes- whether between the same set of actors or different 
ones- the moment the outside forces leave, it is hard to argue that this war has been 
successful. 
      There is also a purely empirical reason for discarding the conventional view of 
humanitarian wars as “short-term and instrumental”. While this conception 
reflected quite well the nature of such wars in the past (such as India’s invasion of 
East Pakistan/ Bangladesh in 1970, when all troops were withdrawn soon after the 
intervention ended) it is no longer factually accurate in the post-Cold War world. 
All of the commonly-cited cases of humanitarian war occurring since the end of 
the Cold War have been followed by a period of military occupation of the target 
state or province, accompanied by a long-term effort to create a stable liberal 
democratic government- and a liberal free-market economy- in the area concerned. 
The only possible exception to this is the case of the intervention in Somalia, 
where military occupation was abruptly terminated- through perceived political 
necessity, rather than by choice- before the post-conflict stage could really begin. 
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In the other cases- Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq- the affected areas are still occupied 
by foreign troops, and still partially governed by international authorities, up to the 
time of writing. 
      The above suggests the need for some kind of concept of jus post bellum- to 
define the responsibilities that humanitarian warriors should bear after military 
intervention has ended, and to set out the nature of a just long-term settlement in a 
case of humanitarian war. As yet few theorists have made any specific attempt to 
explore this area, but having posited the idea of jus post bellum we might then 
construct a minimalist position, involving a minimal understanding of justice, and 
a maximalist (or ‘substantive justice’) postion. The minimalist position would 
restrict the obligations of intervening states merely to seeing that war damage is 
repaired and providing sufficient security to ensure that conflict does not break out 
again. The maximalist position would give intervenors the duty- in cases where 
this is necessary- to occupy and to perform all actions of government until such 
time as stable liberal democratic governments have been installed and are ready to 
take power in the state or states where the war has taken place; and in cases where 
intervention has occurred in a civil war or a territorial dispute, to facilitate 
negotiations for, or if necessary to impose, a sustainable final settlement on the 
issues that have caused the conflict. These are general rules only. Exceptions 
would have to be made in cases where a humanitarian war is conducted by a poor 
country that does not possess the resources for the prolonged occupation of 
another state; in such cases, if the war has received international approval, 
reconstruction might become an international responsibility. 
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      It is difficult- and possibly unwise- to draw up a general list of criteria for the 
jus post bellum, since situations in post-conflict states may differ widely, and thus 
the optimum policies to be followed for ensuring a just outcome will also differ. 
At one extreme, there might be a case of a humanitarian war which is conducted to 
depose an oppressive regime in a state which has few or no significant internal 
ethnic cleavages and no substantial core of support for the displaced regime, and 
hence little potential for internal conflict in the aftermath of the intervention. In 
such a case, it would almost certainly be best for intervening powers to withdraw 
troops quickly and for their postwar role to be confined to providing economic aid. 
At the other extreme, where intervention occurs in a civil war- as been the case 
with most interventions in recent times, it may end the immediate conflict but it 
cannot by itself deal with whatever underlying grievances have sparked that 
conflict- indeed, it may well increase the level of resentment that exists between 
the parties. In such a case a prolonged occupation is likely to be required to 
prevent a resumption of conflict. 
     The most obvious potential drawback with the minimalist position on the jus 
post bellum is that it does not aim at providing a permanent solution, being content 
merely with containing the problem. If there are territorial questions at stake, and 
local leaders are not able or willing to work out a settlement by themselves, then 
the area where intervention has taken place may be left in a state of limbo, which 
in the long run is unlikely to be a sustainable situation. Also, as we have said, 
humanitarian interventions tend to occur in states and regions that are very weak 
economically, and the added factor of war damage tends to produce post-conflict 
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states that are unable to support themselves without considerable outside help. 
Economic impoverishment can be a very powerful contributing factor in causing 
conflict, so there would seem to be a strong case for adding the provision of help 
for economic reconstruction to the post-conflict obligations of humanitarian 
warriors. The rest of this section will explore the maximalist position, as this is the 
one that most theorists working in this area (or at least, those of them who are 
sympathetic to the idea of humanitarian intervention) have tended to take; and the 
one which comes closer to describing the operations that have in fact occurred in 
the aftermath of recent humanitarian wars. 
      In the last few years, theorists have been beginning to address the neglect of 
the period after an intervention. The rise in interest in this question can be ascribed 
to the frustrations encountered in the aftermath of recent interventions such as 
those Kosovo and Afghanistan- and, of course, to the disastrous aftermath of the 
war in Iraq. Such events have served to point up the problems that can occur if 
states undertake a war with humanitarian overtones (I use this term since the 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were not justified solely on humanitarian 
grounds) without any clear plan for what is to happen afterwards. Indeed, a recent 
report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The 
Responsibility to Protect, calls for the “responsibility to rebuild” to be seen as an 
integral part of any intervention. “When an intervention is completed, a post-
intervention strategy is both an operational necessity and an ethical imperative.”110 
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      One theorist who has explored this area- albeit not as yet at great length- is 
Michael Walzer, who in his recent book Arguing About War puts forward two 
criteria for the jus post bellum: ‘legitimacy’ and ‘closure’. ‘Legitimacy’ involves 
the  established principles of democratic theory; ideas of self-determination, 
popular legitimacy, civil rights and the common good. Humanitarian wars should 
end with decent legitimate governments in the defeated states, with minority 
populations protected and neighbouring states secure from aggression.111 ‘Closure’ 
encompasses responsibilities on the part of those who wage humanitarian wars to 
think seriously about post-victory actions and to expend sufficient funds on 
reconstruction.112 Although Walzer does not mention this, ‘closure’ might also be 
taken to include the setting up of a judicial tribunal along the lines of those set up 
in places like South Africa and the former Yugoslavia, to ensure accountability for 
crimes committed during the period of conflict. 
      Walzer gives two models for long-lasting intervention: ‘trusteeship’, under 
which the intervening power occupies and actually rules the country it has 
invaded, holding it in trust for its occupants for an indefinite period until it judges 
that they are ready to take over, and the ‘protectorate’, under which the 
intervention brings a local group or groups to power, and then is sustained only 
defensively.113  In practice, post-intervention arrangements have tended to fall 
somewhere between these two models (for example, in the aftermath of the 
Kosovo war- as we will see later- the international authority assumed extensive 
powers over government at the provincial level, but the intervention caused a 
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power vacuum in the lower levels of government which was swiftly filled by local 
groups). Although he seems to be advocating a fairly expansive conception of the 
jus post bellum, on the question of minimal versus substantive justice Walzer 
nevertheless states that “postwar justice is probably best understood in a 
minimalist way. It is not as if victors in war have been all that successful at 
achieving the minimum.”114 
      Our doctrine of jus post bellum can be fleshed out a little more by drawing on 
some of the work that has been done in recent years on post-conflict reconstruction 
by authors such as Simon Chesterman, William Bain and Roland Paris. Works in 
this area have tended to focus on a broad spectrum of case studies of post-conflict 
societies, with societies that have just been the subject of a humanitarian war 
forming a sub-group within the field. While there are certain issues that are 
specific to the aftermath of a humanitarian war (such as the repair of damage 
directly caused by the intervention itself) that might lead a general set of jus post 
bellum criteria to differ somewhat from the criteria that might apply to 
reconstruction in a case where there has been no military intervention, some 
general ideas can still be drawn out. 
      As an example of a ‘maximalist’ position on jus post bellum, one might look at 
the work of Roland Paris, who advocates what he calls the ‘Institutionalisation 
Before Liberalisation’ approach to reconstruction in post-conflict societies. For 
“peacebuilders”, this strategy has six elements: 
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1) Wait until conditions are ripe for elections 
2) Design electoral systems that reward moderation 
3) Promote good civil society 
4) Control hate speech 
5) Adopt conflict-reducing economic policies 
6) Rebuild effective state institutions115 
 
     As can be seen, while this strategy has the aim in the long run of returning the 
government of the affected area to its inhabitants, in the short term it gives the 
international authorities (or the intervening powers) a fairly open-ended mandate 
to control the administration of the affected territory until they judge that the local 
population is able to take over (Paris states that “no time limits should be placed 
on peacebuilding missions”116).  Most specifically, Paris advocates that 
peacebuilders should delay the holding of elections to allow passions to cool, and 
that when elections are held, peacebuilders should control who is able to take part 
in them by a “carrots and sticks” approach- giving financial aid to parties that 
adopt moderate rhetoric, while banning those that “preach violence or hatred.”117  
        The most obvious problem with the maximalist position is that it is open to 
abuse by powers with an imperialist agenda, who may keep their troops in for 
longer than is necessary and seek to manipulate the composition and actions of any 
new government. (Paris does note three possible criticisms of his strategy, but 
oddly they do not include this one- he seems to take the good intentions of 
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occupying powers as a given. Perhaps this is because he deals mainly with UN-
controlled reconstruction missions from the 1980s and 90s rather than the 
essentially US-controlled missions that have been set up in the last few years.) The 
provision of economic aid, too, often proves to be an invitation to cronyism and/or 
to the imposition of an economic agenda by outsiders. Walzer attempts to deal 
with this problem by stating that “what determines the overall justice of a military 
occupation is… its political direction and the distribution of benefits it provides. If 
its steady tendency is to empower the locals and if its benefits are widely 
distributed, the occupying power can plausibly be called just.” On the other hand, 
“if power is tightly held and the procedures and motives of decision-making are 
concealed; if resources accumulated for the occupation end up in the hands of 
foreign companies and local favourites, then the occupation is unjust.  A just 
occupation costs money; it doesn’t make money.”118 
      This brings in the issue of motive. As we have seen, theorists of humanitarian 
war are reluctant to stipulate that the motives of intervening states must be purely 
altruistic because in practice this is never the case. However, leaving aside for the 
moment the question of whether truly humanitarian motives are required for the ad 
bellum and in bello aspects of a humanitarian war (we will return to this in later 
chapters), it seems certain, going by Walzer’s stipulations, that a genuine altruism 
is required for the jus post bellum. The legitimate form of occupation envisaged by 
Walzer- one that costs money rather than making it- will go directly against at 
least the short-term economic interests of the powers conducting it. Walzer states 
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that “the work of the virtuous is never finished”119; but are states likely to be 
willing in practice to bear such burdens? 
      In a wider context, we have already seen that one criticism made of the 
concept of humanitarian war is that it encourages (or assumes) feelings of moral 
superiority on the part of the intervening powers. A maximalist position on jus 
post bellum necessarily involves such an assumption of moral superiority, as it 
assumes that outside powers will be able to discern what modes and forms of 
government should be adopted in a society better than those who actually live 
there; or, as Bain puts it, “trusteeship rules out dialogue about what is thought to 
be good, right or just. A trustee acts on behalf of someone who is thought to be 
incapable of navigating the choices, dilemmas and responsibilities of ordinary 
life… Thus, trusteeship answers the call of humanity by treating states, and the 
peoples residing within them, as if they have no will of their own”.120 
      The danger of legitimising occupation is a serious one, then, even if occupiers 
abide by Walzer’s strictures. Military occupation, even if conducted with genuine 
good intentions, has serious drawbacks in any situation- it creates resentments on 
the part of the occupied, which may feed through into renewed conflict. Thus even 
in a situation where occupation may seem to be necessary due to the potential for 
conflict if the troops leave, it may in fact make things worse rather than better. 
Walzer admits that the history of protectorates and trusteeships is “not particularly 
encouraging”.121 The history he mentions is that of empire, and this is perhaps one 
reason why theorists have been reluctant to consider the question of jus post 
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bellum. If it becomes the accepted norm for humanitarian wars to be succeeded by 
prolonged military occupation, the concept begins to bear a decided resemblance 
to old-style European imperialism. Bain writes that “the idea of trusteeship cannot 
escape its imperial past, no matter how enlightened or well-intentioned it might be, 
because it belongs to a mode of conduct that is imperial by its nature (and) is 
fundamentally irreconcilable with the idea that we should respect the dignity of all 
human beings.... It is the iniquity of denying the absolute sanctity of the human 
personality that shattered the legitimacy of empire and, along with it, trusteeship in 
international society.”122 The attempts that have been made in recent times to 
rehabilitate the idea of empire- most notably by Niall Ferguson- have not as yet 
won wide enough acceptance for all liberals to be comfortable with this parallel. 
      Indeed, the whole area is a rather difficult one for liberals, as Chesterman 
notes: “state-building operations combine an unusual mix of idealism and realism: 
the idealist project that a people can be saved from themselves through education, 
economic incentives and the space to develop mature political institutions; the 
realist basis for that project in what is ultimately military occupation.”123 
      This points up the serious principled objections to military occupation that 
exist alongside the pragmatic ones. Legitimising military occupation means 
assuming that some people are incapable of fully realising their own interests and 
need to be ruled over for their own good; so denying them a full status as 
autonomous human beings. Humanitarian intervention itself may not necessarily 
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involve an assumption of moral superiority on the part of the intervenors (although 
critics argue that in practice it leads to such attitudes), since it can be argued that 
they are merely helping people to realise their freedom; but, as has been stated,  
once the jus post bellum moves beyond matters of basic reconstruction and the 
repair of war damage and adopts the concept of trusteeship, the assumption of 
moral superiority becomes a clear part of the theory. Bain argues that “the idea of 
trusteeship stands fundamentally opposed to the demands of human dignity as we 
have come to understand it in contemporary international society”, as “giving 
every man his due means that we must respect his right to seek his own salvation 
and to make mistakes in doing so.”124 If one takes the view that, for these reasons, 
even a well-intentioned military occupation is unacceptable in principle, then it is 
difficult to see how humanitarian war can be acceptable as an idea when it cannot 
be restricted to being a purely short-term matter. So the jus post bellum is at least 
potentially subversive of the concept of humanitarian war.  
      There are potential problems, too, with Walzer’s criterion of ‘legitimacy’. 
This, as we have seen, states that the end of the jus post bellum should be the 
setting up of liberal democratic governments in the states where intervention has 
taken place; but what if the people of these states freely choose to be ruled by 
governments that outsiders consider to be illiberal? Equally- and this proves to be 
very important in the case that will be the focus of this thesis- the encouragement 
or impostition of liberal democracy may come into conflict with one of Walzer’s 
other criteria- the protection of minority rights. The problem of the “tyranny of the 
majority” is a very old and familiar one to students of democratic theory, but it 
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may be expected to assume far greater proportions than usual in the aftermath of a 
humanitarian war. 
     There is also the risk of the doctrine being used to provide retrospective 
justification for wars that were not legitimate either in terms of the jus ad bellum 
or the jus in bello. Walzer equivocates slightly on this question, stating that “wars 
of conquest are unjust both ad bellum and post bellum”, but also that a misguided 
intervention may still produce a decent outcome, which would not retrospectively 
justify the war but might be just in itself. A critic might reply that it is naïve to 
expect that a state that is willing to fight a war of aggression to then be capable of 
showing genuine humanitarian concern in the aftermath of that war. 
 
      1.3 Conclusion 
The idea of the humanitarian war, then, can be seen to be a particular formulation 
of the Just War doctrine, applied to a case of humanitarian intervention that 
involves the full-scale use of military force (a more exact term, then, might be Just 
Humanitarian War). Hence it is possible to use established theory to arrive at a 
general set of criteria for such a conflict. As has already been seen, theorists 
disagree on exactly what criteria should apply, particularly with regard to the jus 
ad bellum, but a list which might win reasonably wide acceptance is detailed 
below. 
A legitimate humanitarian war, then, might be said to be: 
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1) A war which is pursued in response to a major humanitarian emergency 
(ie something considerably more severe than the 'routine' abuse of human 
rights that occurs on a daily basis in many countries; 
2) A war in which force is used only after all peaceful avenues which 
promised a genuine chance of success have been explored, and have 
proven fruitless; 
3) A war in which the motives of the intervenors, if not entirely altruistic, at 
least do not hinder the prospect of a humanitarian outcome; 
4) A proportionate war, using means which are likely to result in 
considerably less harm than would have occurred if human rights 
violations had been allowed to continue unchecked; 
5) A war with a reasonable chance of success; 
6) Hopefully, a war with a degree of international approval, and- ideally- 
authorisation from the UN Security Council. 
 
Any such war must be fought in accordance with the established doctrine of jus in 
bello, indeed the doctrine will perhaps apply more strongly than in a war fought in 
self-defence. There is as yet no generally accepted list of criteria for the jus post 
bellum, but various principles- the responsibility of humanitarian warriors to repair 
war damage, to provide economic aid and to facilitate the setting up of stable 
democratic governments- may be tentatively set out. 
      Scholars such as Wheeler regard the rise of the idea of the humanitarian war as 
a positive development: a sign that the international community (of liberal states) 
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is finally becoming prepared to translate the noble rhetoric of Human Rights into 
reality. The erosion of the doctrine of nonintervention, and the willingness of 
liberal states to use force to spread their values, mean that oppressed peoples now 
at last have some meaningful hope of outside help. 
      However, as we have seen, other scholars distrust the whole concept, though 
they do so for widely differing reasons depending on their ethical position. Many 
who accept the basic ethical assumptions of liberal international theory still see 
humanitarian war as a dangerous idea; one that is far too open to abuse, or which 
risks legitimising the use of military force when the real aim should be to banish 
war as an instrument of politics. They argue that military force is neither an 
appropriate nor an effective instrument for protecting humanitarian values. 
      In order to assess the relative truth of these two positions, it is necessary to 
look at a real-world example of a conflict that has been described as a 
‘humanitarian war’. Hence the next chapter- after an initial methodological 
discussion- will ennumerate and discuss the potential cases that might be chosen 
for a project of this kind. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter Two 
Methodology and Case Selection 
 
The aims of this chapter are twofold. The first section lays out the methodological 
approach used in this project,. The theoretical background of the project has 
already been laid out; here I explain why I decided to use a case study approach to 
investigate the theoretical questions posed in the introduction and Chapter 1.  
      The second section of the chapter is devoted to a series of examinations of nine 
conflicts which have been described in at least some quarters as humanitarian 
wars, and which hence might be chosen as case studies for a project of this kind. 
The intention here is not to provide a detailed history of each case, but rather to 
evaluate in brief terms how closely each fits with the theoretical criteria for a 
humanitarian war as laid out in Chapter 1, with the overall aim of explaining why, 
out of all these cases, the NATO intervention in Kosovo was the one chosen for 
detailed examination in this project. 
 
      2.1 Methodology: The Case Study 
This thesis uses a case study approach; a case being, according to Robert Stake, 
anything that can be defined as a “specific, unique, bounded system”.1 Gillham 
defines a case as “a unit of activity embedded in the real world which... merges in 
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with its context so that precise boundaries are difficult to draw.”2  Stake states that 
there are three different types of case study: the “intrinsic case study”, where the 
case itself is seen as the main object of interest and no attempt is made to draw 
wider generalisations; the “instrumental case study”, under which a case is used to 
“provide insight into an issue or redraw a generalisation... the case is of secondary 
interest; it plays a supporting role and facilitates our understanding of something 
else”, and the “collective case study” (where multiple cases are studied together).3 
     Yin also gives three types of case study, two of which essentially coincide with 
the first two in Stake’s classification: the “unique case”, an extreme case which 
has an intrinsic interest (hence this is similar to Stake’s “intrinsic case”; the 
“critical case”, where “the researcher has a clearly specified hypothesis and a case 
is chosen on the grounds that it will allow a better understanding of the 
circumstances in which the hypothesis will and will not hold” (analagous to 
Stake’s “instrumental case”), and the “revelatory case”, where an investigator has 
the opportuity to study a previously inaccessible phenomenon.4 
    This thesis is an example of the second type, the critical or instrumental case 
study; in this instance, the “something else” we are trying to understand is the 
theory of humanitarian war.   
      There is no general agreement in the literature on whether it is possible or 
desirable to generalise from a single case study. Bryman states that “case study 
researchers argue strenuously that (generalisation) is not the purpose of their 
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craft.”5 According to some schools of thought, case studies are useful only in 
terms of describing and intuitively interpreting the particular case which is studied; 
or only for discovering questions or hypotheses which should then be tested by 
large-N experimental studies.6 However, there are some theorists who argue 
against this. Eckstein states that the objectives of case studies “can certainly be the 
development of general propositions rather than portraiture of the particular and 
unique.”7   
      Case study researchers often state that their aim is to generalise to theory rather 
than fact: “they aim to generate an intensive examination of a single case, in 
relation to which they then engage in a theoretical analysis.”8 Silverman argues 
that the generalisability of a single case study can be improved by applying  
methods of “theoretical sampling”. This can be done by, for example, choosing 
‘deviant’ cases, or by comparing one’s own study with others already existing in 
the public domain.9 From this point of view, case studies are more useful for 
building theory than for testing it.   
     Eckstein, however, argues that “case studies... are valuable at all stages of the 
theory-building process, but most valuable at that stage of theory-building where 
least value is generally attached to them: the stage at which candidate theories are 
‘tested’.”10 That is the approach which is to be used here.  
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     So, though it may be doubted whether a single case can offer good grounds for 
sweeping generalisation, a strong school of thought does state that such a study 
can be of value for testing and refining theory11- which is the aim of this project. 
 
      2.1.1. Reasons for Choosing a Case Study Approach 
A case study approach seems logical for a thesis on humanitarian war, since there 
are only a small number of potential cases available for exploration. Opinions 
differ on the number of reasonably good cases of humanitarian war that have 
occurred in world history, but the number is not large. If one wished to do a large-
N sample study, one would have to considerably widen the criteria for choosing 
cases; for example by looking at dubious cases, at cases of humanitarian 
intervention that only involved a very small-scale use of military force, or 
conceivably at cases where intervention did not take place despite the presence of 
a humanitarian crisis. In  doing this, one would risk a loss of focus on the central 
questions of the thesis. 
     An important justification for choosing to study just one case is that there have 
already been a number of books which have explored this theoretical area using 
multiple case studies; for example, Chesterman’s Just War or Just Peace?, 
Wheeler’s Saving Strangers and Garrett’s Doing Good and Doing Well. However, 
full-length studies that focus closely on a single case of humanitarian war are 
much rarer. There have been a number of books written about the war in Kosovo, 
but most are narrative-based and/or polemical and do not explore the issue of the 
implications of the war for IR theory. 
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      The advantages of choosing a multiple-case study approach for a question such 
as this centre mainly on the question of representativeness: a single case may not 
properly represent all the aspects of a phenomenon as complex as that of 
humanitarian war. However, this may not be a clinching argument. Eckstein states 
that, for reasons of practicality, a single case study may be preferable to a multiple 
case study for the purposes of theory-testing, particularly when the phenomenon to 
be investigated is a large and complex one. A researcher will be able to study a 
single case in considerably greater depth, and a single case chosen carefully may 
prove to be more useful in addressing the questions at issue than a number of cases 
chosen in haphazard fashion.12 
     It was felt, then, that, given that much of the existing literature consists of 
relatively brief explorations of multiple cases, there would be more chance of 
making a meaningful contribution to the debate by focusing on a single case, and 
that the gain in depth from concentration on just one case would more than 
compensate for any possible loss in representativeness. 
 
      2.1.2. Criteria for Choosing the Case 
Obviously, having decided to adopt a single case study approach for a project, it is 
necessary to take great care in choosing one’s case. Stake states that the case study 
approach involves ‘purposive’ sampling (as opposed to random sampling); the 
case chosen should be the one from which most can be learnt, rather than 
necessarily the most typical case.13 Plainly there is a danger with a single case 
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study that one may- consciously or otherwise- select a case which is likely to 
confirm one’s own pre-existing prejudices14- another reason why it is necessary to 
establish solid theoretical grounds for the case that one has chosen. 
     My aim in this thesis is to test the theory of humanitarian war on its own terms; 
therefore it was necessary to pick a case which generally seemed to meet at least 
reasonably closely the criteria for a legitimate example of humanitarian war as laid 
out in Chapter One, in order to provide the fairest opportunity to test the theory. It 
would be easy to dismiss the theory by choosing one of the many examples of 
wars where states have claimed to be fighting for humanitarian goals when 
evidence suggests that they were pursuing their own self-interested ends; but while 
such a case would show that there is the potential for the idea of humanitarian war 
to be abused, it would be unlikely to satisfy a supporter of the theory, who would 
argue that there were many better cases that might be studied. To adopt the terms 
used by Eckstein, the intention was to choose a ‘crucial case’ to provide the 
greatest opportunity for falsification of the theory of humanitarian war, and for the 
confirmation of its countertheories (ie the arguments of the  various schools of 
critics of the concept, as detailed in Chapter One).15 
    Eckstein states that in a crucial case, “it must be extremely difficult, or clearly 
petulant, to dismiss any finding contrary to theory as simply ‘deviant’... and 
equally difficult to hold that any finding confirming theory might just as well 
express quite different regularities.”16 He goes on to add, however, that such cases 
are rare in the field of political science, and that proved to be true of the 
                                                 
14
 Silverman op.cit.p.132 
15
 Eckstein in Greenstein & Polsby op.cit. p.116 
16
 Ibid p.118 
 - 70 -
phenomenon of humanitarian war. As we will see, none of the possible cases of 
humanitarian war can be viewed as purely paradigmatic. In the absence of an ideal 
crucial case, Eckstein states that one should “focus inquiry on ‘most-likely’ or 
‘least-likely’ cases- cases that ought, or ought not, to invalidate or confirm theories 
if any cases can be expected to do so.”17 
    Having made the decision to use a single case study, there was a strong 
presumption in favour of choosing a recent case, since one of the central issues to 
be explored in this thesis is whether it is possible for a war to be fought in a 
genuinely humanitarian manner today. The answer to this may conceivably change 
over time as advances in military technology alter the nature of war. One obvious 
example of this would be the difference between the two World Wars; the 
development of techniques of aerial bombing, and other changes in favoured 
military tactics, meant that civilians formed a much higher proportion of the total 
casualties in the Second World War than in the First. Also, much of the theoretical 
work on the idea of humanitarian war has been done quite recently. If one wishes 
to test a theory it is best to choose a case that did not play a part in  establishing 
that theory in the first place, since “testing involves efforts to falsify, and anything 
giving rise to a theory will certainly not falsify it.... Nothing that suggests a theory, 
therefore, can also test it.”18 True, no particular case can be said to have ‘given 
rise’ to the theory of humanitarian war, since it is a theory of a normative type, but 
theorists have evaluated the various past cases in their works and hence these have 
played a part in influencing the structure of the theory. 
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      The intention, then, was to choose the recent case of humanitarian war that 
seems to best meet the theoretical criteria set out in Chapter One, though 
allowance has to be made for the fact that no case is likely to be perfect.  
 
      2.2 Possible Cases of Humanitarian War 
 In this section I list nine cases which might be considered suitable to be studied in 
a project such as this. The intention here is not to offer a detailed history and 
evaluation of each of the various possible cases of humanitarian war that could 
conceivably have been chosen as the central case study for this project. Rather, the 
central aim of this section is  to show why Kosovo was chosen as the case study 
and the other possible cases were not. 
     The cases considered below do not constitute an exhaustive list. I leave out 
some marginal examples such as the US intervention in Haiti in 1994 (when actual 
military action was averted at the last minute after members of the military junta 
agreed to leave peacefully in return for certain concessions), and in Panama in 
1989 (this has been cited as an example of ‘pro-democratic intervention’19, but as 
we saw in Chapter One this type of intervention has not as yet gained general 
recognition as an acceptable variety of humanitarian war). 
      There have been a number of wars over the past two centuries that have been 
cited in one quarter or another as being humanitarian in their purpose. The earliest 
example is probably the war of 1827 in which the UK, France and Russia 
intervened to aid Greek insurgents in their fight for independence from the 
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Ottoman Empire, is often cited as the first humanitarian war. However, this war 
may also be cited as a case of 19th Century power politics- it is generally agreed 
that Russian involvement in Greece had little to do with humanitarian concerns, 
and fear of a unilateral Russian invasion led the UK and France to get involved.20 
But whatever one’s conclusion on this matter, cases from so long ago, though 
potentially important with regard to the question of whether a right of 
humanitarian intervention exists in international customary law, are not suitable 
for study in a project such as this. As has already been mentioned, one of the  
central questions at issue for us here is that of whether it is possible today for a 
humantarian war to be fought in a genuinely ‘humanitarian’ manner, and the 
technological nature of war has changed out of all recognition since the 1800s. The 
same would go for other possible early examples such as the US intervention in 
Cuba in 1898 (another dubious case since the US had economic interests in Cuban 
sugar and, though the stated goal of the war was Cuban independence21, it ended 
with the island as a US protectorate. Walzer describes it as being at best a case of 
“benevolent imperialism”22). Therefore in the process of choosing the case study 
for this project, it was decided to restrict the possible universe of choices to those 
cases that have occurred since World War II, and to  favour recent cases even 
within that group. 
      It is interesting to note that the main post-World War II cases of humanitarian 
war mentioned in the literature fall into two very clear groups. The first group 
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consists of three wars in the 1970s: India’s invasion of Bangladesh (then East 
Pakistan) in 1971; Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978-9 and Tanzania’s 
invasion of Uganda in 1978-9. Although there are many differences between these 
cases, they do share a number of basic features in common. Each case concerns a 
unilateral invasion by a Third World state of one of its immediate neighbours to 
overthrow a government that had been responsible for extremely serious human 
rights abuses (although in each case there were other, non-humanitarian motives 
involved). Also, in each case the outcome is generally seen as having been broadly 
positive. One other notable fact is that in two of the three cases, the intervening 
government was not a liberal democracy but a single-party state- not what one 
would expect from reading accounts of the theory of humanitarian war, which are 
based, as we have seen, squarely within the liberal tradition in international 
relations. 
      If one discounts the very dubious case of the American invasion of Panama in 
1989- which can only be regarded as humanitarian if one takes the extreme 
position that intervention can be justified merely by the undemocratic nature of the 
target government,23 and which in any case, given the level of civilian casualties 
incurred,  would probably fail on the criterion of proportionality- humanitarian 
wars then effectively disappear from the scene for more than a decade. Then, 
moving into the period after the end of the Cold War, we encounter the second 
group of possible cases, which again have significant features in common in that 
each was undertaken by the USA supported by a greater or lesser number of allies: 
Somalia, Iraqi Kurdistan, Kosovo, Afghanistan, the second Gulf War. (Often cited 
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alongside these is the Australian-led peacekeeping force sent into East Timor in 
1999; but as will be shown below, this was not really an intervention at all.) 
      While it is possible that this is a coincidence, it does seem that there has been a 
change in the identity of the principal prosecutors of humanitarian wars, from 
individual Third World states to the USA and its allies. Many Third World states 
do of course continue to conduct smaller-scale humanitarian interventions (as, for 
example, in regionally-organised peacekeeping forces such as that operating in the 
Darfur region of Sudan); but since 1979 none has launched anything that could be 
considered a humanitarian war. Presuming that this trend continues, this 
constitutes an argument for choosing a case study from the second group of wars, 
as these are perhaps more likely to be typical of any humanitarian wars that may 
take place in the future. 
      As an aside, it might be argued that it shows a western-centric perspective 
among international relations theorists that the idea of humanitarian war only 
really entered the mainstream once Western states took to fighting such wars. 
Humanitarian intervention became one of the central concerns for IR theory in the 
1990s, but the earlier cases- fought, as we have seen, by developing countries- did 
not attract the same level of interest, except retrospectively. 
      The rest of this section, then, will focus on each of the potential cases in turn, 
providing a brief summary of how well each one seems to fit the established jus ad 
bellum, in bello and post bellum criteria for a humanitarian war. 
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      2.2.1. India’s Invasion of East Pakistan, 1971 
India’s invasion of Bangladesh is generally placed among the ‘best’ historical 
cases of humanitarian war . It meets the criterion of ‘supreme emergency’, having 
been pursued in response to a humanitarian crisis of considerable magnitude: in 
the months leading up to the war, the province of East Pakistan had been under a 
brutal military occupation, with at least one million people killed and up to ten 
million refugees fleeing to India.24 The war also seems to meet the criterion of 
proportionality, as it was brief- lasting only two weeks- and successful in terms of 
ending the killing, giving self-determination to the people of the liberated state and 
allowing the return of refugees. The level of casualties was also fairly limited.25 
According to Wheeler, the war also meets the criterion of last resort, as there were 
no alternative strategies that could have ended the repression, and the UN Security 
Council was prevented by Cold War power politics from agreeing on any 
collective action.26 The war involved a regime change- East Pakistan was replaced 
by the new independent state of Bangladesh- which conflicts with some theoretical 
accounts of humanitarian intervention, but in this case (Wheeler again) a change of 
regime was the only possible way to end the oppression.27 India also claimed to be 
acting from humanitarian motives; the Indian ambassador told the UN that “we 
have on this particular occasion absolutely nothing but the purest of motives and 
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the purest of intentions; to rescue the people of East Bengal from what they are 
suffering.”28  
      However, India did also claim to be acting in self-defence. There was some 
justification for this- the war had been preceded by a “pre-emptive” attack on 
Indian bases by the Pakistani air force, and India also raised the novel charge of 
“refugee aggression” against Pakistan- but purely on that basis, India’s response 
was grossly disproportionate, so the war can only really be justified on 
humanitarian grounds.29 
      Where the war falls down is on the criterion of ‘broad international support’. 
India’s invasion was unilateral, and was opposed by all the states in the UN 
Security Council except for the USSR and Poland. As stated above, Cold War 
power politics- Pakistan being a key US ally- were dominant over humanitarian 
concerns.30 
      India’s invasion of Bangladesh is regarded by Walzer as a good example of 
humanitarian intervention since, although the motives of the intervening power 
were not pure- India’s government was probably more concerned with gaining the 
upper hand in its long-running dispute with Pakistan than with helping the 
Bangladeshis- this did not effect the outcome since, once the Indians had defeated 
the Pakistani army, they left and imposed no political controls on the new state.31 
This is a reflection of the idea of humanitarian intervention as being ‘short-term 
and instrumental’; we saw in Chapter One that there are problems with this. In this 
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India’s quick exit- which means that there was no jus post bellum in this war, one 
reason for not choosing it as the case study for this thesis- seems to have been less 
due to scruples over imperialism than to the fact that it did not want to be left 
responsible for a very poor country.32 
 
      2.2.2. Vietnam’s Invasion of Cambodia, 1978-9 
Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978-9 clearly meets the criterion of ‘supreme 
emergency’- it is estimated that about 1-2 million people died due to the actions of 
the Pol Pot regime in the period 1975-9, and Amnesty International estimated 
about 300,000 political killings between 1975 and 1978.33 Again, this is a war that 
is generally seen as having been positive in its effects; certainly most of the 
Cambodian population welcomed the Vietnamese troops as liberators.34  One 
thinker who generally takes a very sceptical position on humanitarian war 
nevertheless defines this invasion as “one of the few actions in modern history that 
might plausibly be called a humanitarian intervention.”35 
      In some ways, however, this is rather a strange case. Firstly, Vietnam’s 
credentials for fighting a humanitarian war have been doubted since it was a non-
democratic government with a distinctly dubious record of its own on human 
rights. Secondly, Vietnam never in fact attempted to defend the war on 
humanitarian grounds. This was probably because Vietnam had no interest in 
creating a precedent for the establishment of a norm of a right to humanitarian 
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intervention, since if one became established in international law, it might well at 
some stage be applied against Vietnam and its allies.36 Wheeler states 
categorically that the war fails on the criterion of humanitarian motives: “there is 
no evidence that Pol Pot’s human rights violations played any part in the decision 
to invade Cambodia. Vietnam criticised these only when it became politically 
convenient to do so, and, had a diplomatic settlement been secured with the DK 
(Cambodia) on its borders, it would have coexisted with its murderous 
neighbour.”37 Vietnam’s Foreign Minister told a US Congressman that “human 
rights was not a question; that was their problem.... we were concerned only with 
d as a sham” by the 
UN General Assembly denied recognition to the new Vietnamese-backed 
                                                
security.”38 
      Vietnam’s representative at the UN told the Security Council that there were 
two wars going on, the first being a Vietnamese/Cambodian border war in which 
Vietnam was merely exercising its right to self-defence, and the second an internal 
revolutionary war being fought by the Cambodian people. Vietnam’s invading 
forces did in fact include members of an exiled insurgent group39, but, in the 
words of Wheeler, the claim of “two wars” was “easily expose
presence of over 100,000 Vietnamese soldiers in Cambodia.40 
      Again, the war fails on the criterion of ‘broad international backing’: apart 
from the Soviet bloc, it attracted almost universal condemnation- and indeed, the 
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Cambodian government, preferring to give Cambodia’s seat at the UN to a 
guerrilla organisation led by remnants of the Khmer Rouge.41 
      The jus post bellum became an issue in this conflict, as Vietnamese troops 
remained in Cambodia for a decade afterwards; this was criticised, but can be 
viewed as having been necessary to prevent the return to power of the Khmer 
Rouge which, as indicated, remained active as a guerrilla force (Garrett dissents 
from this argument, stating that it was the presence of Vietnamese troops itself that 
led to the resistance, but this is not the general view)42. Vietnam also made 
creditable efforts at reconstruction, for example by rebuilding infrastructure and 
providing training for Cambodian doctors and other professionals (a class that had 
been virtually wiped out by Pol Pot). However, Vietnam was also criticised for 
replacing the Khmer Rouge with a puppet government favourable to its own 
interests rather than a more broad-based coalition43. And, perhaps not surprisingly 
given Vietnam’s own domestic record, the new government it helped to set up in 
Cambodia was itself accused of serious human rights abuses- including arbitrary 
arrest, detention and torture- though nothing remotely on the scale of what had 
gone before.44 
 
      2.2.3. Tanzania’s Invasion of Uganda, 1978-9 
It is generally agreed that the contemporaneous Tanzanian invasion of Uganda 
also meets the criterion of ‘supreme emergency’- its target was the notorious 
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regime of Idi Amin, which according to Amnesty International was responsible for 
the deaths of 300,000 people between 1971 and 197945- and that of 
proportionality; again it involved a regime change, with Amin being replaced as 
the head of state by his predecessor Milton Obote, but it is hard to see how Amin’s 
abuses could have been halted without his removal. 
      It also meets the criterion of ‘broad international support’ better than the 
previous two cases, since, while there was little active enthusiasm expressed about 
Tanzania’s action either by other African states or by the great powers, nor was 
there much opposition. Nigeria and Sudan both denounced the invasion, but the 
great majority of African states did not.46 In the case of the great powers, the lack 
of opposition can probably be ascribed to the fact that- in contrast to the previous 
two cases- neither of the countries involved was a key Cold War ally for either 
side.47  Equally, Wheeler argues that the lack of opposition expressed by other 
African states probably had less to do with concern for the humanitarian situation 
inside Uganda than with the fact that Amin had broken the norms of sovereignty 
and non-aggression by invading Uganda. Also, Tanzania’s President Julius 
Nyerere was an “outspoken advocate of humanitarian values” (Wheeler)48, who 
had been condemning the actions of Amin’s regime for some years, so it might be 
expected that this war would also meet the criterion of ‘humanitarian motives’. 
      However, as in the previous case, such motives were not cited. Nyerere 
preferred to rest the justification for the war on self-defence; some six months 
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previously, Ugandan troops had invaded a border area of Tanzania, although the 
claim of self-defence was not entirely convincing since those troops had already 
been withrdrawn. Like the government of Vietnam,  Nyerere argued that two wars 
were taking place: one a war of self-defence and the other being fought by 
Ugandan dissidents to depose Amin49- although again, there was little justification 
for this claim. 
     Some have expressed doubt over whether the war can be said to have had a 
successful outcome as, in its aftermath, several Ugandan governments came and 
went- some of them as oppressive as Amin’s had been- and there was also a civil 
war between Obote’s restored government and left-wing guerrillas.50 
 
      2.2.3.1. Overview of the 1970s Cases 
The three cases from the 1970s are described by Chesterman as the ‘best cases’ of 
humanitarian intervention since all were pursued in response to a major crisis, all 
had “broadly positive” outcomes, and in each case the prospect of a “realistic 
alternative polity” was present (which Chesterman believes was not the case in 
Kosovo).51 
   However, although all these three cases have been widely cited as examples of 
humanitarian war, in none of them did the intervening government actually cite 
humanitarian motives as the main reason for its action.  
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    Another reason for not choosing one of these three wars as the case study for 
this thesis is that in the 1970s, theoretical doctrines of humanitarian war were not 
as developed, nor as widely accepted as they are now. Indeed, the term 
‘humanitarian war’ had not at that time been coined. The fact that in each case the 
intervening power proved reluctant to cite humanitarian justifications for its action 
is an indication of this. The list of jus ad bellum criteria for a humanitarian war 
that was laid out in Chapter 1 only really became settled in the 1990s.  
     There is also a further good reason, to do with the jus post bellum, for choosing 
a war fought by the USA and European powers- ie one of the examples from the 
1990s- as the case study. These countries are the richest in the world and therefore 
should be expected to have sufficient resources to devote to the jus post bellum if 
they are genuinely committed to it. In the case of a humanitarian war fought by a 
developing nation (as in the three cases of the 1970s), it would seem unfair to 
criticise the intervening state for not carrying out reconstruction in the liberated 
territory, given that it is unlikely to possess the wealth to do so without the risk of 
bankrupting its own economy. It is unsurprising, then, to find that in two of the 
three cases from the 70s, there was no post-war occupation, and in the third 
(Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia) the continued presence of Vietnamese troops 
could, given continued activity by the Khmer Rouge, have been justified on the 
grounds of self-defence, just as the war was. In contrast, in all of the main post-
Cold War cases, the initial intervention was followed by a military occupation of 
the target state, with outsiders (to varying degrees in each case) taking over the 
functions of government. In the case of Somalia, the occupying force soon 
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departed after facing resistance; in the cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
troops remain up to the time of writing.  
     Hence we now move on to the second group of possible cases of humanitarian 
war: those from the post-Cold War era. 
 
      2.2.4. ‘Safe Havens’ for Kurds in Iraq, 1991 
The first of the often-cited humanitarian interventions of the 1990s,  the 
enforcement of no-fly zones in Iraq and the setting up of ‘safe havens’ for the 
Kurdish population, is not a suitable case study for this project, as though it was 
possibly a humanitarian intervention, the level of force used was not really 
sufficient for it to be classified as a humanitarian war. Nevertheless a brief 
exploration of some of the issues raised by it may be worthwhile here. 
       Freedman and Boren state that the case of the safe havens “was an important 
precedent but the circumstances were exceptional and the long-term impact of the 
action was mixed.”52 The exceptional nature of the circumstances stems in part 
from the fact that Western governments were widely accused in the media of being 
responsible for Saddam Hussein’s oppression of the Kurds, given that they had 
supported him in the 1980s and had then abandoned the Iraqi population in the 
aftermath of the first Gulf War after encouraging them to overthrow their leader. 
Hence some prefer to define this as a case of ‘imperial responsibility’ rather than 
humanitarian intervention. Roberts, too, states that Kurdistan was a special case 
since Saddam (like Idi Amin) had broken the established rules of the game by 
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invading another country, and was hence seen as having at least partially lost his 
own right to sovereignty.53 
 
     2.2.5. Somalia, 1992-3 
The US-led intervention in the civil war in Somalia in 1992-3 has been described 
as “the first modern case of the military occupation of a country for avowedly 
humanitarian reasons alone.”54 In some senses, there were two interventions in 
Somalia: the first took place in late 1992, with a narrowly-defined mandate of 
ensuring the distribution of food aid, and the second followed a new eruption of 
fighting in early 1993; a force of 20,000 peacekeepers (about half of whom were 
US troops) was sent in with a much broader mandate centred around 
reconstruction. It is doubtful whether the first intervention can genuinely be called 
a humanitarian war; the second probably does meet the definition, although the 
lack of a state enemy creates some doubts according to how the term ‘intervention’ 
is usually understood. The first intervention is a slightly odd case since, as de Waal 
notes, “the intervention force was sent to protect foreign aid workers, rather than 
Somali civilians”55- as its main aim was to ensure the distribution of aid. 
     The case of Somalia is generally agreed to meet the criterion of ‘humanitarian 
motives’ better than most. Though the US did have non-humanitarian motives for 
intervening (for example, for President Bush, going into Somalia served to draw 
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attention away from his Administration’s perceived failure to act in Bosnia)56, 
these were not obviously inconsistent with a humanitarian purpose. The US and 
other Western powers had no substantial strategic interest in Somalia, nor were 
they directly threatened by a refugee crisis.57 The second intervention was 
accompanied by much humanitarian rhetoric from the new Clinton administration; 
Madeleine Albright, then US ambassador to the UN (and who we will meet again 
in later chapters), said the operation “aimed at nothing less than the restoration of 
an entire country as a proud, functioning and viable member of the community of 
nations.”58 
      A case might however be made that humanitarian motives, while present, were 
not sufficiently strong to ensure success in the jus post bellum. The US, says 
Wheeler, was not interested in long-term reconstruction and wanted to hand over 
to the UN as soon as possible; “had there been any question of a protracted US 
commitment involving casualties, it is clear that Bush would not have launched an 
intervention.”59  
      Somalia also seems to meet the criterion of ‘supreme emergency’: the 
intervention was precipitated by a civil war which, along with drought, helped to 
cause a famine that killed 300,000-350,000 people in 1992, and with central 
government having collapsed chronic lawlessness made it very difficult for aid to 
be properly distributed.60 The criterion of ‘last resort’ is difficult to apply to 
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Somalia because there was no legitimate internal authority with which outsiders 
could negotiate. 
      It could be argued that it would be unfair to choose Somalia as a case study 
since the situation there- with the complete collapse of institutions of government- 
was even more intractable than most cases of civil war, meaning that it was always 
highly unlikely that the intervention would produce a successful long-term 
settlement. As it stands, the eventual failure of the operation seems to provide a 
cautionary tale against expecting too much from humanitarian interventions, 
particularly as far as the jus post bellum is concerned. Wheeler states that “the 
haunting question raised by Somalia is whether humanitarian intervention that tries 
to combine both the short term and long term goals of rescuing victims from 
starvation and lawlessness, and restoring legitimate authority, is always doomed to 
end in a humiliating exit.”61 But Mayall writes that Somalia was an exceptional 
case since the society did not merely lack a functioning state but historically “was 
more accustomed to statelessness than statehood.... although all interventions in 
civil conflicts face comparably intractable problems, very few... are faced not 
merely with the corruption of central authority but by its total disappearance 
combined with powerful structural obstacles to its reconstruction.”62 Included 
among these obstacles was the fact that, according to Vaux, Somalis “were not 
necessarily unhappy with being a failed state; their previous unhappy experience 
with the authoritarian Western-backed regime of Said Barre meant that many in 
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Somalia preferred statelessness to the alternative of the imposition of a new pro-
Western regime.”63 This meant that the Western paradigm of humanitarian 
intervention, which focused on restoring the institutional framework of a 
conventional nation state, was particularly ill-suited to Somalia. So, if the 
intervention in Somalia is judged a failure, the highly unusual nature of the case 
means that this does not provide evidence that all humanitarian interventions are 
doomed to fail. 
     Not all observers are agreed that the Somalia intervention should be called a 
failure. Garrett states that “buried beneath all the rhetoric about the ‘failure’ of 
Operation Restore Hope is the elementary fact that a great many Somalians were 
saved from an early death by the efforts of the international community.”64 
However, there is some dispute over whether the number of lives saved was 
exaggerated in early reports: the UN’s initial claim that 2 million Somalis were in 
imminent risk of starvation was later reduced to 330,000 in a report by the 
Refugee Study Group.65 De Waal alleges that the famine had already passed its 
worst point by the end of 1992; death rates were dropping, and most of the deaths 
that were taking place were due to disease rather than starvation.66 He argues that 
although the military intervention did improve the movement of food aid, it made 
no attempt to deal with the epidemics and thus probably had no significant impact 
on mortality.67 Indeed it may have been counterproductive in the long run: “the 
increased and indiscriminate supply of relief food has the predictable effect of 
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driving the price of cereals down to very low levels and providing a serious 
disincentive to production.... Thus was a new season of food aid dependency 
created in many areas.”68 
      But however one chooses to judge the first intervention, the second will always 
be remembered as a failure. US forces sought confrontation with the warlords but 
ended up causing civilian casualties (leading to doubt over whether the operation 
meets the criterion of ‘proportionality’); this led the population, most of whom had 
initially welcomed the peacekeepers, to turn against them. Rising (though still 
small) numbers of American casualties led to a political backlash and a 
humiliating withdrawal of US troops.69 At the time of writing- some thirteen years 
on- Somalia still remains effectively stateless. 
      The exceptional nature of the Somalia case, then, limits the amount one can 
learn from it. Hence, for example, the fact that- in contrast to the cases of the 
1970s- there was wide international support for intervention in Somalia justified 
on humanitarian grounds does not signify a great change in state attitudes to 
humanitarian war since, in contrast to earlier cases, intervention did not take place 
against a functioning state. As Roberts states, the Somalia case was exceptional 
because it was “not a case of intervention against the will of the government, but 
of an intervention where there is a lack of government.”70 Hence sovereignty was 
not an issue. 
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      2.2.6. East Timor, 1999 
Another often-cited recent example of humanitarian intervention is the 
peacekeeping operation set up in East Timor in response to the eruption of 
violence that followed the 1999 referendum on independence. This case and that 
of Kosovo are often bracketed together, as they occurred in the same year- as in 
the Human Rights Watch report on 1999, which records that “twice in the past 
year, in Kosovo and East Timor, members of the international community 
deployed troops to halt crimes against humanity.”71 But in fact, the East Timor 
was not an intervention at all, since the definition of an ‘intervention’ in 
international relations is an operation which takes place without the consent of the 
target state. Troops were only sent into East Timor after the government of 
Indonesia had given its permission for them to enter, though in fact this permission 
was not legally necessary since Indonesia had taken over East Timor by force in 
1975 and the UN had never recognised its sovereignty over the area.72 
      This case, then, has no place in a discussion of humanitarian war. East Timor 
should rather be seen as an example of the success of diplomacy, since Indonesia 
was induced to give its consent to the arrival of a peacekeeping force by non-
military measures such as economic sanctions and a suspension of arms sales by 
the US and EU (although it might have been better had such diplomacy been 
attempted some 25 years earlier). 
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      2.2.7. Afghanistan, 2001- 
The US-led intervention in Afghanistan, which began in October 2001 and 
continues to the time of writing, seems to meet the test of ‘supreme emergency’. 
The Taliban regime, overthrown by the intervention, was a brutal medievalist 
dictatorship which undoubtedly ranked among the worst human rights violators in 
the world in recent times, although some have attempted to make at least a partial 
defence of the Taliban on the grounds that their brand of politicised Islam 
provided the only real hope for peace and unity in Afghanistan after a prolonged 
period of civil war.73  
     Claims of humanitarian motives also formed a significant element in the 
official justification for the invasion of Afghanistan: President Bush described the 
bombing as an action of “generosity of America and our allies”, in the aid of the 
“oppressed people of Afghanistan.” Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said that, 
like other recent US interventions in Kuwait, Somalia and Kosovo, the war was 
being fought “for the purpose of denying hostile regimes the opportunity to 
oppress their own people and other people.”74 Much in particular was made of 
Taliban oppression of women; US First Lady Laura Bush said after the regime fell 
that “because of our recent military gains in much of Afghanistan, women are no 
longer imprisoned in their homes. The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the 
rights and dignity of women.”75 However, claims that the intervening powers were 
genuinely motivated by concern for women’s rights did lack some credibility 
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given that in the 1980s, the US had armed and funded the Mujahadin- who had 
treated women in much the same manner as the Taliban- in their war with the 
Soviet-backed regime in Kabul.76 
      As we saw in Chapter One, humanitarian rhetoric on the part of political 
leaders does not a humanitarian war make; if it did, then the Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria and Hitler’s invasion of Czechoslovakia would both have been 
humanitarian wars. In the case of the invasion of Afghanistan, it is clear that it 
would not have happened if the September 11 attacks had not taken place and 
Osama Bin Laden had not been hiding there. Indeed, in the months immediately 
preceding the attacks, there had been signs of improving relations between the US 
government and the Taliban; in May 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell made a 
statement welcoming the ban imposed by the Taliban on opium production.77 
Therefore the war was not humanitarian in motivation. Moreover, these non-
humanitarian motives had an adverse impact on US strategy; had humanitarian 
concerns prompted the war, one might have expected the US to have been more 
discriminating in choosing its allies among the anti-Taliban elements in 
Afghanistan. As it was, bad as the Taliban undoubtedly were, the alliance that the 
US and its allies favoured to take control of the new Afghanistan included a 
number of warlords whose record was little better. 
      The US government claimed that its good intentions were proved by the fact 
that American planes were dropping food parcels to hungry Afghans as well as 
bombs; however, the airdrops of food were generally dismissed by aid workers as 
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a publicity stunt which had no real effect in combatting hunger. The UN special 
rapporteur on the right to food “condemned US airdrops... as a catastrophe for 
humanitarian aid and warned that the US was effectively feeding Taliban 
fighters.”78 Nor did it help that the humantarian rations were dropped in packages 
that were the same colour as cluster bombs.79 
     Much of the literature is dismissive of the idea that the war was fought for 
humanitarian reasons. Chesterman states that “the human rights of the Afghan 
population were not uppermost in the minds of the Bush administration.”80 
Similarly, Minear concludes that “the rationale for the targeting of first al Qaida 
and then the Taliban had nothing to do with improving the lot of Afghan civilians 
and everything to do with reprisals for the September 11 events.”81  The war was 
regarded as one of self-defence; invocation of humanitarian motives was 
coincidental to other concerns and was put forward mainly with the aim of holding 
together the international coalition. 
      There are also serious doubts over whether the war should be regarded as 
meeting the test of proportionality, given the high level of civilian casualties 
compared to, for example, the Kosovo intervention. One study for the first nine 
months of the intervention estimated between 3125 and 3620 civilian deaths;82 
other estimates go as high as 8000, with possibly as many as 20,000 killed 
indirectly (for example by starvation).83 
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      As far as the jus post bellum is concerned, the record in Afghanistan is at best 
ambiguous. Although some reasonably peaceful elections have been held, much of 
the country is still effectively controlled by warlords, and there have been frequent 
complaints that, outside the capital, Kabul, the situation of women in particular has 
scarcely improved.84 
     One other reason for choosing Kosovo rather than Afghanistan as the case 
study has to do with the availablility of literature. Several of the major 
contemporary works on humanitarian intervention- for example, Wheeler’s Saving 
Strangers and Chesterman’s Just War or Just Peace?- were published in the 
period between the war in Kosovo and that in Afghanistan, and so contain 
accounts of the former intervention but not the latter. Therefore there is a wider 
selection of perspectives available on the Kosovo war from established theorists in 
this area. 
 
      2.2.8. Iraq, 2003- 
Claims of humanitarian motives were made for the second Gulf War. Its official 
title was “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, and members of the US and British 
administrations predicted that their troops would be welcomed as liberators. Vice 
President Dick Cheney said that the streets of Baghdad and Basra would “erupt in 
joy in the same way as the throngs in Kabul greeted the Americans”85, and UK 
Defence Minister Geoff Hoon said that “I think there is every prospect that the 
population will be enormously relieved by the action the international community 
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might take.”86 But these arguments were very much secondary to arguments of 
preventive self-defence based on Saddam’s supposed weapons arsenal and links to 
al Qaida. Moreover, some of the states that opposed the war based their opposition 
on the belief that any good humanitarian effects from the overthrow of Saddam 
would be outweighed by other bad consequences. France’s Prime Minister Jean-
Pierre Raffarin said that “the US has erred in going to war, morally, politically and 
strategically. There was an alternative to war. Going to war was a moral error 
when one can disarm in other ways.”87  
      I do not intend here to go into much detail concerning the justifications for, 
course of and aftermath of the second Gulf War, since it has attracted far more 
outright opposition from avowed supporters of the idea of humanitarian war than 
any of the other cases listed in this chapter, and so it was not seriously considered 
as a potential case study for this project. The war in Iraq was not pursued in 
response to an immediate humanitarian emergency, nor with the aim of preventing 
one. The target government was undeniably a major violator of human rights, but 
was not in the period leading up to the war committing crimes any worse than 
those it had been committing for years; nor did those prosecuting the war make 
any claim that it was about to do so. As was mentioned in Chapter 1, in the case of 
Iraq Saddam Hussein’s most serious crimes against his people had occurred some 
10-15 years before the war took place, and the groups who had been the main 
victims were already fairly effectively protected through the imposition of no-fly 
zones. Even more so than in the case of Afghanistan, the high level of civilian 
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casualties makes it difficult to argue that the war meets the criterion of 
proportionality. As for the jus post bellum, it would require far more space than is 
available here to do justice to the well-known- and ongoing- story of the débacle 
of post-war Iraq.  
      As has been stated, this project aims to evaluate the theory of humanitarian war 
on its own terms. Therefore it would be unfair to pick the second Gulf war as the 
case study, since although a minority of the leading thinkers on the subject did 
support the war (Michael Ignatieff would be one example), most did not regard it 
as a legitimate humanitarian intervention. For example, Michael Walzer’s 
opposition- based on the fact that there was no immediate humanitarian crisis- was 
noted in Chapter 1 (though he also stated at the same time that he would not march 
against the war).88 In contrast, most theorists supported the war in Kosovo, at least 
in principle (though often with reservations over NATO’s choice of tactics).  
     Some of those who initially supported the Iraq War have since changed their 
position, whereas those who supported the Kosovo war have generally not 
recanted. Even those- such as Ignatieff- who still regard the war as having been 
legitimate in its conception acknowledge that it was carried out in a disastrously 
flawed fashion. The Iraq war, then, would make an excellent case study for a 
project on how the concept of military humanitarianism can be abused, but that is 
not the question that this thesis aims to address. 
 
      2.2.9. Kosovo, 1999- 
In contrast to earlier humanitarian wars, the alliance that conducted the Kosovo 
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war relied strongly on humanitarian motives for its official justification. NATO 
leaders and spokesmen also consistently cited the criteria of ‘supreme emergency’ 
and ‘last resort’ in justifying the bombing. All this will be explored in more detail 
in Chapter 4, but a couple of examples can be given here. Tony Blair told the 
House of Commons on 23 March 1999- the day before the bombing began- that 
"we must act to save thousands of innocent men, women and children from 
humanitarian catastrophe, from death, barbarism and ethnic cleansing by a brutal 
dictatorship".89 Blair said after the war that “Good has triumphed over evil, justice 
has overcome barbarism, and the values of civilisation have prevailed.”90  
      NATO did have other motives for acting, such as a wish to protect its own 
credibility, but at first sight at least these might not seem incompatible with the 
humanitarian nature of the operation. Claims of other non-humanitarian motives- 
such as economic hegemony- have been made, but- as will be seen later- do not in 
general seem particuarly convincing. In the aftermath of the war, Kosovo was 
occupied by a NATO-led force and a UN administration set up over the province, 
making it a useful case study for the doctrine of jus post bellum. 
      Some have doubted whether the war in Kosovo met the criterion of ‘supreme 
emergency’, and it must be admitted that, before the bombing began, the human 
rights abuses that were taking place in Kosovo were not on the scale of some of 
the other examples that have been listed; however, as will be shown in later 
chapters, the situation in the province was still undoubtedly bad.  
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    Where Kosovo is most obviously superior to the three cases of the 1970s is in 
meeting the criterion of broad international backing; most obviously in the fact 
that it was fought by an alliance of 19 states rather than by a single government, 
but also in the fact that it attracted a fairly impressive degree of support from states 
not directly involved. Kosovo was the first full-scale war against a functioning 
state to attract wide international support specifically as a humanitarian war. As 
we have seen, the interventions by India and Vietnam both met with almost 
universal international disapproval, and while this was not the case with 
Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda, it is unlikely that many African states would have 
given even tacit approval to that intervention if Uganda had not already broken the 
established norms of international politics by invading Tanzania. In contrast, 
although NATO’s intervention was not authorised by the UN, nor ever explicitly 
endorsed by it, the Security Council did reject by 12 votes to 3 a Russian/Chinese 
resolution condemning the bombing. Wheeler states that the Security Council vote 
“was historic because, for the first time since the founding of the Charter, seven 
members (ie the seven states in the Security Council that were not members of the 
NATO alliance but voted against the resolution) either legitimated, excused or 
acquiesced in the use of force justified on humanitarian grounds in a context where 
there was no express Council authorisation.”91 
      Most theorists of humanitarian war did support the intervention in Kosovo; 
Walzer, for example, said that military action seemed “entirely justified, even 
obligatory”92; Michael Glennon praised “America’s new willingness to do what it 
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thinks right”.93 However, they often did so with reservations over the tactics that 
were used, believing that NATO should have sent in troops on the ground rather 
than relying on air power (see, for example, Wheeler’s comment that “NATO 
acted preventatively and it was right to do so, but it employed the wrong 
means”).94 However, as we will see, no NATO state- not even the UK, generally 
viewed as the most hawkish of the powers involved- was at all enthusiastic about 
the use of ground troops, and it was only the ruling out in advance of that option 
that made it possible for the war to be fought at all. Hence it might be argued that 
despite the reservations of the theorists, Kosovo provides a true picture of what 
humanitarian wars- at least when fought by Western states- will tend to look like 
in reality. 
      If we descend from the world of academic theorists into that of media 
commentators, it can certainly be said that Kosovo created an unprecedented 
amount of optimism about the concept of military humanitarianism as a succession 
of leading liberal figures praised the noble goals of the war and the purity of 
NATO’s motives. Polly Toynbee, for example, said that “there was nothing in this 
for anyone, no political gain for any leader, no glory, only the certainty that 
Milosevic’s monstrous ethnic cleansing had to be stopped”, and stated that the war 
was a “brave and probably only chance for the West to collectively to create a 
more ethical foreign policy.”95  John Lloyd said of the war that “it is said that we 
live in a selfish world, where the politics of democratic governments are 
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determined solely by material interest. Yet now it seems that we have become 
truly good people, fighting evil in the Balkans”, and added that over Kosovo, “the 
further left, or the more liberal, you go, the more force is called for.”96 This is 
overstating the case- many figures on the left opposed the war- but it is generally 
true as far as the liberal centre-left is concerned. 
 
      2.3. Conclusion: Why Kosovo? 
The main reason for choosing to study the Kosovo intervention is that, although it 
may be doubted whether Kosovo is actually the ‘best’ case of humanitarian war 
over the whole period of post-World War II history, it is quite clearly the best case 
since the end of the Cold War. Both Afghanistan and Iraq are best viewed as 
straightforward wars of realpolitik for which the war-making powers cited some 
humanitarian motives in an attempt to bolster the public justification for the 
invasions; and both, the latter in particular, have had very dubious outcomes. 
Somalia, though closer to being straightforwardly humanitarian in motivation, was 
essentially a failure; also, as an intervention in a stateless country it cannot be 
considered a representative case. And, though we can never be sure what the 
future holds, the three cases from the 1970s seem to represent a type of 
humanitarian war that has disappeared, at least for the moment, and so is less 
relevant to current discussion. Also, given that much of the theoretical work on 
humanitarian war has been done in the last fifteen years, the three cases from the 
1970s tend to be viewed retrospectively in most studies on the subject. Kosovo, on 
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the other hand, provided a contemporary test of the theory at the time when 
interest in the idea of humanitarian war was at its height. 
       
 Chapter Three 
The Kosovo Conflict: Case History 
 
This chapter will begin by providing a short narrative history of the conflict in 
Kosovo up to the launching of the NATO intervention on 24 March 1999, focusing 
mainly on events within the province, and will then move on to explore some 
theoretical issues which are raised by the internal development of the conflict. 
      Historical works on the conflict in Kosovo trace its origins to as far back as the 
defeat of Serbia by the Ottoman Turks in the 14th and 15th Centuries; the Battle of 
Kosovo in 1389 has acquired a central place in the historical mythology 
surrounding the province.1 This, then, is a territorial conflict which has been going 
on intermittently in one form or another for a very long time, although it was 
temporarily frozen by the creation of Yugoslavia and by the Cold War.  However, 
as this thesis is not directly about the origins and development of the conflict in 
Kosovo, but rather seeks to use the conflict as a case study for evaluating and 
informing the theory of humanitarian war, it is not worthwhile here- even if space 
permitted- to go into the deep historical background behind the conflict. The 
reasons why the conflict occurred are only relevant to this thesis in so far as they 
relate to and were influenced by NATO’s decision to launch a humanitarian war. 
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Therefore this chapter will focus mainly on the period 1987-1999, beginning with 
the rise to power of Slobodan Milosevic.  
      There are many contentious aspects to the history of this period. The intention 
of this chapter is not to adjudicate on the rights and wrongs- legal or moral- of the 
dispute over the status of Kosovo, but merely to detail the development of that 
dispute. A number of common themes can be traced in the literature, and these will 
form the core of this chapter. 
       This chapter will focus mainly on internal events within Kosovo and Serbia, 
although it will mention the various international efforts to resolve the conflict 
where these had an impact on the perspectives and actions of internal groups. The 
international history of the conflict will be discussed in greater detail in the section 
on the ‘last resort’ in Chapter 4. 
      Once the main historical points have been set out, the final section of the 
chapter will deal with some wider issues raised by the development of the conflict 
in Kosovo which are not generally covered by the theoretical literature on 
humanitarian war. The most important such issue is the question of the effect of 
the possibility or expectation of intervention on internal conflicts. 
      The theoretical literature on humanitarian war tends to regard military 
intervention as an act which either takes place or does not, and which is decided 
upon by intervening powers. It will be argued, however, that the case of Kosovo 
demonstrates that if actors on either side in an internal conflict perceive the 
possibility of outside intervention in the form of a humanitarian war occurring at 
some point in the future, this can have a very significant impact on the way these 
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actors behave, and hence on the course of the conflict. Plainly the perpetrators of 
human rights abuses in any given situation may be encouraged or discouraged 
from continuing their abuses depending on whether they believe that action may 
be taken against them. This much is acknowledged by theorists. However, the 
other side in such a conflict- the perceived victims- are rarely discussed except as 
passive figures who may or may not be saved by the actions of outsiders. But the 
victims have just as strong an incentive to seek international intervention in a 
conflict as those perpetrating the abuses have to ensure that it does not take place. 
Groups acting- or claiming to act- on behalf of the victims can take action to 
maximise the possibility of intervention, and these actions can have a major 
impact on the course of the conflict. 
      In Kosovo, it will be argued, the possibility of a future military intervention 
served to destabilize the situation, to reduce the possibility of a peaceful settlement 
and helped to turn the conflict into an open military struggle. This was because, as 
the case of Kosovo demonstrates, outside intervention is far more likely to take 
place if there is a full-scale civil war going on in the relevant state or province than 
if there is one-sided abuse of human rights by government actors. As we will see, 
for as long as they pursued tactics of peaceful resistance to Serb repression, the 
Kosovo Albanians found their plight effectively ignored by the outside world since 
the situation inside the province, though bad, did not threaten wider regional 
stability and was overshadowed by larger-scale violence in neighbouring states. 
But once the KLA emerged with its terrorist tactics, triggering retaliatory 
escalation by the Serbian government, the province immediately gained a much 
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higher international profile- the beginning of the process which was soon to result 
in the international military intervention that the KLA leaders had sought. 
Terrorism worked, albeit at great cost to the civilian population. This leads to a 
concern over whether humanitarian wars may act as a destabilizing factor by  
removing incentives for compromise, and by encouraging oppressed groups to turn 
to violence in order to provoke reprisals and increase the chances of intervention 
occurring.  
 
      3.1 Preliminaries:1974-1987 
The modern history of the Kosovo conflict may be said to have begun in 1974, 
with the drawing up of a new constitution for Yugoslavia. This gave Kosovo the 
status of an “autonomous province” within Serbia,2 but did not elevate it to the 
level of a separate constituent republic of the Yugoslav federation. Therefore, 
unlike these republics, Kosovo did not have the constitutional right to secede.3 
This was to prove important when the federation began to break up in the early 
1990s; while the other constituent nations of Yugoslavia, such as the Slovenians 
and Croatians, won recognition from Western governments when they declared 
independence, the Kosovo Albanians, because their province did not have the 
same constitutional status, were not able to gain international backing for their 
own efforts to establish an independent state. In this they were in the same position 
as other national minorities which did not have their own republic, such as the 
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Krajina Serbs of Croatia. Indeed, Western governments continued officially to 
oppose independence for Kosovo even as they went to war in 1999, though the 
logic of Western policy appeared to point to independence. 
      Although they were denied the right to secede, in other respects the 
constitutional settlement of 1974 was quite favourable towards the Kosovo 
Albanians. In 1981, an Albanian professor at the University of Pristina claimed 
(admittedly, not without a certain amount of the usual communist hyperbole) that 
“not a single national minority in the world has achieved the rights that the 
Albanian nationality enjoys in socialist Yugoslavia.”4 Albanian was made the 
official language of the province, and Albanian leaders were able to promote the 
Albanianisation of cultural and public life, which resulted in a marginalisation of 
the Serbian minority.5 This was to lead to trouble when a new politicised Serbian 
nationalism, rejecting the notion of the unity of the federation of Yugoslavia, 
began to gain support in the late 1980s. 
 
      3.2 1987-1991: The Rise of Milosevic  
Milosevic’s ability to exploit the resentments of the Serbian minority in Kosovo 
played a major part in his rise to power. Malcolm writes that “it was... the issue of 
Kosovo that brought about his transformation from little-known Party apparatchik 
into demagogic political leader.” On April 24 1987, Milosevic told protesting 
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Kosovo Serbs that “nobody should ever dare to beat you”- these were “the words 
on which his entire political future would be built”.6 
      Some 130,000 Serbs left Kosovo between 1966 and 1989 because of what 
Hedges describes as “frequent harassment and discrimination” by the majority 
Albanian population.7 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo 
reports that the Serbs who left the province in this period “were genuinely afraid of 
physical violence and damage to their property; they also experienced institutional 
and ideological discrimination.” Wilder stories of the rape of Serbian women by 
Albanians circulated in Belgrade. These were not substantiated by official figures, 
which showed the rate of rape in Kosovo to be less than half that in greater 
Serbia8; but the existence of such rumours was a sign of a growing mistrust 
between the two ethnic groups. Unconfirmed or exaggerated stories of inter-ethnic 
violence have impacted on the course of the conflict in Kosovo on more than one 
occasion; most recently, the riots of March 2004 (see Chapter 6) were sparked by 
rumours- never proved- of ethnic Albanian boys drowning after being driven into a 
river by a gang of Serbs. 
       Another contributing issue was the fact that, due partly to the aforementioned 
emigration and partly to a higher birthrate among Albanians, the Serbian minority 
was declining in terms of its proportion of the total population of Kosovo; down 
from 23.5% in 1961 to 13.2% in 1981, and only 9.9% in 1991.9 
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      By the end of 1987, Milosevic had been installed as President of the Serbian 
League of Communists. He immediately embarked on a strategy of the 
‘Serbianisation’ of Kosovo, which was to remain in place for the next decade. 
Police harassment and repression of Kosovo Albanians had begun to escalate as 
early as 1987, but the beginning of the period of crisis in the province can 
probably be dated to March 2 1989, when Kosovo Albanian party leaders were 
arrested on the grounds that they had organised a miners’ strike; this action led to 
massive demonstrations and the imposition of emergency rule over Kosovo.10 In 
the same year, laws were passed preventing Albanians from buying or selling 
property without the permission of the authorities.11 
      On July 2 1990, Albanian delegates to the Kosovo Assembly declared political 
sovereignty for Kosovo as an independent unit in the federal system (although not, 
as yet, as a separate state). Three days later, the Serbian government dissolved the 
assembly and began a purge of Albanians in government posts and the media. This 
was followed in September 1990 by the proclamation of a new constitution that 
revoked the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina12 (an ethnically diverse province 
in northern Serbia containing a sizeable population of ethnic Hungarians13- later to 
be an important centre of opposition to Milosevic, a fact which did not prevent it 
from receiving particularly heavy bombing during the NATO intervention). The 
new constitution gave Serbia control over Kosovo’s police, courts and civil 
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defence, social and economic policy, educational policy and the choice of an 
official language.14 
      If the emerging Kosovo Albanian resistance movement had not initially 
advocated complete independence for the province, this was to change in 1991, as 
the Yugoslavian federation began to fall apart. Kosovo was to follow the example 
of Slovenia and Croatia in declaring independence. A clandestine referendum was 
held in September 1991, which produced a 99% vote in favour of independence 
for Kosovo on an 87% turnout.15 
 
      3.3 Before Dayton: Kosovar Apartheid, the LDK and Peaceful Resistance 
In the first half of the 1990s, the dominant force in the Kosovar independence 
movement was the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), led by Ibrahim Rugova, 
who- as the sole candidate- was elected President of Kosovo’s ‘shadow 
government’ in May 1992.16 The LDK favoured a strategy of peaceful resistance, 
aiming to deny the legitimacy of Serbian rule by such tactics as boycotting 
elections and censuses and creating the apparatus of a parallel state.17 Rugova 
believed that this strategy would win Western support for independence for 
Kosovo; he said in 1991 that “we have learned that non-violence is the modern 
European preference.”18 
      The Kosovar nationalist movement of this time has been criticised for 
following an unrealistic strategy of combining peaceful methods of resistance with 
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an absolute refusal to compromise on its demand for independence.19 Certainly the 
LDK’s policy led it into some strange contradictions. Although the LDK refused 
to seek accommodation with Belgrade, on several occasions they found 
themselves playing a crucial role in helping to prop up the Milosevic regime. For 
example, the Kosovo Albanian population boycotted the presidential elections of 
December 1992, which Milosevic would undoubtedly have lost had they turned 
out against him. The Albanian population again boycotted Yugoslav elections in 
January 1994, meaning that extreme Serbian nationalists were elected to represent 
Kosovo.20 Those elected included the notorious war criminal Arkan.21 
      The resistance preferred for Milosevic to continue in power rather than be 
replaced by a more reform-minded leader, because their strategy depended on 
Serbia continuing to seem profoundly evil- which left them as the obvious ‘good 
guys’. Vickers writes that “it would have been a disaster for them if a 
peacemonger like (Milan) Panic (who became Prime Minister of Serbia in July 
1992, only to be defeated by Milosevic in December) had restored human rights, 
since this would have left them with nothing but a bare political agenda to change 
borders.”22 LDK Vice President Fehami Agami explained that “frankly, it is better 
(for us) to continue with Milosevic. Milosevic was very successful in destroying 
Yugoslavia and in the same way, if he continues, he will destroy Serbia... [Panic] 
is offering enlightened hegemony.”23 
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     This points up a crucial difference in how the Kosovo dispute was interpreted 
inside and outside the borders of the FRY. For the international community, when 
it was paying attention to what was going on in Kosovo, the issue was regarded as 
being one of the abuse of the human rights of one ethnic group by another, within 
a single state. For the Kosovo Albanians (as for the Serbs) the dispute was at root 
over territory and sovereignty. To Kosovo Albanian leaders, human rights abuses 
by the Serbian government were a symptom, the cause of which was the fact that 
Kosovo was not independent. As Rugova was to emphasise to US Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright during the Rambouillet negotiations, the Kosovars 
always equated security with independence.24 We will return to this issue later in 
the chapter. 
     The system that operated in the province in the 1990s has been termed 
‘Kosovar Apartheid’.25 The Milosevic regime pursued a ‘Serbianisation’ 
programme in the public sector- for example, in September 1993 the Serb 
authorities replaced the directors of the largest state enterprises and utilities with 
members of Milosevic’s Socialist Party.26 The overwhelming majority of those 
Albanians who had held state employment- including most doctors, health workers 
and schoolteachers- were soon sacked on a variety of pretexts. Segregation was 
introduced in schools, and arbitrary arrest and police violence became routine- a 
Serbian law allowed the arrest and summary imprisonment for up to two months 
of anyone who committed a “verbal crime” such as “insulting the patriotic feelings 
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of Serbian citizens.”27 The authorities also made some efforts at colonising the 
province, for example by resettling Serbian refugees there, though these did not 
take place on a large enough scale to arrest the long-running decline in the Serbian 
minority as a proportion of the population of Kosovo.28 
      Meanwhile, the LDK set up its own parallel systems and institutions of 
government, plus its own system of tax collection. Two-thirds of children in 
Kosovo were taught outside the official school system.29 
      Despite the organisation’s espousal of peaceful resistance, LDK rule was not 
entirely benign. The party used its power to isolate those Albanians who tried to 
maintain contact with Serbs.30 Judah described the LDK as “a curious mirror 
image to Milosevic’s SPS”, which “brooks little dissent and those that challenge 
it... can even be ostracised in the tight-knit Albanian community.”31 
      Looking back on the early 1990s, leading LDK member Xhafer Shatri 
acknowledged that although passive resistance had been the right strategy, the 
party had been too timid and had never taken it to its logical conclusion: “we 
should have been stronger. There should have been boycotts of Serbian goods, 
utility bills should never have been paid. They could arrest one or ten people but 
never 100,000. We had too many illusions, we did not do enough.” Chief amongst 
these illusions was a misplaced confidence in the goodwill of the international 
community.32  Rugova proved to be mistaken in his belief that the LDK’s strategy 
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would win Western support for independence for Kosovo- or even attention to the 
situation in the province. In fact, Kosovo was, says Vickers, “never more than a 
peripheral item in international talks” prior to 1998.33 The US government did 
impose economic sanctions on the  Yugoslav federal government in late 1990 and 
early 1991 over its decision to declare martial law in Kosovo, and  the Bush and 
Clinton administrations in the US did periodically issue stern warnings to 
Milosevic. For example, in December 1992, in a letter to the Serbian leader, 
George Bush said that "in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian 
action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the 
Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia proper".34  
      However, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report on the 
crisis concluded that such warnings "were overshadowed by the tendency to treat 
Milosevic as an interlocutor whom the West could not afford to alienate in its 
efforts to achieve a diplomatic settlement of the regional crisis."35 Hence, when 
the EU recognized Yugoslavia in April 1996, autonomy for Kosovo was not 
required- merely "a constructive approach". "(A)chieving Milosevic's cooperation 
on Bosnia was given priority over exercising leverage on Kosovo".36  
                                                
      The essential elements of Western policy- the low priority given to the conflict 
in Kosovo except when it reached a level sufficient to threaten either a refugee 
crisis or the disruption of wider regional stability, and the almost total reliance on 
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threats of bombing as a tool for forcing Milosevic to negotiate- were to remain 
constant from this point on.  
      The situation in this period suited Milosevic as the passive stance of the LDK 
meant that the situation in Kosovo was fairly stable, and thus- particularly as 
Western powers were at that time preoccupied with the war in Bosnia- the 
province’s low international profile was not likely to change. There was, 
nevertheless, always the potential that Kosovo could become a major international 
issue, even more so than was the case with Bosnia. Kosovo is in a more important 
strategic position than Bosnia, which is located in the middle of the old 
Yugoslavia, with no external borders except an extremely narrow outlet to the sea.  
A war in Kosovo could more easily have threatened to spill over beyond the 
borders of the old Federation and threaten the security of countries like Albania, 
Bulgaria and Greece.37 However, for as long as there was no active military 
conflict in the province, outside powers had no strategic reasons to treat the 
situation there as one meriting action. 
  
      3.4 The Turning Point: Dayton 
For these reasons, the issue of Kosovo was not dealt with at the Dayton 
negotiations of 1995 that decided the future of Bosnia. There were other factors 
involved- for example, trying to include Kosovo in the talks would have added 
further difficulties to an already very complex agenda- but these were relatively 
minor.  
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     There is general agreement in historical accounts of this period that the 
exclusion of Kosovo from the talks played the pivotal part in starting the sequence 
of events that led to the rise of the Kosovo Liberation Army, civil war in the 
province in 1998 and eventually to NATO intervention. After Dayton, according 
to Vickers, “it... became apparent to all that as long as there appeared to be relative 
peace in Kosovo, the international community would avoid suggesting any 
substantive changes.” Hence, “in response to the situation after the Dayton 
Accords, the Kosovars, snubbed and humiliated, were forced to re-evaluate their 
political stance.”38  
      Moreover, the nature of the agreement reached at Dayton on the future of 
Bosnia “convinced many Albanians that the international community understood 
only the language of force, and not that of non-violence” (Vickers).39 For the 
previous five years, in the face of considerable provocation, Kosovo Albanian 
leaders had held to their strategy of peaceful resistance- exactly the course of 
action which, one would think, should have made them very popular with Western 
liberals and statesmen interested in the promotion of human rights. And yet their 
plight had been ignored. In contrast, the Bosnian Serbs- who had pursued a violent 
policy of ethnic cleansing in pursuit of their territorial aims- had won significant 
concessions at Dayton. Admittedly they had not won independence, but they had 
gained recognition for their own Republika Srpska as an autonomous entity within 
the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina40. Unlike Kosovo- which, as we have seen, 
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had been given official status as a separate province within Serbia under the old 
Yugoslav constitution- Republika Srpska was an entirely new entity, established 
by force.41 It seemed clear that, if one wished to make a material alteration to the 
post-breakup settlement in the former Yugoslavia, the best way to achieve this was 
through violence rather than peaceful resistance. 
     A KLA fighter told Chris Hedges that “we all feel a deep, deep sense of 
betrayal. We mounted a peaceful, civilised protest to fight the totalitarian rule of 
Milosevic. We did not go down the road of nationalist hatred.... The result is that 
we were ignored.” The lesson drawn was that “those who want freedom must fight 
for it.”42 
 
      3.5 After Dayton: The Rise of the KLA and Civil War 
The Kosovo Liberation Army grew out of the Popular Movement for Kosovo 
(LPK), a small Switzerland-based emigre group formed in the early 1980s.43 
Although the first armed attacks by its parent organisation took place as early as 
May 199344, the KLA publicly announced itself in February 1996 with 
simultaneous bomb attacks on five camps hosting Krajina Serb refugees who had 
been resettled in northern Kosovo.45 
      What the KLA had in common with the LDK was that both believed that 
independence for Kosovo was only likely to be achieved with help from the West. 
Where they differed was in their favoured strategy for ‘internationalising’ the 
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issue. From 1995 onward, the evident failure of the ‘peaceful resistance’ strategy 
led to a rise in support for the violent tactics favoured by the KLA. 
      Also different was the final aim of the KLA’s ‘internationalisation’ strategy, 
which “became that of inducing NATO-based military intervention rather than a 
diplomatic compromise, as only the former would likely lead to independence 
rather than some form of autonomy of the pre-1989 variety.”46 
      The LDK was further weakened in 1997 by the collapse of the Belisha 
government in Albania- which had been the only government to recognise the 
Kosovo Republic as an independent state.47 The collapse of the Albanian army at 
the same time- and the resultant looting of military arsenals- also gave the KLA a 
new source of bargain-priced weapons.48 
      The KLA is described by Hedges as splitting “down a bizarre ideological 
divide, with hints of fascism on one side and whiffs of communism on the 
other.”49 Certainly, though in some sections of the Western media the KLA has 
been portrayed in rather romantic fashion as a band of freedom fighters, it is hard 
to argue with the US Special Envoy to the Balkans Robert Gelbard’s 
characterisation of the KLA (in February 1998) as “undoubtedly a terrorist 
group”.50 Given the situation in Kosovo in the late 90s, attacks on Serbian police 
and troops might well have been defended as legitimate acts of resistance in the 
name of national self-determination, but the KLA also made a practice of attacking 
Serb civilians and fellow Albanians who were regarded as collaborators (or those 
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merely perceived to be not supporting the KLA). According to the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s indictment of KLA commander 
(and later Prime Minister of Kosovo) Ramush Haradinaj (for “crimes against 
humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war”), the KLA’s victims, 
“including Albanian and Roma civilians believed by the KLA to be refusing to 
cooperate with or to be resisting the KLA by non-military means, were targeted for 
persecution and maltreatment, comprising intimidation, imprisonment, beating, 
torture and murder.”51 When the organisation briefly took control of the Drenica 
region of Kosovo in late 1997, the organisation banned all political parties and 
expelled Serbs, Gypsies and Gorans (Slavic Muslims).52 The KLA’s demands did 
not stop at independence for the province of Kosovo: it also officially laid claim to 
territory in southern Serbia as well as parts of Montenegro, Macedonia and 
Greece.53 Macedonia and southern Serbia were both to become minor flashpoints 
of conflict in the years after the NATO intervention in Kosovo. 
      KLA attacks continued through 1996 and 1997. However, 1998 saw a dramatic 
change in the nature of the conflict. From February of that year, the scale of the 
guerrilla operations escalated sharply. The KLA gained some martyrs- and greater 
popular support- in March 1998 after the Serbian forces killed a KLA strongman 
and his entire family in an assault on the village of Donji Prekaz.54 
                                                 
51
 ICTY, Haradinaj et.al. Initial Indictment 24 Feb 2005, http://www.un.org/icty/-
indictment/english/har-ii050224e.htm, Para.16 
52
 M. Radu, ‘Stabilising Borders in the Balkans: The Inevitability and Costs of a Greater Albania’, 
in T. Galen Carpenter, ed. NATO’s Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War, Washington 
DC, Cato Institute, p.126 
53
 J.G. Jatras, NATO’s Myths and Bogus Justifications for Intervention’, in Galen Carpenter op.cit. 
p.26 
54
 FAC Report Vol.I op.cit. Para.26 
 - 118 -
      The Serbian government forces were initially slow to respond to this escalation 
in the conflict, and by the summer of 1998 the KLA controlled 40% of the territory 
of Kosovo. A brutal response eventually did arrive with a major Serbian offensive 
between 23 August and 5 September 1998.55  Over the whole of 1998, about 2000 
people were killed and- according to UN estimates- over 298,000 were made into 
refugees or internally displaced.56 Serbian security forces were responsible for the 
great majority of the casualties. 
      The KLA’s aim was to use terrorist tactics to provoke a response from the 
government forces. Given the nature of the Milosevic regime, the importance 
attached by Serbian leaders to retaining Kosovo, and the normal character of 
counter-insurgency campaigns as seen in many countries all over the world, it was 
a predictable that the response would be violent and undiscriminating in its effects. 
KLA leader Hashim Thaci told BBC investigators that “we knew full well that any 
armed action we undertook would trigger a ruthless retaliation against our 
people…. We knew we were endangering civilian lives too, a great number of 
lives.”57 KLA leaders knew that they could not defeat the Serbian army by 
themselves, whether in open battle or by guerrilla tactics; but they could hope to 
do so indirectly, by creating an internal conflict in the province which, with the 
Kosovo Albanians appearing as the victims, might well provoke Western 
intervention on their side. Even the peaceful resistance movement realized this: 
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Alush Gashi, an advisor to Rugova, said that NATO intervention “depends on how 
we look on CNN. People need to see victims in their living rooms.”58 Western 
powers, too, were aware of the KLA tactics: US intelligence concluded in 1998 
that the KLA “intended to draw NATO into its fight for independence by 
provoking Serb atrocities.”59 
      The KLA were also able to benefit in this period from the attention of the 
Western media, which tended to see them as “freedom fighters” rather than 
“terrorists”. Pettifor writes that “the KLA were perceived as classic Balkan rebels, 
the oppressed in the hills taking on the foreign occupiers.... and, most important 
for the international media, they were ‘the underdogs’, risking all for their country, 
an attractive image compared to the heavily protected and repressive Serbian 
security forces.”60 
     The strategy of provocation proved successful. The escalation of the conflict in 
1998 meant that, for the first time, Western governments were forced to take 
serious action with regard to the Kosovo crisis (the KLA was also helped by the 
fact that by this time,   Milosevic was no longer useful to the West as a facilitator 
of peace in Bosnia, so there was no reason to placate him as there had been in 
1995). The action taken was based on the already-existing strategy of threats of 
military force aimed at Milosevic in order to persuade him to accept a diplomatic 
settlement. On 13 October 1998, following a “concentrated diplomatic effort by 
the USA to persuade European states that… the threat of NATO force… was the 
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only possible means” to resolve the crisis, every NATO member agreed to an 
activation order which was designed to prepare for aerial bombardment of the 
FRY.61 The result was the ‘Holbrooke agreement’ (so called because it was 
brokered by US diplomat Richard Holbrooke) of October 1998, which mandated 
the reduction of Serb forces in Kosovo to “pre-crisis levels”, a ceasefire in Kosovo 
and the deployment of 2000 unarmed OSCE peace monitors in the province.62    
      The Serbs largely kept to their side of the Holbrooke agreement, at least 
initially. General Naumann, a participant in the October negotiations, said that “I 
think it is fair to say that Milosevic honoured the commitment which he had 
made.... He withdrew the forces and he withdrew the police... more or less.”63 
However, the KLA took advantage of the troop withdrawals to recapture much of 
the territory it had lost during August and September. According to Judah, the 
agreement also gave the KLA- which had been “hard pressed and... holed up in the 
hills”- “a  reprieve, time to organise and rearm, and as they told anyone who cared 
to listen, time to prepare for their spring offensive.”64  “In most cases,” said 
Naumann, “the escalation came from the  Kosovar side... what the Serbs got 
wrong was that they reacted in an indiscriminate way.”65 
      The problem was that the KLA took the threat of NATO force which had 
accompanied the Holbrooke agreement as a promise of future NATO 
intervention66, and hence from this point on had even less incentive to 
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compromise. Unsurprisingly, the Serbs soon responded to the KLA’s breaches of 
the ceasefire. During the winter the conflict resumed, although thanks to the 
presence of the monitors it did so at a far lower intensity than in the summer, 
except for the widely-publicised killing by Serb paramilitaries of some 45 ethnic 
Albanians at Racak on January 15 1999. There is some dispute over whether all 
those killed at Racak were civilians, as was initially reported: Henig writes that 
“quite what happened at Racak and, in particular, how many ‘unarmed civilians’ 
were killed will probably never be known, but it was a defining moment in the 
countdown to war”.67 
      The resumption of the conflict led to a new set of negotiations at Rambouillet 
and Paris in February and March 1999. These talks, the failure of which led 
immediately to the beginning of the NATO military intervention, will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter 4. 
 
      3.6 Conclusion: The Pre-Intervention Consequences of Humanitarian 
     War in Kosovo 
We have seen, then, that long before the NATO bombing began in March 1999, 
the possibility that military intervention might occur at some point in the future 
had an impact on the actions and strategies pursued by the government of 
Yugoslavia and by the various groups representing the Kosovo Albanian 
population. Surprisingly though, while Western policy focused mainly on 
attempting to persuade Milosevic’s government to alter its behaviour towards the 
Kosovo Albanians- whose representatives, before Rambouillet anyway, received 
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little attention- it was upon the latter group that Western policy exercised a 
decisive influence. While, as we will see in Chapter 4, the Serbs took little heed of 
NATO’s threats, the attitudes of NATO governments towards Kosovo in the mid-
1990s played the crucial role in causing the Kosovar resistance to change its 
tactics, and in facilitating the rise of violent extremists to replace the peaceful 
figures who had dominated the resistance in the first half of the 90s. 
      If the prospect of intervention had had the effect of encouraging both sides to 
seek a peaceful settlement, all might have been well. Even if only one of the sides 
had been persuaded to seek peace, while the other had remained unmoved, that 
would have been something.  But while Western threats seem to have had no 
decisive impact either way on the Serbs, their impact on the Kosovo Albanians 
was to encourage them to escalate the crisis through the use of violence, thereby 
worsening the immediate situation and, in the longer term, greatly reducing the 
chances of a sustainable peaceful settlement. 
     It is a commonplace for Western leaders, when planning to go to war, to say 
that the dictator who we will be fighting against ‘only understands the language of 
force’. But in the case of their response to the Kosovo crisis, this could also be 
applied to Western countries themselves. For as long as the Kosovo Albanians 
pursued their strategy of peaceful resistance, they were largely ignored. However, 
as soon as the KLA arose, with its terroristic tactics, NATO powers began to take 
notice of Kosovo. 
     As we have seen- and will see in more detail in Chapter 4- Western action with 
relation to Kosovo before 1998 was distinctly sporadic and half-hearted. In this 
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period the West’s main priority in the Balkans was attempting to resolve or at least 
contain the conflict in Bosnia. Kosovo, because of the peaceful strategy pursued 
by the LDK, did not constitute an immediate problem in the way that Bosnia did. 
Although serious human rights abuses were occurring in the province, there was 
no internal armed conflict and the situation posed no short-term threat to regional 
stability. This explains, for example, the exclusion of the issue of Kosovo was 
excluded from the 1995 Dayton talks. The Independent International Commission 
on Kosovo notes that “the political will to mount a major diplomatic effort could 
only be mobilised after the conflict escalated into full-scale violence.”68 
     The long-term effects of the decision to exclude the question of Kosovo from 
the Dayton talks proved to be disastrous. Most importantly, the structure of the 
Dayton process and the content of the Accords sent out the worst possible message 
to oppressed groups such as the Kosovo Albanians. 
     This was not because Western leaders deliberately set out to reward those who 
used terroristic methods to achieve their goals. However, the nature of Western 
priorities in the Balkans in the 1990s was such as to have precisely this effect. The 
decision to intervene or not in Kosovo, as in other places, was taken not according 
to the severity of human rights abuses- as the theory of humanitarian war states 
that it should be- but according to the perceived presence or absence of a threat to 
wider regional stability, and the possibility of large-scale refugee flows which- 
given the sensitivity of the issue of immigration- would create political problems 
for governments in Western Europe. US Secretary of Defence William Cohen and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff H. Skelton said that NATO had three major 
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interests in Kosovo: preventing destabilisation of “NATO’s south-eastern region”, 
ending the refugee flow which was overtaxing infrastructure, and “protecting 
NATO’s credibility”.69 The first two of these only became problems after the 
emergence of the KLA, and the third only became an issue once threats of NATO 
force had been made.  
     Hence an incentive was created for the KLA to escalate the crisis in the 
province by using terrorist actions to provoke a Serbian response. The history of 
counter-insurgency campaigns across the world shows that a government faced by 
the threat of an armed guerrilla group seeking independence for a portion of its 
territory is unlikely to be pusillanimous in its response, particularly if that 
government is led by someone like Slobodan Milosevic. An excessive response by 
the Serbian government would then enshrine the Kosovo Albanians as the victims 
in the eyes of the outside world.  
     A further factor involved here was the difference- mentioned earlier- between 
how the crisis was perceived internally and externally. That is, the Kosovo crisis 
was viewed by outsiders as a human rights issue, whereas for Kosovo Albanian 
leaders (the LDK and  KLA were alike in this matter), as for the government of the 
FRY, the conflict was one of territory and sovereignty- whether Kosovo was to 
become independent or remain part of Serbia. For Kosovo Albanian leaders, 
human rights abuses within the province served as proof- and as an illustration to 
the outside world- that the Kosovars should have the right to self-determination. 
Equally, for the Serbian authorities- though it might well be argued that they had 
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forfeited any moral right to sovereignty over Kosovo by the abuses directed at the 
majority population over the previous decade- the province was still rightfully part 
of Serbia and they were entitled to respond to a separatist threat as would any 
legitimate government.  
      There is a danger that imposing such a ‘human rights framework’ on a 
territorial conflict can lead to a simplistic outlook in which one side is regarded as 
purely villainous while those on the other side are regarded as passive victims. In 
this case, as we have seen, Kosovo Albanian leaders were not mere victims but 
actors with their own agenda who were able by their actions to influence the way 
in which NATO powers perceived  and acted upon the crisis in Kosovo  
      Thus there is a possibility of a humanitarian war being launched may serve to 
inflame internal crises by giving members of an oppressed group an incentive to 
turn to violent tactics, thereby favouring extremist currents within that society and 
reducing the chances of a peaceful settlement. It is almost certain that, had the 
Kosovo Albanians stuck with peaceful resistance, there would have been no war 
and Kosovo would most likely still be in Serbian hands today. As Pettifor says, “it 
can be stated with certainty that NATO would not have intervened in Yugoslavia 
without the emergence of the KLA.”70 The UN Balkans Commander Major-
General Lewis Mackenzie was later to reflect ruefully that “the Kosovo Albanians 
(meaning the KLA) played us like a Stradivarius.”71 
      It is hard, then, to avoid the conclusion that, in Kosovo, terrorism worked, 
albeit at huge cost to the population. True, the KLA did not achieve their goal of 
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full independence- but today Kosovo is clearly a de facto separate state, part of 
Serbia in name only. The depressing conclusion that can be drawn from this is 
that, if an oppressed people wish to bring about a humanitarian war to liberate 
them, they are far better off turning to terrorism than to peaceful resistance, 
because terrorist tactics are far more likely to provoke an excessively violent 
response, and a resulting humanitarian crisis- together, perhaps, with a threat to 
international stability. 
     It must be admitted that attitudes have changed since 1999, and it is unlikely 
that the KLA would be regarded with a similar degree of sympathy in Western 
capitals if they chose to start their campaign today. It was, after all, an Islamic 
terrorist group, and one which is alleged to have had at least indirect links with al 
Qaida via the brother of the leader of an Egyptian jihad organisation.72 In fact, it is 
intriguing to speculate on what might have happened if the civil war in Kosovo 
had not erupted until, say, the spring of 2002. Milosevic would undoubtedly have 
attempted to sell his campaign of reprisals as part of the global war on terror, and 
given the atmosphere prevailing in the aftermath of 9/11, Serbia might even have 
become a valued Western ally. A number of Central Asian dictatorships- eg 
Uzbekistan - were able to exploit the War on Terror for their own ends in precisely 
that fashion. 
      There is, however, some evidence that the hope of provoking a humanitarian 
war is leading groups in other areas to adopt the KLA strategy. Specifically, the 
rebel groups in Darfur have been accused by the UN of attempting to provoke 
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atrocities by Sudanese forces, and some fear that media coverage of the Darfur 
crisis- much of it having a distinctly pro-underdog and therefore pro-rebel slant, as 
was the case in Kosovo- has served to embolden the rebels to increase their 
demands.73  
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 Chapter Four 
Kosovo: The Jus ad Bellum 
 
This chapter will deal with the question of what the prehistory of the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo reveals about the jus ad bellum in a real case of 
humanitarian war. It will do this by looking in turn at each of the theoretical 
criteria for a humanitarian war, as detailed in Chapter 1: ‘last resort’, 
‘humanitarian motives’, ‘supreme emergency’, ‘wide international backing’, 
‘proportionality’ and ‘reasonable expectation of victory’. 
      The chapter will begin with a brief general summary of the extent to which the 
official justifications given for the intervention followed the theoretical criteria 
outlined in Chapter 1. Then each of these criteria will be discussed, beginning with 
the criterion of ‘last resort’, using evidence from sources both opposed to and in 
favour of the bombing and of the principle of humanitarian war.  
      Issues to be looked at in the section on the ‘last resort’ include the question of 
whether the conflict could have been resolved peacefully, either in 1999 or earlier, 
if outsiders had followed different courses of action. An attempt will be made from 
this to draw out some lessons about the potentially problematic nature of the ‘last 
resort’ in humanitarian wars, when there may be doubts over whether attempts to 
find a peaceful settlement have been pursued with sufficient vigour. 
       The next section will look at the motives that the NATO states had for 
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intervening in Kosovo- whether these were wholly, or at least mostly, 
humanitarian, and how these motives influenced the course of events in the run-up 
to the war. It will be recalled that humanitarian war theorists argue that the fact 
that states may have non-altruistic motives for undertaking an intervention does 
not matter provided that these motives do not hinder the chance of a humanitarian 
outcome; but the case of Kosovo provides some evidence that this idea may not be 
realistic in practice. It is widely acknowledged that non-humanitarian concerns 
such as the perceived need to protect NATO’s credibility played a major part in 
motivating the intervention; these ancillary motives seem to have had a significant 
impact on the course of events. This section will also analyse the charge, often 
made by critics of the war, that NATO countries negotiated in ‘bad faith’  at the 
final negotiations in Rambouillet and Paris. 
       ‘Supreme emergency’, the next criterion to be discussed, is another highly 
problematic area. The abuses of human rights suffered by the Kosovo Albanian 
population were undoubtedly severe, but before the bombing began they were not 
exceptional by global standards; this leads to questions over the selective nature of 
humanitarian intervention.  
       The other criteria- ‘wide international support’, ‘proportionality’ and 
‘reasonable expectation of victory’ will then be investigated more briefly, as these 
are either less important or less problematic, or else (particularly the case with the 
last two criteria) are better investigated in other chapters. 
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       4.1 Out of the mouths of babes and spokesmen: Use of the Theoretical 
       Criteria in Justifying the NATO intervention 
 
The justifications offered for the war by NATO leaders and spokesmen followed 
very closely the theoretical criteria for a humanitarian war. In particular, ‘last 
resort’, ‘severity of human rights abuses’ and ‘humanitarian motives’ were cited in 
almost every speech and article. At the UN Security Council meeting on 24 March 
1999, the representatives from the USA (who said that “the United States and its 
allies had begun military action only with the greatest reluctance”), the 
Netherlands (who said that “his country had participated in and assumed 
responsibility for the present situation because there was no other solution”), 
France (“[Commitments] were not respected by Belgrade, despite every effort to 
prompt it to do so. Thus, [diplomatic] efforts had been exhausted”), the United 
Kingdom (“Every means short of force had been tried to avert this situation”), and 
Germany (“the international community had done its utmost to find a peaceful 
solution to the Kosovo conflict”) all used ‘last resort’ arguments to justify their 
countries’ support for the intervention.1                  
      NATO’s humanitarian motives, and the alleged extreme severity of the human 
rights abuses that were taking place in Kosovo, were also widely cited, usually in 
tandem. Tony Blair told the House of Commons on 23 March 1999 that “we must 
act to save thousands of innocent men, women and children from humanitarian 
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catastrophe, from death, barbarism and ethnic cleansing by a brutal dictatorship”.2 
The British DfID and FCO Annual Report on Human Rights for 1999 neatly 
encapsulated all three of the criteria to be dealt with in this chapter when it said in 
its introduction that: 
 
“Together we (the UK government) stood up for the rights of the people of 
Kosovo... NATO was united in its resolve to defend those rights and the 
international community was overwhelmingly supportive of our actions.... This 
was not a conflict we wanted. But there could not have been a more vivid way of 
demonstrating our commitment to human rights as enshrined in the (UN) 
Declaration.”3 
 
The criterion of ‘broad international support’ was less often cited, however, 
probably because it was more problematic. The UN Security Council neither 
endorsed nor condemned the war, opposition to it was expressed by such major 
powers as Russia, China and India (as well as a number of smaller states in the 
developing world), and, although NATO was united on the decision to go to war, 
its members were certainly not wholly in agreement on the issue of what form the 
war would take. Nevertheless, on 26 March the US representative on the Security 
Council did mention that “his country greatly appreciated the broad support for 
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NATO that had been shown in the Council on Wednesday (24 March).”4 
      Overall, then, if one concentrates purely on official statements, Kosovo looks 
in these areas like a paradigmatic case of a humanitarian war as outlined in the 
theory. 
       
      4.2 The ‘Last Resort’  
Theorists of humanitarian war are almost invariably careful to state that it must be 
a last-resort option. True, the case of Kosovo did cause one or two to reject this 
criterion. Leon Wieseltier argued that “a war against genocide must be fought with 
a fury.... For the purpose of stopping genocide, the use of force is not a last resort: 
it is a first resort”5. But the vast majority continue to hold on to it, and we saw 
above that those who launched the NATO intervention unanimously claimed that 
it was a ‘last resort’ option. 
      This section, then, will look at how the ‘last resort’ was reached in Kosovo by 
detailing the history of the various international efforts to resolve the crisis by 
diplomatic means. It will hopefully help to fill a gap in theoretical accounts of 
humanitarian war, most of which do not give much consideration to what one 
might do before one reaches the oft-mentioned last resort. 
     Broadly, opponents of the war have criticised the way negotiations were 
conducted in the years leading up to the war in three different ways. Firstly, it has 
been argued that there was insufficient attention paid to the possibility of a 
diplomatic solution in the years up to about 1996- ie before the emergence of the 
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KLA made the prospect of a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo issue far more 
remote. Secondly, it has been argued that the negotiations that did take place were 
conducted using the wrong kind of strategy (eg too-heavy reliance on threats rather 
than inducements, failure to involve Russia- seen by the Serbs as their most 
powerful ally- more closely). Thirdly, critics have argued that, at least in the final 
sets of negotiations at Rambouillet and Paris in February-March 1999, NATO was 
negotiating ‘in bad faith’- that, by this time, NATO governments had already 
decided to go to war over Kosovo, and these final negotiations were pursued with 
the aim of justifying a war. This, it is alleged, was done by drafting the proposed 
Peace Accords in such a way as to ensure a Serbian rejection, then refusing to 
countenance any changes- rather than of producing a diplomatic settlement. This 
section will deal with the first two criticisms; the third will be explored in the next 
section, which focuses on NATO’s motives for intervening in Kosovo. 
       
      4.2.1 The Early Phase: 1990- Spring 1998 
The period before the spring of 1998 is generally skimmed over or not mentioned 
at all in the literature dealing with the war, largely because not much diplomatic 
action took place. The situation in Kosovo was overshadowed by the- at this time- 
much deeper and more urgent crisis in Bosnia. However, it is well worth looking 
into this period, since it has been suggested that, had Western nations been more 
engaged with the problem at this stage, and had they shown more imagination in 
the tactics they used rather than relying purely on threats of force, it might well 
have proven possible for the international community to have facilitated a peaceful 
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solution to the Kosovo problem, and the war might never have happened.       
     If this is indeed the case, then it points to a potential problem, not so much with 
the idea of humanitarian war as such, but with the vast amount of effort that has 
been expended by many people over the past decade or so in promoting the idea of 
using force for humanitarian ends. Could more be achieved in terms of addressing 
humanitarian crises by attempting to rehabilitate the old and somewhat out-of-
fashion virtues of peaceful diplomacy than by trying to make the case for using 
force? It is worth mentioning here that- as we will see later in the chapter- some of 
the political leaders who were involved in the NATO intervention, most notably 
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, were accused by critics of the war of 
viewing international politics through the lens of the ‘Munich analogy’, and hence 
automatically equating peaceful diplomacy with appeasement.6 Has the recent 
popularity of the idea of using force to resolve humanitarian crises- and the 
seductiveness of war, which seems on the surface to offer a neat and clear cut 
solution to such crises compared to the necessarily messy convolutions and 
compromises of diplomatic action- contributed to a cavalier and dismissive 
attitude to diplomacy among some leaders? 
      The little international diplomatic action as did occur over Kosovo in this 
period has already been summarised in Chapter 3. In late 1990 and early 1991 the 
US imposed economic sanctions on the Yugoslav federal government over its 
decision to declare martial law in Kosovo and accept Serbia’s revision of its 
constitution; but the sanctions proved counter-productive since they served to 
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further undermine the federal government’s already dwindling authority. 
According to Woodward, the US approach “favoured the nationalist rather than the 
civic, nonnationalist definition of the Kosovo problem (and) bypassed the arena 
where a nonnationalist, democratic approach was possible.”7 The US periodically 
threatened the use of military force “in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by 
Serbian action.” But, as we have seen, the issue of Kosovo was not discussed in 
the Dayton negotiations, and overall the crisis was given a low priority. 
      A number of observers have argued that real opportunities for a negotiated 
settlement were missed in the period before spring 1998 because of the inaction of 
the West. The hearings on Kosovo held by the Foreign Affairs Committee 
produced agreement on this point among a number of witnesses, among them 
Dame Pauline Neville-Jones (former Political Director of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office), Balkans specialist Dr. Susan Woodward and Dr. Oleg 
Levitin, a Russian participant at the Rambouillet talks, who said that “I am sure 
that it was possible to solve the problem earlier- and at a cheaper price.”  Levitin 
describes the idea that Milosevic could never have given up Kosovo as “a 
myth...Milosevic needed Kosovo for practical reasons....Milosevic, after Dayton, 
viewed Kosovo as the most valuable card in his hands, which if sold, had to be 
bargained at the last moment and at a maximum price. Emotional motives were of 
little importance to him: all he needed was personal power.... Nothing suggested 
that he would not have given up Kosovo, had he come to the conclusion that his 
                                                 
7
 S. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, Washington DC, 
Brookings Institution, 1995, p.382 
 - 136 -
personal power was not jeopardised by a deal.”8 The idea that Milosevic might 
have been willing to let go of Kosovo for practical reasons does not fit with the 
picture painted of him during the bombing by NATO government sources as a 
nationalist fanatic and ‘new Hitler’ bent on genocide, but it is fair to point out that 
in earlier times he had been regarded by the West in a rather different way. A 
British Ministry of Defence official made the interesting claim to the Foreign 
Affairs Committee that “we did not think that (Milosevic) was a war criminal” 
before March 1999, since “he had behaved in a reasonably responsible way in 
trying to get the settlement in Bosnia.” This is contrary to the conclusions of the 
UN Srebrenica report, which criticises the international community for treating 
Milosevic as “part of the solution not part of the problem,”9 but it offers a realistic 
picture of Western attitudes in this period.  
      Several suggestions have been made concerning tactics that the West might 
have tried in this period. Levitin suggested the “Tatarstan model”- with Kosovo 
within Yugoslavia, but outside Serbia- believing that Kosovo Albanian politicians 
would have accepted this as late as early 1998.10 Others have suggested that 
inducements might have been offered to Serbia for cooperating, such as lifting of 
sanctions, fast-track stabilisation and association agreements.11 It has also been 
suggested that Western powers should have made more effort to involve the 
Russians- I will return to this suggestion later in the chapter.  Instead, the West 
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relied purely on a strategy of threat, which proved consistently ineffective and was 
based on a misreading of events in Bosnia. It was generally assumed that bombing 
had forced the Serbs to agree to negotiate at Dayton, when in fact it had played 
only a minor part; other factors, such as fears of a Croat-led ground offensive and 
the concession by the US of a separate Serb territorial entity within Bosnia, had 
been more important.12 Woodward suggested that UN peacekeeping troops might 
have helped in late 1997 or early 1998, but added that to have made a serious 
effort at negotiations at that time “would have required a fundamental shift in 
attitude towards Serbia and the Serbs and we were not prepared to do that.”13 
      The Independent International Commission on Kosovo concluded that “one of 
the major lessons of Kosovo is that greater early engagement with a region in 
crisis with a view to preventing conflict is invariably a more effective response 
than late intervention using force.”14 The Commission points to a “window of 
opportunity” that occurred in July 1992 when Milan Panic became Prime Minister 
of Serbia. However, Panic’s attempts to make a deal with Rugova fell through and 
shortly after he was defeated in an election which the Kosovo Albanians 
boycotted.15 
      It has been suggested that something might have been achieved if the West had 
attempted to aid the pro-peace and pro-democratic forces in Kosovo and Serbia; 
instead, Western policy inadvertently helped to keep Milosevic in power, even 
though his control was often very shaky. As was mentioned in Chapter 3, he would 
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have lost the election in 1992 if the Kosovo Albanians had voted; and in 1996 he 
was reduced to 30% of the vote.16 
      It can never be known for certain what might have happened if the various 
diplomatic alternatives suggested above had been tried in Kosovo. It is certainly 
possible- perhaps even likely- that no amount of effort by outsiders could have 
reconciled the gulf between the positions of even the moderate Kosovar and 
Serbian leaders, or that Milosevic’s untrustworthiness would have wrecked all 
attempts at a settlement. However, real possibilities did exist, and were not 
pursued. The question is: why not? The first answer to this is that- as has been 
mentioned already- for much of the 1990s, Milosevic was viewed as “a man we 
can do business with”, particularly at Dayton. The US in particular supported him 
in the late 80s and early 90s since he was an economic liberal and political 
conservative who supported the kinds of economic reform favoured by the IMF- 
he was regarded as a sort of Balkan version of the Chilean dictator Augusto 
Pinochet.17 He was also known to be pro-American; while an executive of Serbia’s 
largest bank, he spent extended periods in New York.18 Woodward remarks that 
“it was common at th(is) time... for Westerners and banks to choose ‘commitment 
to economic reform’ as their prime criterion for supporting East European and 
Soviet leaders (as well as many in developing countries) and to ignore the 
consequences that their idea of economic reform might have on democratic 
                                                                                                                                      
18
15
 Ibid p.48 
es 8/1/2000, FAC Report Vol.II op.cit. p.131 16 Woodward, Examination of Witness
17
 Woodward (1995) op.cit. pp.106-7 
 TRB, ‘No Contact’, The New Republic April 12 1999, p.6 
 - 139 -
development.”19 
      Thus Kosovo did not become a potential target for a humanitarian war until the 
Serbian dictator had outlived his usefulness to the West in terms of aiding a 
with a problem when it threatens to get completely out of hand, one may find 
 be the case with regard to Kosovo. 
settlement in Bosnia, and had thoroughly lost his early reputation as an economic 
reformer. 
     Other factors contributing to the failure to search actively for a diplomatic 
settlement seem to have included a lack of imagination and short-termism; an 
unwillingness to deal with the problem while it did not appear to be absolutely 
urgent. The danger of this kind of attitude is that, if one only begins to seriously 
deal 
that one has left it too late. That was to prove to
       
      4.2.2 The Later Phase: From Spring 1998 
When civil war erupted inside Kosovo in 1998, events in the province immediately 
gained a much higher profile in the international media, and diplomatic efforts to 
address the crisis were pursued with far greater intensity. The problem was that, 
once the KLA became the leading actor on the Kosovo Albanian side, the 
prospects of a peaceful settlement- even with active international involvement- 
ceded sharply. Indeed, many observers have concluded that from the spring of re
1998 onwards, there was effectively no chance of a negotiated settlement.    
 
      4.2.2.1 The Holbrooke Agreement and the Deployment of OSCE Monitors 
An apparent diplomatic breakthrough occurred in October 1998 when the 
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Yugoslav government signed up to the ‘Holbrooke Agreement’. Its terms included 
a reduction of Serbian forces in Kosovo to the levels of before February 1998, and 
the deployment of 2000 unarmed monitors from the Organisation for Co-operation 
and Security in Europe (OSCE) to ensure continued cooperation with the 
agreement.  As was seen in Chapter 3, the Serbs did essentially keep to their side 
of this deal, at least for a time; but the KLA took advantage of Serb withdrawals to
20
 
 December 1998, the KVM had only 50 staff.22 
ost far less in 
                                                
re-occupy lost territory. The Serbs responded, with the result that conflict 
continued- though at a greatly reduced level of intensity- through to March 1999. 
      It is scarcely disputable that, as the House of Commons Defence Committee 
report on Kosovo puts it, “the international community did not display sufficient 
seriousness of purpose or sense of urgency in supporting the KVM”21 (Kosovo 
Verification Mission- the OSCE monitors). The OSCE, having no staff of its own, 
had to rely on secondments and nominations by member states. These states 
dragged their feet badly, and in
Even in March 1999, only 1400 observers were present- well short of the 2000 
prescribed by the Agreement.23 
       This is an example of a theme which was to resurface during the aftermath of 
the intervention- that the international community, though able with little apparent 
trouble to fund a full-scale war, is often reluctant to provide the necessary 
resources for peacekeeping operations- even though such activities c
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terms of money and personnel than a war. This provides strong backing for 
scepticism about the humanitarian rhetoric of Western governments. 
      Despite the shortfall in personnel, the KVM did succeed in limiting the level of 
atrocities, though not in preventing them altogether- which was all that could 
reasonably have been expected given the lack of a will to peace on either side. Air 
y was that, when the 
                                                
Marshal Day concluded that it “worked for a few months” but in the end was 
given an “impossible task”.24 
      Had the KVM been introduced a year earlier, it is possible that the subsequent 
history of Kosovo might have been different- but, as we have seen, the impetus for 
negotiations did not exist then. As it was, the KVM was never likely to do 
anything more than buy time, providing a period of relative quiet in which efforts 
could be made to find a more permanent solution. The traged
negotiations came that might in theory have enabled the working out of that 
solution, no party was prepared to search seriously for peace. 
       Before leaving this subject to move on to the question of NATO’s motives for 
intervention, there is one other matter that should not go unmentioned, as it 
certainly did not help the prospects for a peaceful settlement: namely, the US 
attitude towards the KLA. Officially, the US regarded the KLA as- in the words of 
special envoy R. Gelbard- “without any question a terrorist group”. This has been 
criticised, as Milosevic may have regarded it as a ‘green light’ for his campaign 
against the separatists25- but it is hard to argue with it as a statement of fact. 
However, despite this, it has been alleged in the press media that CIA officers 
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working under the cover of the KVM gave covert assistance to the KLA in 
planning actions against Serb police and civilians. “I’d tell them which hill to 
avoid, which wood to go behind, that sort of thing,” an agent is said to have 
. Critics of humanitarian war worry that the concept is highly open to 
hopefully, the lessons of Kosovo “can build pressure in the future to view war as a 
admitted.26 If this is correct, it raises a strong suspicion that US motives in going 
to war were more anti-Serb than pro-Albanian. 
      What conclusions can be drawn from all this about the ‘last resort’ in a 
humanitarian war? Clearly, it shows that the concept is at best highly problematic. 
If the intervening states pursue negotiations up until the last moment, and only 
intervene when those negotiations have irrevocably broken down, it would seem 
undeniable that they have waited for the ‘last resort’; but what if there is doubt 
over whether those negotiations were pursued in good faith? The danger is that the 
list of criteria for a legitimate ‘humanitarian war’ becomes merely a set of boxes to 
be ticked in order to give a war the appearance of legitimacy. Governments pursue 
negotiations not in order to avoid war but merely to show that they have tried to 
negotiate
abuse, and the case of Kosovo shows that this is true, at least in the area of the ‘last 
resort’. 
     Most theorists of humanitarian war would not be pleased if their arguments 
were used to justify resort to military action in a situation where serious 
negotiations might have borne fruit: but, even in an apparent ‘best case’, an 
argument can be made that this is precisely what happened. Falk argues that 
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last resort and to uphold the humanitarian character of a humanitarian 
for a peaceful settlement did exist, at least before 1998, and it was not 
. 
       
intervention.”27 
      Again, it must be stressed that we will never know for sure what would have 
happened in Kosovo if Western countries had pursued different tactics. But a 
chance 
taken
      4.3 Humanitarian- and Other- Motives 
As we saw in Chapter One, even pro-humanitarian war theorists admit that the 
motives that states have in launching a war are rarely, if ever, exclusively 
altruistic. It will be seen in this section that an investigation of NATO’s motives 
for launching the war in Kosovo serves to bear out this admission, even in an 
                                                                                                                                      
apparent “best case” of humanitarian war. 
      As was noted earlier in this chapter, the statements of NATO leaders and their 
spokesmen did stress very strongly the humanitarian motives for the action. 
However, several arguments have been advanced for doubting the idea that 
humanitarian concerns were the crucial factor in motivating NATO to use force. 
The first is the issue of selectivity. In 1999, abuses of human rights of equal or 
greater magnitude to those in Kosovo were happening in a number of other 
countries all over the world, but nowhere else did they provoke a Western military 
response. Indeed, in certain cases- for example in Turkey- the West was actually 
providing military aid to the abusers. This does not in itself constitute an argument 
26
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against the use of force in Kosovo, nor against the idea of humanitarian war; but it 
might lead one to doubt the stated motives behind the Kosovo action. George 
Kennan writes that “a lack of consistency implies a lack of principle in the eyes of 
                                                                                                                                      
much of the world: whereas morality, if not principled, is not really morality.”28 
      If states are prepared to launch a war in order to protect the human rights of an 
oppressed people, one would expect them to perform the far smaller task of 
providing a safe haven for refugees who belong to the persecuted group. And yet 
one of the more remarkable- and yet, in the context, not terribly surprising- 
contradictions of the Kosovo war is that, even in the last month before the 
intervention, courts in at least one NATO state- Germany- were rejecting the 
asylum claims of Kosovo Albanians on the basis of governmental assertions that 
there was no systematic Serb persecution of Albanians in Kosovo. On 24 February 
1999, the Upper Administrative Court of Munster- citing status reports from the 
German Foreign Office, concluded “that the often feared humanitarian catastrophe 
threatening the Albanian civil population has been averted”, after “the winding 
down of combat in connection with an agreement made with the Serbian 
leadership at the end of 1998.... Events since February and March 1998 do not 
evidence a persecution programme based on Albanian ethnicity. The measures 
taken by the armed Serbian forces are in the first instance directed toward 
combating the KLA and its supposed adherents and supporters.”29 In fact, 12,000 
Kosovo Albanians were deported from Germany back to Serbia in 1998, and 
27
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before the war only 5% of Kosovars in Germany were afforded some form of 
lateral 
otives’). Those which have been widely mentioned include the following: 
(which) was due to celebrate its fiftieth anniversary in 
                                                                                                                                      
protection.30 At the very least, this is a clear case of rank hypocrisy. 
      Critics of the war (and some supporters) have suggested a number of possible 
alternative motivations for the intervention (what might be termed ‘col
m
 
1) The need to maintain ‘NATO’s credibility’. This was actually 
mentioned as a motive by NATO leaders- British Foreign Secretary 
Robin Cook cited it in a speech on 14 April 1999, arguing that this 
meant that Britain’s national interest was thus engaged in the war, since 
“our national security depends on NATO”31 Albright was also to write 
later that “the situation (in Kosovo) was emerging as a  key test of 
American leadership and of the relevance and effectiveness of 
NATO… 
April.”32 
2) A wish to assert US hegemony over a recalcitrant Serbia.33 This links 
fairly closely with the matter of NATO’s credibility. Michael Ignatieff, 
a supporter of the intervention, noted in a review of the memoirs of 
NATO commander Wesley Clark that “as Clark tells it, the really 
decisive impulse propelling the campaign was not Milosevic’s human 
29
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30
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32
 Albright op.cit. p.391 
 Chomsky (1999) op.cit. 
 - 146 -
rights violations…. What mattered most was the need to impose 
NATO’s will on a leader whose defiance, first in Bosnia and then in 
an might have been the case had they 
dispute between 
Kosovo, was undermining the credibility of American and European 
diplomacy and of NATO’s willpower.”34 
3) Guilt over the failure to prevent atrocities in Bosnia. As we saw earlier 
in this chapter, the prehistory of the NATO intervention did contain 
certain features validating the truth of the old cliché that military 
planners are always fighting the last war. Elements of NATO’s 
strategy- particularly the reliance on threats of bombing- were based on 
lessons drawn (some argue, mistakenly) from what happened in 
Bosnia. More broadly, the fact that a new conflict was occurring in the 
same region as the widely-publicised conflict in Bosnia (and involving 
similar actors- specifically, Serbs and Muslims) gave the impression 
that history was repeating itself, whatever the actual historical 
differences between the two conflicts. This also meant that the 
atrocities that took place in Kosovo- for example, the killings at Racak- 
received greater attention th
occurred elsewhere, because they raised the fear that Kosovo was going 
to turn into ‘another Bosnia’  
4) Concern over the threat to peace and security in the wider region- eg in 
Albania and Macedonia (which also had an ongoing 
the government and the large Albanian minority- this was to flare up 
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again in the years following the Kosovo intervention) 
nd Churchill: one 
up “the last economy in south-central Europe to be uncolonized by 
5) “Reluctance to accept large numbers of refugees on a permanent basis” 
(Roberts)35 
6) A wish to weaken Russia by denying it allies in the Balkans while 
expanding NATO into Eastern Europe36 
7) Personal motives on the part of certain NATO leaders. Albright is said 
to have desired a personal success, since her term in office “had 
hitherto been marked by a long catalogue of failure.” Blair is said to 
have been influenced by his admiration for Thatcher a
American NATO insider referred to him as “that Winston Blair”.37 It is 
very difficult to evaluate this suggestion objectively.  
8) Economic motivations. In some anti-war circles, claims have been 
made that NATO was motivated by economic factors. These involve 
the routing of a pipeline through the Balkans for oil from the Caspian 
Sea, which aside from ensuring US energy security was also meant to 
“advance the privatisation aspirations of the US government in the 
region” and “facilitate rapid integration” of the Balkans “with western 
Europe”38; or, more broadly, a wish to dismantle the socially-owned 
enterprises that still dominated the economy of Yugoslavia, and to open 
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Western capital.”39 The latter claim is given some credence by the 
presence of the ‘free market principles’ clause in the Rambouillet 
Accords, but it seems unlikely to me that economics played more than 
a very minor part in prompting the decision to intervene. NATO 
undoubtedly had some economic interest in controlling Kosovo, but the 
same might be said for just about anywhere. When compared with later 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq- both places, for differing 
reasons, of major strategic importance in the world oil economy- the 
economic reasons for invading a small, landlocked province in the 
Balkans seem distinctly meagre. (The oil pipeline, moreover, was never 
actually meant to pass through Yugoslavia, so its relevance is tenuous 
at best.) 
w which was overtaxing infrastructure, and “protecting 
 
Some of these have been confirmed as genuine motivating factors by statements 
from officials. For example, US Secretary of Defence William S. Cohen and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff H. Skelton said that NATO had three major 
interests in Kosovo: preventing destabilisation of “NATO’s south-eastern region”, 
ending the refugee flo
NATO’s credibility”.40 
      No single one of the above suggestions is entirely conclusive by itself- it is 
likely that, as with most conflicts, a number of different motivations contributed in 
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varying degrees to the decision to intervene. But having established that, as 
expected, NATO’s motives were at least not wholly humanitarian, the crucial 
question for the theory is whether any of these motives were likely to have 
affected the chances of a humanitarian outcome. This chapter will only deal with 
the question of whether the motives listed above might have led NATO not to 
negotiate to the ‘last resort’, hence reducing the likelihood of a peaceful 
settlement. But it is also possible that such ‘collateral motives’ might adversely 
affect the ‘humanitarian’ nature of an intervention by, for example- if the wish is 
to weaken the enemy state, as may have been the case with Serbia- leading the 
intervening forces to fight on for longer than is necessary to achieve an acceptable 
outcome, or to show less concern for the plight of civilians than might have been 
province before it looked 
the case if the intervening states had been truly motivated by humanitarian 
concerns. Those issues will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
      In the case of some of the examples on the list- the unwillingness of Western 
European states to permanently host large numbers of Kosovar refugees, for 
example- logic suggests that the non-altruistic motive should have aided the 
chances of a humanitarian outcome (although, as has been seen, the refugee issue 
did force NATO states into some bizarre moral contortions). The same would go 
for motives 3 (guilt over the failure in Bosnia) and 4 (fears that turmoil in Kosovo 
could spill over into the rest of the region). It can be argued, however, that if 
NATO countries had been genuinely concerned with the rights of the Kosovo 
Albanians, rather than merely with preventing a major refugee outflow, they might 
have shown more engagement with the situation in the 
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like developing into a major regional crisis. As we have already seen, such earlier 
engagement just might have made the war unnecessary. 
      The other motives on the list raise more serious concerns. The desire in some 
NATO states- particularly the USA- for a strong NATO and a weak Russia could 
well explain the failure of NATO states to contemplate alternative ‘hats’ for an 
intervention or to attempt to form a united front with the Russians. The fact that 
NATO’s ‘credibility’ became such an important issue had particularly bad 
implications for the possibility of a humanitarian outcome. The House of 
Commons Defence Committee concluded that “the perceived need to defend 
NATO’s credibility was, in itself, a major factor in driving the process whereby 
the Alliance found itself painted into a corner in March 1999 from which its only 
way out was to pursue a military campaign against Serbia.”41 Ignatieff notes that 
“if the issue becomes credibility, then the strategic logic becomes circular: NATO 
has to bomb in order to prove that it will bomb. The message of all this might be: 
never use force merely in order to show that you have the political will to use 
force.”42 Thus, even if NATO leaders had judged that a resort to force was only 
likely to worsen rather than ameliorate the situation of the Kosovo Albanians, by 
provoking Serb reprisals against the population (depending on which official 
statements you believe, this may or may not have been the case), they would still 
have been forced to launch a war in order to protect the credibility of the Alliance. 
      It was NATO’s reliance on threat diplomacy that resulted in ‘credibility’ 
becoming an issue; critics argue that when this was allied with the tendency to 
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present proposed solutions to the conflict as non-negotiable, as was the case with 
the Rambouillet Accords, any compromise solution was made virtually 
possible. It is necessary, then, to take a detailed look at the negotiations at 
e charges of the critics are justified. 
im
Rambouillet to see if th
 
      4.3.1 Rambouillet 
The Rambouillet conference of 6-23 February 1999, and the Paris follow-up talks 
on 15-18 March, formed the final set of negotiations before intervention began. 
The failure of the Serb/FRY delegation to sign the ‘Interim Agreement for Peace 
and Self-Government in Kosovo’- usually referred to as the ‘Rambouillet 
Accords’- led NATO to decide to carry out its threats, and on 19 March the OSCE 
monitors were withdrawn preparatory to the beginning of the bombing some five 
days later. The history of these negotiations is well worth looking at in detail, as 
brinkmanship (of a strategy reliant on threat and non-negotiable principles)… is 
for many critics of the war, the events at Rambouillet provide evidence that NATO 
was negotiating in bad faith 
      The Rambouillet negotiations have proven to be perhaps the biggest single 
source of controversy in a highly controversial war. Marc Weller, a supporter of 
the NATO intervention, states that Rambouillet was a “significant departure” in 
international mediation because it was based on non-negotiable principles with 
agreement to be maintained through threat or use of force.43  This probably made it 
illegal under international law, which voids treaties which are signed under duress. 
The Independent International Commission on Kosovo notes that “the inherent 
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not an approach designed to resolve underlying problems or to make war a matter 
d Rambouillet as an effort to “negotiate an equitable 
absolutely intolerable: how could he possibly accept them? It was quite 
                                                                                                                                      
of last resort.”44 
      Supporters of the war have argued that the intransigent stance of the Serbs at 
Rambouillet, and the eventual breakdown of negotiations, served to demonstrate 
the bad faith of the Milosevic regime and proved that only military action could 
address the situation. NATO had made every reasonable attempt to secure a 
negotiated settlement they say, but after Rambouillet the ‘last resort’ had been 
reached: force was the only option left. The US representative told the UN 
Security Council that “(b)y rejecting a peace settlement... Belgrade had chosen the 
path of war.” He describe
settlement to the crisis.”45 
     Critics of the war, however, have argued that NATO came to Rambouillet with 
the aim of justifying a war rather than negotiating a peace, and hence made no 
serious attempt to engage with the Serbs. In fact, NATO may have deliberately 
aimed to ensure that the Serbs would reject the terms offered to them by including 
in the ‘non-negotiable’ text of the Accords conditions which no sovereign state 
could ever possibly accept. (There would have been a famous historical precedent 
for this particular tactic: Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum to Serbia in 1914). Lord 
Gilbert, Britain’s defence Minister of State formally responsible for intelligence, 
told the Defence Select Committee that “certain people were spoiling for a fight in 
NATO at that time,” and that “the terms put to Milosevic at Rambouillet were 
ffairs Vol.75/2, 1999, p.250 43 M. Weller, ‘The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo, International A
44
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deliberate.”46 Even less vociferous critics often argue that NATO was far more 
concerned with ensuring that the Kosovo Albanians- who were also a party to the 
negotiations- would accept the proposed deal than with assuaging Serbian 
concerns. 
      The makeup of the Kosovo Albanian delegation itself has attracted criticism, 
with the West accused of favouring the KLA over more moderate groups. The 
delegation was headed by KLA leader Hashim Thaci, and two-thirds of the places 
on it were given to the KLA and its associated parties- leaving the elected 
government of Kosovo in a distinct minority.47 This was probably a fair reflection 
of the balance of power on the ground in Kosovo in early 1999, but it did not help 
the prospect of finding a settlement. The contrary argument to this- and it is a 
strong one- is that excluding the KLA from negotiations would merely have 
ensured that any agreement which had been reached would not have lasted for 
long. Still, Woodward’s assertion that the Rambouillet negotiations overly 
“privilege(d) the role of the KLA” which was “only one of many voices in 
Kosovo”48 is borne out by the results of post-intervention elections, in which the 
political parties that have sprung out of the  KLA have only gained around a 
quarter of the vote. 
      The Allies were insistent at Rambouillet that the peacekeeping force that 
would be sent into Kosovo following an agreement had to be led and controlled by 
NATO. The main reason for this appears to have been the attitude of  the US 
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government, which did not have much confidence in the ability of organisations 
such as the UN and OSCE to perform such an operation successfully, and 
preferred NATO as an instrument since US predominance in defence spending 
ensures that it has a controlling role in the organisation- although another 
motivating factor may have been the need to find a reason to justify NATO’s 
continued existence. McGwire alleges that the US was keen to keep NATO going 
on order to prevent the emergence of an alternative European security structure.49 
More defensibly, the perceived failure of the OSCE verification mission also led to 
the conclusion that something more robust was required- and NATO seemed to 
provide a better framework for an active peacekeeping force as opposed to the 
bouillet, but they would not even consider the 
front with Russia. The idea that the West should have made more effort to involve 
rather more passive, monitoring approach taken by the OSCE mission. 
      However, the decision to bring in NATO has been criticised for three reasons. 
First, it resulted in “NATO’s credibility” becoming an issue, hence raising the 
stakes whenever any threat of force was made; secondly, it made a peaceful 
outcome less likely, as the prospect of a NATO-controlled force occupying 
Kosovo was obviously going to be harder for the Serbs to swallow than, say, a 
conventional peacekeeping operation under UN auspices. US Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright said that Serb negotiators had told her that they could accept 
the political deal on offer at Ram
presence of a NATO-led force.50 
      Thirdly, it made it far more difficult for Western countries to form a united 
                                                 
49
 Cit. in N. Chomsky, A New Generation Draws the Line: Kosovo, East Timor and the Standards 
of the West, London, Verso, 2000, p.127 
 - 155 -
the Russians in negotiations has been put forward by a number of people as an 
alternative negotiating strategy that might have been tried. Advocates of this view, 
such as Jonathan Steele, note that Russian pressure played a crucial part in 
eventually forcing Milosevic to concede at the end of the war, and yet little effort 
was made to get the Russians on side before the intervention began. Instead, the 
West went out of its way to antagonise Russia by insisting that NATO should take 
the lead in any intervention or peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Steele argues that 
“Russia’s resistance to the use of force against Yugoslavia was largely based on its 
concerns over the future role of NATO.... Western governments should not have 
linked the Kosovo crisis to the debate over NATO’s future. The two issues were 
separate. By joining them, Western governments unnecessarily raised the stakes by 
putting the Alliance’s credibility on the line as well as antagonising Russia.” In 
reply to the argument that historical links or a common Slavic tradition would 
have made Russia disinclined to put pressure on Milosevic, Steele argues that 
“Russia had... no common interest with Milosevic.... what temporarily united 
Milosevic and Moscow were shared suspicions about NATO intentions....Western 
governments should therefore have been more creative in considering alternative 
political ‘hats’ for an international intervention in Kosovo”- such as a coalition of 
the willing, or the OSCE.51 
     Much of the controversy around the Accords has centred on Appendix B, titled 
“Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force”, but generally referred 
to as the SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement). Paragraph 8 of this Appendix 
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decrees that: 
 
           
not be lim ny areas 
or facilities as required for support, training, and operations.”52 
nstitutional offence to permit the presence of foreign troops on 
                                                
“NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft and  
equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the 
FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but 
ited to, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet, and ulitisation of a
 
As has been widely noted, this is a charter for the occupation of all Yugoslavia, 
not just Kosovo. If the government of the FRY had signed this agreement, NATO 
would have been given- in the words of Adam Roberts- “troop rights (across the 
whole FRY), not merely in transit but manoeuvre and goodness knows what 
else.”53 Critics argue that these are terms of surrender, not of negotiation, and no 
sovereign state which had not just been utterly defeated in a war could ever have 
accepted them. This was particularly so for the FRY, where Tito’s constitution in 
fact made it a co
Yugoslav soil.54  
      Since the stated aim of the Rambouillet Accords was merely to end the conflict 
in Kosovo, it was manifestly unnecessary for NATO forces to enjoy the right to 
occupy all Yugoslavia. In fact, no-one, as far as I am aware, has attempted to 
defend the SOFA on the grounds that NATO actually needed this free access. 
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Particularly bizarre is the inclusion of the words “territorial waters”: Kosovo is 
landlocked, as indeed is Serbia, so this could only have been needed if NATO had 
faith, the 
                                                
wanted to occupy Montenegro as well.  
       Critics argue that the SOFA in that form was included in the Accords purely 
in order to ensure that the Serbs rejected them, and point out that this provision 
was omitted from the agreement that ended the war- in that, KFOR troop rights 
were restricted to Kosovo. A wider point can be made that the diplomacy to end 
the war was also more geared towards searching for a genuine settlement in that it 
brought to the fore negotiators such as Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and 
Russian special envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin, who were more acceptable to 
Yugoslavia than the negotiators at Rambouillet. Richard Falk concludes from this 
that “had the search for a peaceful settlement been undertaken in good 
pattern of pre-war and post-war diplomacy would have been reversed.”55 
        In attempting to defend the SOFA from the charges of critics, NATO 
governments have adopted two different strategies. The first is to insist, as in the 
British Ministry of Defence’s report Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis, that the 
SOFA was similar to arrangements already in place for Bosnia.56 But Roberts 
insists that “there are provisions in there that are not in the Dayton agreement” (he 
goes on to say that “whoever wrote that military agreement... should be taken aside 
and shot”).57 Even if true, this argument is irrelevant since the criticisms of the 
SOFA concern its territorial scope, not its content as such. The second strategy is 
 
55
 R. Falk, ‘Humanitarian Wars, Realist Geopolitics and Genocidal Practices: Saving the 
Kosovars’, in Booth op.cit. p.330 
56
 Ministry of Defence Report, Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis, CM4724, HMSO 2000, p.10 
57
 Roberts cit. in FAC Report Vol. I op.cit. Para.62 
 - 158 -
to blame the fact that the document was “drafted in a hurry”, and “because the 
Rambouillet accords tried to preserve the idea of the territorial integrity of the 
FRY and Kosovo’s continuing status as part of it, it was technically more difficult 
to limit the geographical scope of the SOFA”.58 This does not seem credible, since 
the term ‘Kosovo’ is used throughout the rest of the Accords- in fact, Chapter 1, 
ring rejection, so the doubt 
 caused considerable 
ontroversy was Chapter 8, Article 1(3), which stated that: 
s  
effo ct, 
Agreement and to consider proposals by any Party for additional measures.” 
                                                
Paragraph 6 refers to there being “no changes to the borders of Kosovo”. 
      It is clear from the course of events that the Serbs would have rejected the 
Accords even without the SOFA. Indeed, it is generally stated that they made no 
public objection to it, although the Serbs say that they denounced the SOFA at 
their (poorly attended) last Paris press conference.59 However, this does not prove 
that the SOFA was not included with the aim of ensu
remains over the good faith of the intervenors. 
     The other clause in the Rambouillet Accords which
c
 
“Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international meeting 
hall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on
the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party’s 
rts regarding the implementation of the Agreement, and the Helsinki Final A
and to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this 
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This Article came to be interpreted as meaning that the future of Kosovo would be 
decided by a referendum three years after the conclusion of negotiations. As can 
be seen, the actual text of the Article does not even come close to saying anything 
so specific- it includes a reference to the “will of the people”, but also to the 
Helsinki Final Act, which guarantees the inviolability of frontiers except by 
agreement. However, the US government chose to push for this interpretation, and 
during the negotiations, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright sent the following 
tter to the Kosovo Albanian delegation: 
 
T
o
f            
confirming a right fo rendum on the final 
status of Kosovo after three years. 
Madeleine Albright 60 
                                                
le
Rambouillet, 22 February 1999 
his letter concerns the formulation (attached) proposed for Chapter 8, Article 1(3) 
f  the interim Framework Agreement. We will regard this proposal, or any other     
ormulation of that article that may be agreed at Rambouillet (italics added), as
r the people of Kosovo to hold a refe
Sincerely, 
, Secretary of State
 
As the FAC report notes, “it appears that the US Secretary of State was offering 
US support for a referendum regardless of what was agreed at Rambouillet.”61 It is 
this episode, more than any other, which provides strong backing for the charge 
that NATO’s only real aim at Rambouillet was to get the KLA’s support for any 
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deal. The former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia told the Canadian House of 
Commons Committee on Foreign Affairs that the “demand that a referendum on 
autonomy be held within three years guaranteed a Serbian rejection.”62 It might be 
added that this provision, like the occupation clause in the SOFA, did not reappear 
the bombing, Milosevic’s concern 
                                                
in the post-campaign settlement. 
      Many have blamed the intransigent attitude of Albright for the failure of 
negotiations. Albright- a one-time refugee from Czechoslovakia- is accused of 
having been “blinkered by her obsession with viewing all international crises 
through the lens of the ‘1930s analogy’.... For her, Milosevic was a modern-day 
Hitler... and any attempt to resolve the crisis on terms Belgrade might accept was 
‘appeasement.’”63 When one of her aides suggested she compromise during a 
negotiation session, she replied: “where do you think we are, Munich?”64 
Albright’s memoirs do offer a certain amount of evidence to back up this charge of 
wilful intransigence towards the Serbs. At one point she describes Milosevic as 
living in a “parallel universe” because he said to her during the Rambouillet 
negotiations that “the crucial issue for us is that we cannot have a solution that 
causes non-Albanians to flee (from Kosovo).”65 Given that this- an exodus of non-
Albanians- is precisely what happened after 
does not in this instance appear unreasonable. 
      The British government had similar preoccupations, although in Britain’s case 
this was normal- Henig states that “the latter part of the 1930s defined British 
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foreign policy for the remainder of the Twentieth Century and, perhaps, into the 
Twenty-First.”66 The ‘Munich analogy’ has become virtually a mantra for British 
ed necessary for a peace treaty to wander into such blatantly irrelevant 
was... that it was difficult to threaten Milosevic because of his lack of concern for 
politicians in situations like this. 
      At the risk of straying into side issues, it is worth mentioning that the 
Rambouillet Accords also contain certain rather odd provisions in the sphere of 
economic policy. Chapter 4A (Economic Issues) dictates that “the economy of 
Kosovo shall function in accordance with free market principles”. This section 
does not seem to have been a sticking point in negotiations- it was picked up later 
by critics of the war, but not by the parties themselves- but one wonders why it 
was deem
territory. 
      I am forced to the conclusion that in fact, none of the three parties went to 
Rambouillet with any serious intention of concluding a peace deal. The Kosovo 
Albanians, as was shown in Chapter 3, did not want to settle for anything less than 
independence, which would clearly become a far stronger possibility if the Serbs 
were defeated in battle by NATO than if a peace deal was reached. As for 
Milosevic, it seems that he was not greatly concerned by NATO’s threats and had 
already decided to put the Alliance’s credibility to the test. Neville-Jones said that 
“I suspect that by (the time of Rambouillet) he regarded the Western position as 
being one where this negotiation was a disguised way of getting an international 
presence on Serb soil which would lead to the separation of Kosovo from Serbia, 
and he was not going to have that. It was easier to be bombed....The problem 
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his people and his country.”67 This is a serious indictment of NATO’s long-term 
strategy of relying solely on threats. 
      The exact attitude of the NATO countries at the negotiations is more difficult 
to establish with certainty, but the evidence indicates that by this time they had 
effectively decided on military intervention, and only continued with negotiations 
in order to provide legitimacy for a war. At the very least, NATO made no effort 
to put together a set of accords which the Serbs might have accepted, and a strong 
argument can be made that parts of the Accords were deliberately included in 
order to ensure a Serbian rejection. The real objective that NATO had at 
Rambouillet was to gain the endorsement of the Kosovo Albanian delegation for 
the deal, and a number of concessions were made in order to ensure that this was 
achieved. The Kosovo Albanians had two key demands: a binding referendum on 
independence after three years and a NATO ground force in the meantime68- and 
they were effectively granted both, even though the former did not appear 
explicitly in the text of the Accords. 
     At least three of the motives on the list given earlier in this section: ‘NATO’s 
credibility’, the wish to assert US hegemony over Serbia, and the wish to weaken 
Russia, could all be put forward as explanations for NATO’s failure to negotiate 
seriously at Rambouillet. It must be asked from this whether the theorists of 
humanitarian war are wise to rest their argument on the idea that non-humanitarian 
motives do not matter if they do not affect the outcome. The case of Kosovo shows 
that motives do matter, and do affect outcomes. 
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       4.4 Supreme Emergency 
We saw in Chapter 1 that theorists of humanitarian war tend to agree that the use 
of military force should be restricted to cases where the abuse of human rights is 
exceptionally severe; in Walzer’s phrase, “acts that shock the moral conscience of 
mankind.”69 It is questionable whether the situation in Kosovo before the bombing 
was sufficiently bad to merit that description. Some confusion on this matter has 
been caused by the sudden escalation in killings and expulsions by Serbian forces 
that occurred in the very first days of the bombing. Many short accounts of the war 
(usually in media reports rather than academic literature) do not get this 
chronology correct. (To provide one example, a newspaper obituary of Ibrahim 
Rugova talked of “the NATO bombing campaign of Yugoslavia in 1999, which 
had followed the intensification of Milosevic’s crackdown in the province.”)70 It is 
possible to argue that the NATO bombing meets the ‘Just Cause’ criterion as a 
pre-emptive intervention, on the grounds that the Serbian offensive would have 
happened in the same way even without the bombing and that NATO, by doing its 
best to try to impede Serbian forces, was attempting to mitigate its effects. I will 
deal with this issue at greater length in the next chapter, but here it suffices to note 
that- although there is much uncertainty on this point- the available evidence 
indicates that it was the bombing campaign that prompted the massive escalation 
in atrocities by Serbian forces, and that in the absence of any bombing (or other 
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international action) the likeliest scenario would have been another Serbian 
offensive of the type seen in 1998. 
     Before the bombing, the Kosovo Albanians were undoubtedly suffering very 
real abuses of their basic rights. But, as indicated above, even if we restrict our 
timescale to the mid-to-late 1990s, it is not difficult to find many examples of 
abuses of human rights on a similar or greater scale to those in Kosovo in a 
number of other countries across the world. In an article assailing NATO for its 
“hypocritical humanitarianism”, Bandow gives a long list of examples of conflicts 
with death tolls and refugee figures which dwarf those in Kosovo in the period 
before the bombing- these include such cases as Angola, Rwanda, Turkey, East 
Timor, Chechnya and Sri Lanka. He cites the case of a 3-day battle between the 
Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan government in the autumn of 1998, in which 
nearly as many died as did in Kosovo in the whole of that year.71  
      It is worth mentioning the massacre at Racak in this context. It is often argued 
that this single event- the slaughter of 45 Kosovo Albanian civilians by Serb 
paramilitaries on 15 January 1999  so angered the leaders of NATO states that, in 
the words of Washington Post correspondent Barton Gellman, it “transformed the 
West’s Balkan policy as singular events seldom do.”72 Matthew Wyman says that 
“Racak seems likely to come to be regarded as a singular moment in modern world 
history.... what Racak crystallised for Western policy-makers was the peculiar 
awfulness of official Serb policy towards ethnic Albanians within Kosovo.”73 
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      And yet Racak, though undeniably a shocking atrocity- even allowing for the 
fact that some doubt has been cast over whether all of the victims were civilians 
(see Chapter 3)- is the sort of event which happens with depressing frequency in 
some countries. To take just one example, on April 6 1999- while the war in 
Kosovo was going on- Indonesian troops murdered 60 people in a church in 
Liquica, east Timor.74 When Israeli troops killed 52 Palestinian civilians in Jenin 
in 2002, this was widely dismissed as a minor matter, largely because the number 
of deaths turned out to be much lower than early reports had stated. 
      So why did military intervention occur in Kosovo particularly, and not in these 
other cases? One factor is that human rights abuses in places like East Timor and 
Sri Lanka did not receive the kind of media coverage that was devoted to Racak 
and to human rights abuses in Kosovo in general. Racak, paradoxically, may have 
attracted so much attention in part because it was a relatively isolated incident- no 
other comparable atrocities are known to have occurred in Kosovo in the period 
between the signing of the Holbrooke Agreement and the withdrawal of the OSCE 
monitors. In contrast, the East Timor massacre cited above was just one of a 
succession of atrocities by Indonesian forces in 1999, causing an estimated 3000-
6000 deaths that year. Furthermore, as Weymouth states- and as was noted in 
Chapter 3- “the Western media widely represented the pre-intervention hostilities 
in a pro-Kosovo Albanian light.”75 Weymouth argues that there is an anti-Serb 
ideological current in the Western media which dates from the beginning of the 
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Twentieth Century, and was reinforced by the Cold War76, concluding that “it is 
highly likely that the distinctly unsanitised pictures coming out of Kosovo... were 
instrumental in forcing the hands of Western politicians to take action against 
Milosevic”.77 Media coverage stirred up public opinion over Kosovo in a way that 
did not occur for more distant, less well-covered crises. 
      One seemingly plausible explanation for the selectivity of intervention in the 
case of Kosovo centres on geographical location- the fact that Kosovo, unlike 
other countries where massacres were taking place in 1999, is in Europe. Peter 
Beinart- a supporter of the intervention- admitted during the conflict that 
“America’s Kosovo war is unintelligible without reference to the race of the 
victims.”78 If it is true that only human rights abuses that take place within Europe 
are likely to cause enough concern in the West to motivate the launching of a war, 
then the whole debate over humanitarian war may be a little pointless, since we are 
unlikely to see any more such wars in future unless a new set of conflicts occurs in 
the Balkans. However, this explanation is not wholly convincing. Selectivity can 
be seen to operate even in cases of human rights abuse that occur within Europe- 
for example, the flight of Serbs from the Krajina region of Croatia in the 1990s did 
not lead to the governmental concern and calls for intervention that were raised by 
ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. 
     A further factor is involved: the identity of the government that is committing 
the abuses. Bandow concludes that “in practice the United States seems prepared 
to conduct armed humanitarian crusades under three conditions: those being killed 
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are white Europeans, the perceived aggressor is not a US ally, and there is 
saturation media coverage of the conflict.”79 
     Though the concerns outlined above are very serious, they do not by 
themselves constitute an argument against the use of military force in Kosovo, or 
against the ideal of humanitarian war. While the human rights abuses in Kosovo 
before the bombing did not reach a level so as to be exceptional in the sad context 
of late 20th Century history, the situation in the province was undeniably serious- 
and, if military force can indeed be the most effective and humane way to deal 
with such crises, there seems to be no good reason why its use should not be 
considered. A final evaluation here will have to wait for Chapter 5, where the 
effects of using military force in such situations will be looked at in more detail. 
The case of Kosovo does show the continued truth of Hedley Bull’s contention- 
expressed in 1977- that “the international order does not provide any general 
protection of human rights, only a selective protection that is determined not by 
the merits of the case but by the vagaries of international politics.”80 Humanitarian 
wars, then, will tend to be selective and dubious in their motivation. But most 
theorists already acknowledge this, and would reply that, in the cases where a 
humanitarian war is made possible because human rights abuses are occurring- 
and being widely covered in the media- in a state that is not an ally of the potential 
intervening coalition, some good may still be done. 
      There may, however, still be a problem if selectivity leads to scarce resources 
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being diverted away from more serious crises. Vaux argues that this is what has 
happened in recent years: the pattern of humanitarian aid funding has become 
more and more distorted in favour of those countries where Western powers have 
been at war (and where therefore aid serves a political purpose in ensuring the 
perceived success of the operation)- such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo- and 
away from places like Angola and the Congo, where humanitarian needs are far 
greater. He states that “it has been estimated that 2½ million people died in the 
DRC over the last years while our government, the UN and the aid agencies 
focused on Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.”81 
 
      4.5 International Support for and Opposition to the War 
The criterion of ‘international support’ is one of the vaguer aspects of 
humanitarian war theory. Under the minimalist version of the criterion, it is merely 
considered preferable that a humanitarian war should be fought by a coalition 
rather than a single state. Under a maximalist version, wide international support is 
required for a humanitarian war to be considered legitimate; it should be 
authorised by a UN Security Council resolution, or at least it should be obvious 
that such a resolution would have been passed but for opposition from one or two 
permanent members. 
      The Kosovo intervention attracted a fairly high degree of international support. 
It was, of course, fought by a 19-member coalition. The UN Security Council 
never explicitly endorsed the war (and any resolution authorising NATO to use 
force would certainly have been vetoed by Russia and China), but it never 
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condemned it either. On 26 March a Russian/Chinese resolution condemning the 
bombing was rejected by 12 votes to 3 (the third vote came from Namibia).82 
However, opponents of the war point out that Russia, China, Belarus and India- 
who together represent 40% of the world’s population83- all made statements 
opposing the war during the debates in the Security Council. There was also 
widespread opposition in the developing world, and among Islamic states- despite 
the fact that the intervention was officially aimed at helping the largely Muslim 
Kosovo Albanian population.  President Clinton said that “through our efforts in 
the Balkans we have also helped to bridge the gulf between Europe and the Islamic 
world, the source of so much trouble over the last Millennium”84, but this was 
wishful thinking. 
      It may be pointed out in response to this that many of the states which opposed 
the war were dictatorships, which would be expected to oppose a war that was 
fought in the cause of human rights- although this does not go for India, whose 
representative at the UN charged that NATO “was trying to intimidate a 
government through unprovoked aggression”.85 
      In fact, apart from a few democratic governments which opposed the war, the 
reactions of states to the intervention were pretty much as one would expect from 
the theory; so this is one area where the case study does not raise serious concerns 
about the application of the theory in practice. However, from what we have seen 
of the motives of the states that supported intervention, it may well be concluded 
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that, by itself, wide international support does not necessarily legitimate a 
humanitarian war. The reasons for that support also matter. 
       
      4.6 ‘Proportionality’ and ‘Reasonable Expectation of Victory’ 
There is not a great deal to be said here about these two final criteria for the jus ad 
bellum in a humanitarian war. As we have seen, the criterion of ‘Proportionality’- 
the idea that humanitarian wars should be limited in their aims, which in the 
different theoretical accounts includes such notions as the idea that intervention 
should be ‘short-term and instrumental’, and a requirement for no regime change- 
was cited by prominent NATO figures in their justifications for the bombing. 
However, the question of whether it is feasible and/or desirable that humanitarian 
wars be limited in such a manner is better left for the discussion of the bombing 
itself and its aftermath in Chapters 5 and 6. Although ‘proportionality’ is a 
criterion of the jus ad bellum, it is only in the jus in bello and the jus post bellum 
that its feasibility and consequences become evident. 
     ‘Reasonable expectation of victory’ would seem at first sight to be 
unproblematic in the case of Kosovo, as here the world’s mightiest military 
alliance was planning to fight a war against a single small, economically fragile 
Balkan state. Indeed, many leading figures in NATO expected the war to be over 
in a few days. However, if one defines ‘victory’ as the prevention of a 
humanitarian crisis (as one should in the case of a humanitarian war), then the 
nature of the tactics NATO was planning to use made it far less of a certainty. This 
issue, however, is better left to Chapter 5, which will look in detail at the tactics 
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used in the bombing campaign and will assess whether it could have been 
reasonably expected that they would be successful. 
 
      4.7 Conclusion 
We can see, then, that the examination of the international prehistory of the 
Kosovo intervention has raised some very serious concerns about the theory of 
humanitarian war. The charge of critics that the concept is highly open to abuse 
has been shown to have some backing, at least in the case of the ‘last resort’ 
criterion. NATO leaders insisted that they only took the decision to go to war after 
all peaceful options had been exhausted; but in fact the search for a peaceful 
solution was all too often characterised by lack of interest (in the early phases) and 
lack of seriousness (in the later phases). There is strong circumstantial evidence 
that the decision to go to war was effectively taken some time before the end of 
negotiations. As for the issue of motive, it has been seen that, even in this ‘best 
case’ of a humanitarian war, there is considerable doubt over whether the motives 
of the intervening states were mostly altruistic; and it may also be argued that it is 
too glib for theorists to rely on the idea that non-humanitarian motives do not 
matter if they do not affect the outcome. In the case of Kosovo, motives- 
particularly the perceived need to protect NATO’s credibility- strongly influenced 
the course of events in the months leading up to the war. 
      One further lesson can be drawn from this chapter: that of the need for a 
revival of interest in methods for peaceful settlement of disputes. It has been seen 
that, if Western nations had been more engaged and more imaginative in pursuing 
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a diplomatic solution, there is at least a possibility that the crisis in Kosovo might 
have been averted. In this respect, humanitarian war may indeed be a dangerous 
concept; amid all the talk of war as an instrument for resolving humanitarian 
crises, the possibilities offered by non-military action may sometimes be forgotten. 
The duality of ‘armed intervention’ versus ‘doing nothing’ ignores the many other 
options that may exist in any given situation. As Jonathan Steele has written, “a 
plethora of hot wars over the last decade has turned people cold on democracy. 
The Churchillian adage that jaw-jaw is better than war-war is forgotten in favour 
of the faulty notion that applying superior military power is the best way to handle 
stubborn political conflicts.”86 
     Even the most evangelistic proponents of liberal interventionism do at least 
affect to believe that war should always be avoided if it is at all possible; but the 
underlying assumption behind many arguments for humanitarian war is that force 
is the only tactic that works. This seems to have been a popular assumption among 
NATO-area policymakers during the years preceding the Kosovo war. Often it 
appeared that NATO only had one diplomatic tactic: to threaten to bomb Serbia. 
Threats of military action can undoubtedly be highly effective in many situations, 
provided of course that they are credible; but they do not always work. With 
Milosevic, such threats were ineffective. It is hard not to share the conclusion of 
the Independent International Commission on Kosovo that “one of the major 
lessons of Kosovo is that greater early engagement with a region in crisis with a 
view to preventing conflict is invariably a more effective response than late 
intervention using force.” The Commission admits that “this might appear to be a 
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counsel of perfection”, but argues that “if governments were to listen more 
carefully to the human rights warnings of NGOs and use their political and 
diplomatic influence on abuser states at an earlier stage, the focus of international 
intervention could shift towards prevention, with long-term benefits for vulnerable 
communities everywhere.”87 
     Such change is not likely to happen. Vaux writes that “rather than suppressing 
problems, they (Western governments) could focus on the underlying causes, 
addressing the issues of injustice and inequality that underlie security threats. But 
this seems unlikely. Any politician attempting such an uncertain and long-term 
strategy would be overtaken by those offering the excitement of war and political 
certainties.”88  Unfortunately, the case of Kosovo- where Western politicians 
moved straight from effective non-engagement to threatening and then using force, 
with very little in between- demonstrates the truth of this comment- and the wide 
support given to this policy by liberal humanitarians demonstrates the 
seductiveness of the military option. But perhaps, in the more subdued post-Iraq 
climate of today, there may be room at least in some quarters for a rehabilitation of 
ideas of peaceful diplomacy. 
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 Chapter Five 
Kosovo: the Jus in Bello 
 
On 24 March 1999, NATO planes launched the first bombing raids against 
Yugoslavia. The bombing was to last for some 78 days, until it ended with the 
signing of the Kosovo Peace Accords in early June. This chapter will look at the 
conduct of the military intervention, judged against the theoretical idea of a 
humanitarian war, and will attempt to draw out lessons as to what humanitarian 
wars are likely to look like in practice. 
      This chapter will be split into four sections. The first section will give a brief 
general overview of the bombing campaign. The chapter will then move on to a 
more detailed analysis of the campaign. This will be split into two sections: the 
first will focus on the attacks aimed at Serb forces in Kosovo, aimed at ‘degrading’ 
their ability to inflict harm on the Albanian population; the second will focus on 
the attacks on targets in Serbia outside Kosovo, which seem to have been pursued 
mainly with the aim of coercing the Milosevic regime into accepting NATO’s 
political demands with regard to the future status of Kosovo. 
      The first aspect of the campaign- the bombing of the Serbian army in Kosovo- 
had the more immediately humanitarian objective, as it was aimed directly at the 
forces who were accused of causing the crisis. However, these attacks are widely 
viewed as not having been particularly successful- indeed, many have argued that 
 - 175 -
they actually made the situation worse by provoking the Serbs into launching an 
all-out campaign to expel the Kosovo Albanian population. The bombing of 
targets in Serbia proper, which involved the bombing of civilian (or at least, not 
purely military) targets such as TV stations, bridges and oil refineries, can also be 
said to have had a humanitarian objective, though in a more long-term sense- that 
of forcing Milosevic to accept a NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo. This part 
of the campaign is generally viewed as having been successful in causing 
Milosevic to sue for peace. It was because of this disjunction that the Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo judged that “the NATO war was neither a 
success or a failure: it was in fact both.”1 
     By assessing the success or failure of the campaign, and its impact on the 
civilian populations of Kosovo and Serbia, we can draw out lessons which may 
help to answer the question of whether a humanitarian war can be fought in a 
genuinely humane manner, and the extent to which military force can be useful in 
serving humanitarian ends. 
      It is true that the NATO operation was widely criticised on tactical grounds. 
Most notably, many of those who believe in the ideal of using force to advance the 
cause of human rights argued that NATO should have been sending in ground 
troops to protect the Kosovo Albanians rather than relying purely on high-level 
bombing. Therefore the fourth and final section of this chapter will investigate the 
reasons why this option was not pursued, and what the likely consequences might 
have been if NATO had heeded the widespread calls for a ground invasion. 
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      5.1 The Campaign: A Brief Overview 
As stated above, the bombing lasted for some 78 days. During this time, NATO 
planes flew 38,400 sorties, including 10,484 strike sorties, during which 26,614 air 
munitions were released against 900 separate targets.2 
      In one respect, the war was astoundingly successful. With pilots flying  at 
15,000 feet in order to negate the threat of Yugoslav air defences, NATO forces 
did not suffer a single casualty throughout the campaign- an unprecedented 
occurrence in any war.3 Although the UK government claimed after the war that 
“there was no requirement for ‘zero casualties’, as has been alleged,”4 avoiding 
casualties on the Alliance side was certainly a very high priority. This was to have 
consequences for the ‘humanitarian’ character of the campaign, as we will see 
later on. 
      However, casualties were suffered on the other side, and among civilians. It 
has to be acknowledged at this point that that there is still a great deal of 
uncertainty over casualty figures for the war- particularly over the numbers of 
civilian casualties, both those inflicted by bombing raids and those caused by 
Serbian government forces. Therefore the figures that follow, in this and the next 
section, should not be regarded as definitive.  
       According to its own figures, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia suffered at 
least 600 casualties among its own troops, about half killed by NATO and half by 
the KLA.5 There is still no generally-agreed figure for the number of civilian 
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casualties caused by the bombing campaign. In its study on the effect of the 
bombing campaign, Human Rights Watch produced an estimate of between 488 
and 527 verified civilian casualties.6 Other estimates have been higher, ranging 
from about 6007 to as high as 2600 (Belgrade’s estimate).8 General Ralston, Vice 
Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that Serbian civilian casualties had 
been “amazingly light... less than 1500.”9 General Wesley Clark said on August 
31 1999 that there had been just “20 incidents of collateral damage” in the entire 
war; however this proved to be an underestimate. Human Rights Watch found 
evidence of at least 90 separate incidents involving civilian casualties.10 
                                                
      The very first bombing raids were on Serb forces in Kosovo, and statements by 
NATO leaders at the beginning of the war focused on immediate humanitarian 
justifications for the action. For example, British Defence Secretary George 
Robertson said on 24 March that military action “will be taken against only 
military targets with a very clear objective, not to bomb common sense or even 
self-interest into the mind of President Milosevic, but to reduce the military 
capability that is being used against a civil population.” One day later, he told the 
House of Commons that “this is a limited action with a strictly humanitarian 
objective, which we believe can be achieved through air strikes.”11 This was 
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already a change from the position before the bombing, when military action had 
been threatened in order to support diplomatic action to end the crisis.12 
     In a televised speech on 24 March setting out NATO’s objectives, Bill Clinton 
concentrated mainly on humanitarian justifications for the campaign, though with 
a nod to the motivation of ‘credibility’; he said that the aims of the bombing were 
“to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s response to aggression, to deter 
Milosevic’s escalating attacks in Kosovo, and seriously to damage Yugoslavia’s 
military capability to wage war in the future."13  
     However, within a week, NATO planes had begun to attack targets outside 
Kosovo, and a second set of objectives for the bombing- focusing on coercing 
Milosevic into accepting NATO’s demands- was emerging in official statements. 
      By 21 June, Robertson was completely contradicting his earlier statement, 
saying that “frankly, we were seeking to coerce Milosevic to back down.” General 
Wesley Clark said of the bombing that “it was not designed as a means of blocking 
ethnic cleansing.... (Nor) as a way of waging war against the Serb and MUP forces 
in Kosovo.”14 
      Even long after the campaign had ended, this contradiction was still not 
entirely resolved. The Ministry of Defence report Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis, 
published in 2000, claims that “NATO’s action had limited military objectives: to 
disrupt the violent attacks of Milosevic’s forces and to weaken their ability to 
continue these activities.”15  
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      This chapter will now turn to a detailed examination of the NATO 
intervention, focusing first on the bombing of targets within Kosovo. 
 
      5.2 The Bombing Campaign I: within Kosovo     
The beginning of the bombing campaign was immediately followed by a 
catastrophic worsening in the situation of the ethnic Albanian population in the 
province. A major offensive by Yugoslav troops, Serbian police and paramilitaries 
resulted in a dramatic escalation in killings of Kosovar civilians and a massive 
exodus of refugees from the province. What had before been mainly a counter-
insurgency campaign, albeit marked by excessive force and frequent outrages 
against civilians, now turned into an organised- and largely successful- attempt to 
expel the entire Albanian population. During the bombing campaign, 
approximately 863,000 refugees were displaced from Kosovo, and another 
590,000 people became internally displaced within the province. This amounted to 
over 90% of the Kosovo Albanian population as of 1998.16 There is still no exact 
agreement on the number of killings that took place. Some sources give a figure of 
around 10,000; the Independent International Commission on Kosovo suggests 
this figure as an estimate, and a  study by the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science produced an estimated figure of between 7494 and 13627 
killings.17 Some other studies have produced lower estimates. The two-year 
investigation of mass graves in Kosovo by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia resulted in the exhumation of approximately 4000 bodies 
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or parts of bodies.18 This figure, again, is not definitive: on the one hand, it would 
not be expected to include every casualty; on the other, it  includes casualties on 
both sides and does not refer solely to the period of the bombing.19 If one assumes 
that the figure of 10,000 is roughly correct, then  the number of civilians killed 
during the 2½ months of the bombing campaign was approximately five times 
greater than the number killed in the whole year preceding it.  
      The most extreme charge that has been levelled against the bombing 
campaign-  the idea that these refugees were fleeing from NATO bombs rather 
than Serbian attacks- can be discounted. There is wide agreement in the sources 
that virtually all of the refugee flow was caused by Serb action- indeed, the exodus 
is better viewed as a case of organised expulsion than one of refugees fleeing.20 
      However, thecampaign clearly did not succeed in its stated objective of 
preventing Serb forces from carrying out human rights abuses in Kosovo. It has 
been widely argued that in fact the campaign made the situation far worse, as the 
escalation detailed above would not have occurred if bombing had not taken place. 
 
      5.2.1 The Serbian Offensive: Dates, Nature and Planning 
In assessing whether it is true that the bombing made the situation worse, the first 
thing that needs to be established is exactly when the escalation began. Some pro-
war sources claim that the Serbian offensive was already well under way when the 
final decision to bomb was taken. The British Ministry of Defence report Kosovo: 
Lessons from the Crisis claims that there was a “renewed Yugoslav/ Serbian 
                                                 
18
 ICTY Annual Report 2001, http://www.un.org/icty/repannu-e/2001/AR01e.pdf  
19
 J. Pilger, ‘Calling the Kosovo Humanitarians to Account’, 2004, http://www.antiwar.com  
20
 Independent International Commission on Kosovo op.cit.  p.90 
 - 181 -
offensive underway in Kosovo” around 19 March, and that the OSCE withdrew its 
peace monitors because of this offensive- denying the widely-accepted account 
that they were withdrawn because of the impending bombing.21 However, the 
MoD report provides no evidence for its claim of a Serbian offensive before 19 
March. In its Chronology, the earliest report of action by Yugoslav forces is a 
sketchy account of an offensive in Drenica on 21-22 March, then there is nothing 
until 29 March.22 
      Other sources- even official reports by departments of NATO governments- 
follow the same pattern in terms of dates. For example, apart from the killing of 
one person on 18 March, all the atrocities listed in the US State Departments’s 
Executive Survey of May 1999 (titled ‘Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in 
Kosovo’) date from after the withdrawal of the monitors.23 This report states that 
“in late March 1999, Serbian forces dramatically increased the scope and pace of 
their efforts, moving away from selective targeting of towns and regions suspected 
of KLA sympathies toward a sustained and systematic effort to ethnically cleanse 
the entire province of Kosovo.”24 
      The International War Crimes Tribunal indictment of Milosevic gives the same 
picture. The Second Amended Indictment refers to crimes “beginning on or about 
Jan. 1 1999”25; but with just two exceptions, all of the crimes specifically referred 
to in the indictment date from after 23 March. The exceptions are the Racak 
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killings and an attack on 8 March during which FRY/Serbian forces partially 
burned the village of Kotlina.26  The ‘background’ section of the indictment does 
refer more obliquely to a series of offensives by Serbian forces in late February 
and early March, but no crimes from this period- except for the single example 
from 8 March, noted above, which does not mention any casualties- are included 
on the charge list.27 
      The most complete account of human rights abuses by VJ forces in this period 
is detailed in the OSCE report Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen as Told. This report states 
that the OSCE/KVM monitors were withdrawn “in the face of an untenable 
situation of deteriorating security... as well as the impending internationalisation of 
the conflict”,28 but makes clear that whatever indications there may have been in 
advance of a worsening situation, the escalation itself happened after the monitors 
were withdrawn. 
      Furthermore, the escalation seems to have happened in two phases. The Report 
states that “the level of incidents of summary and arbitrary killing escalated 
dramatically immediately after the OSCE/KVM withdrew on 20 March”29, and 
then that “summary and arbitrary killing became a generalised phenomenon 
throughout Kosovo with the beginning of the NATO air campaign”30 on 24 
March. 
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      The report also notes the change in the nature of Serb tactics and objectives, 
stating that “up to that point, the attentions of the Yugoslav and Serbian military 
and security forces had been generally directed towards communities in Kosovo in 
areas that were on UCK (KLA) transit routes or where there were UCK bases.... 
After 24 March however the general pattern changed and included areas that had 
previously been relatively quiet.”31 The ICTY indictment of Milosevic 
corroborates this, describing the Serbian offensives of 1998 as being characterised 
ing campaign 
                                                
by “widespread destruction of property and expulsions of the civilian population 
from areas in which the KLA was active.”32 
      There has been much discussion over whether the Serbian offensive was 
planned in advance. Certainly the coordinated nature of the offensive, with the 
Serbian armed forces, police and paramilitaries all working together, and the fact 
that it began so quickly after the monitors were withdrawn- 307,500 refugees left 
Kosovo within the first eight days of the campaign33- indicates that a good deal of 
it was pre-planned. The expulsions were mostly highly organised, with those 
displaced being forced from their homes by armed troops in a process routinely 
preceded by shelling.34 It is also the case that the Serbs were building up their 
forces on the borders of Kosovo for some time before the bombing began. 
However, these facts are largely irrelevant to the question of whether the 
escalation would have happened anyway in the same fashion if NATO had not 
bombed. Given that NATO had been threatening to launch a bomb
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for some time, it would be something of a surprise if Serbian leaders had not 
drawn up plans for how to respond if these threats were carried out. 
      Supporters of the bombing have pointed to a document known as ‘Operation 
Horseshoe’ as evidence that the Serbian government had planned all along to expel 
the Albanian population. First revealed by the German Defence Ministry in April 
1999, ‘Operation Horseshoe’ supposedly details a Serbian plan to surround 
Kosovo from three sides and drive the population into Albania.35 US Defence 
Secretary William Cohen told Congress that Milosevic could have carried out this 
operation “in a week or so” if the bombing had not thwarted his plans (although 
the bombing clearly did not prevent him from carrying it out quite effectively 
anyway). However, there are doubts over the authenticity of the plan. OSCE 
worker and retired German general Hans Loquai claimed that it was fabricated 
from an analysis by a Bulgarian intelligence agency of Serbian behaviour during 
the war (in fact they even distorted this analysis, which concluded that Serb tactics 
were focused on counter-insurgency rather than ethnic cleansing). German 
intelligence, he alleged, also coined the word ‘Horseshoe’ in the title of the report, 
                                                
mistakenly using the Croatian word for a horseshoe (‘Potkara’) instead of the 
Serbian word (Potkovica).36  
      There is also some ambiguity about the meaning of ‘Horseshoe’ in this 
context. The first documented use of the word ‘horseshoe’ in connection with 
Kosovo occurred in a report published in October 1998 by Dr Dusan Batakovic, a 
Kosovo Serb. This report, which was widely discussed in Serbia at the time of 
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publication, proposed the cantonisation of Kosovo according to the ethnic 
composition of localities within it. The name was suggested by the fact that under 
this plan, Serbs would control a horseshoe-shaped area along the borders with 
Serbia, while Albanians would control the southern and central areas of the 
province.37 This does not match the ‘Operation Horseshoe’ discovered or 
produced by German intelligence, nor does it match what actually occurred during 
entic, without knowing when 
 was drawn up one cannot say whether it constitues evidence that the Serb 
the bombing- Serbian tactics then were aimed at driving out all Albanians 
regardless of what part of the province they had been living in. 
      Even assuming that ‘Operation Horseshoe’ is auth
it
offensive would have occurred without the bombing. 
 
      5.2.2 Did the Bombing Campaign Provoke the Atrocities? 
Then British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook has stated that “there is no evidence 
that what happened subsequently (to the beginning of the bombing) would not 
have happened anyway.”  But nearly all independent observers have rejected the 
idea that there was no link between the bombing and the sudden change in Serb 
tactics. Indeed, even certain figures within the Alliance have accepted the 
existence of a link; General Naumann, Chairman of the NATO Military 
Committee in 1999, said that the humanitarian catastrophe “may ha
38
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accelerated by NATO, and definitely some of the atrocities which happened were 
caused by NATO bombs, since (these provoked) this vendetta feeling.”39 
     Madeleine Albright states in her memoirs that in advance of the negotiations at 
Rambouillet, the US had “received intelligence indicating that the Serbs were 
planning an assault on large KLA units and command centres during a two-week 
period in March, followed by a months-long operation to wipe out pockets of 
resistance.”40  If this intelligence was accurate, it sounds like a repeat of the 
Serbian offensive of Spring 1998- not anything resembling the all-out offensive 
that actually occurred during the bombing. Therefore it may be concluded that the 
balance of the available evidence strongly indicates that the bombing did indeed 
 NATO provoked the attacks on the civilian Kosovar 
                                                
cause a qualitative change in the tactics used by the Serbs, from a brutal and 
excessive, but still fairly conventional, counter-insurgency campaign to an all-out 
attempt to expel the whole of the Kosovo Albanian population, whether or not they 
were providing support for the KLA. 
      The Independent International Commission on Kosovo concludes that “it is... 
certainly not true that
population.... It is nonetheless likely that the bombing campaign and the removal 
of unarmed monitors created an internal environment that made such an operation 
feasible.”41  This occurred because of two main factors; the first practical, the 
second psychological.  
     Firstly, the withdrawal of the peace monitors gave the Serbs an apparent 
opportunity to launch an all-out offensive without being under the same level of 
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scrutiny. Secondly, the effect of the bombing created an impulse for retaliation on 
the part of the Serbs. Unable to strike back against NATO, they turned on the only 
available targets: the Kosovo Albanians. This made the offensive even more cruel 
in its effects than it would otherwise have been. Adam Roberts has said that “there 
is no doubt at all that there was a connection” between the withdrawal of the 
h there are strong indications that 
oked the Serbs into intensifying 
eir assault on the Albanian population, war supporter Matthew Wyman replies: 
ked 
 
                                                
monitors, the start of bombing and the violence; “all major cases of genocide and 
ethnic cleansing in the 20th Century have occurred during or shortly after major 
wars: the chaos and hatred unleashed in war, the secrecy that wartime conditions 
engineer, can provide the necessary conditions for such mass cruelty.”42 
      The OSCE monitors, though they could do no more than contain the conflict, 
do seem to have exercised a genuine restraining influence, certainly on the Serbs 
though perhaps not so much on the KLA. Thoug
much of the offensive was pre-planned, it was only the withdrawal of the monitors 
and the bombing that gave the Serbs the opportunity to carry out their plans.What 
we do not know- and never will know- is how long that restraining influence could 
have lasted if the bombing had not taken place. 
      To the argument that the NATO bombing prov
th
“if someone is being tried for murder, does the fact that they were provo
remove their personal responsibility for their actions?”43 Clearly not- but it might 
suggest that the provoker is not entirely innocent. 
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       5.2.3 ‘Degrading’ the VJ Forces: The Impact of the Campaign in Kosovo 
The British Ministry of Defence claims that the campaign was successful in that 
the Serb forces were forced “to conceal their tanks and heavy weapons from 
NATO attack”, which limited their ability to oppress the Kosovo Albanians.  
However, it is hard to attach much credence to 
44
this contention, given the speed 
, 153 armoured personnel carriers, 389 
                                                
with which the Serbs were able to displace over 90% of the Kosovo Albanian 
population. It is hard to see how they could have done so much more quickly or 
completely even with the use of heavy weapons. 
      The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, while stating that the 
bombing did seriously damage Yugoslavia’s air defences, concludes that “the 
NATO attacks in Kosovo did relatively little damage to FRY ground forces.”45 
This view is echoed in most sources. The House of Commons Defence Committee 
concluded that “VJ and MUP forces in Kosovo were able to withdraw... after 
10/6/99 with their flags flying, plausibly claiming to have remained undefeated”.46 
      Debate has often centred on disputes over the exact figures for Yugoslav heavy 
armaments destroyed and damaged by NATO bombing. After the war, NATO 
reported “validated strikes on 93 tanks
artillery pieces and mortars and 339 military vehicles”, but these numbers may 
well have been exagerrated; the UK Chief of Defence Intelligence has conceded 
that they were “probably...optimistic”.47 
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      However, this statistical quibbling is in essence irrelevant to judging the 
success or failure of the campaign. The clear fact is that, during the bombing- and 
regardless of whatever damage they may or may not have sustained- Serb forces 
ctly helping the Kosovars. Atttacks on 
                                                
succceeded in pushing over 800,000 people out of Kosovo. Indeed, they had 
largely achieved their aim of expelling the Kosovo Albanian population long 
before the bombing was over. Thus, at least in terms of achieving its immediate 
humanitarian objectives, the campaign has to be counted a clear failure. 
      In claiming that the campaign was proving to be a success because they had 
destroyed x number of tanks, command posts, road bridges, military airfields or 
aircraft, NATO leaders showed a misunderstanding of the nature of ethnic 
cleansing, which “does not require heavy armour or sophisticated command and 
control”.48  A large number of thugs with guns can do the job perfectly well. It is 
possible that NATO knew this, and that the bombing of targets in Kosovo 
continued, despite its failure, because it provided a way for NATO to be seen to be 
doing something about the Serbian atrocities, and the figures handed out to the 
media gave an impression of success. Certainly if a NATO spokesman had 
admitted that the Alliance could not stop the ethnic cleansing, nor even slow it 
down- and had announced that therefore NATO would from then on concentrate 
purely on attacking strategic targets in Serbia- the PR implications would have 
been disastrous. The bombing of Serb forces was far easier to sell to the public and 
the media, as it seemed to be aimed at dire
targets in Serbia proper might have offered more hope for achieving the 
campaign’s longer-term objective- that of producing a settlement that would allow 
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the refugees to return- but in the meantime NATO had to be seen not to be 
completely abandoning them to their fate.  
        After the bombing was over, some Alliance spokesmen claimed that they had 
known all along that the campaign was unlikely to succeed in preventing 
expulsions. George Robertson told the Royal United Services Institute in late 
mmer 1999 that “NATO knew from the start that we could only hope to limit or 
 the ground.”49 The 
su
contain the sort of state run terrorism that was happening on
evidence indicates that the campaign did not even succeed in achieving that 
objective. 
 
     5.2.4 ‘Collateral Damage’ in the campaign within Kosovo 
The ‘humanitarian’ campaign also had a more direct effect on the Kosovo 
Albanians. The Human Rights Watch study documented 32 instances of ‘collateral 
damage’ resulting from bombing within the borders of Kosovo, resulting in 
between 278 and 317 civilian dead.  Though dwarfed by the numbers killed by 
the Serbs, this is still a significant figure, and there is a possibility that NATO’s 
decision to have its pilots fly at an altitude of 15,000 feet- taken with the aim of 
reducing the risk of casualties among its own forces- resulted in this figure being 
higher than it need have been. There were several instances during the campaign 
of NATO pilots attacking refugee convoys in mistake for military convoys. The 
most serious of these occured on April 14, when a convoy of refugees was 
repeatedly attacked on a stretch of road between Djakovica and Decane, resulting 
50
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in 73 deaths. Human Rights Watch said that “there is a question as to whether 
NATO’s extraordinary efforts to avoid casualties among its pilots precluded low-
umbers of 
rupulously- if not more so- than in any other type of conflict. 
Certainly one would think that the minimal requirement in any true humanitarian 
                                                
flying operations that might have helped to identify targets more accurately”, and 
that in this case, “flying at a higher altitude seems to have impeded a pilot from 
accurately identifying a target... inadequate precautions were taken to avoid 
civilian casualties.”51 
      It is clear that in the Kosovo conflict, NATO’s one over-riding priority- which 
had more impact than any other factor in shaping the Alliance’s overall strategy- 
was minimising the risk of casualties among its own forces. We will see this again 
later in the chapter when we come to the reasons why the Alliance did not pursue 
the strategy- advocated in many quarters- of an invasion of Kosovo by ground 
troops. One would of course expect this to be a high priority for any military 
power in any war, but not to the extreme extent that was the case in Kosovo. The 
USA- the dominant power in NATO- proved willing to take significant n
casualties among its forces during the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, so why 
would it not do so in Kosovo? The most likely reason for this was that Kosovo was 
a ‘humanitarian war’, and that the fundamental national interests of NATO powers 
was not involved, or at least not to the same extent as in other conflicts. 
     This raises a serious problem for the idea of humanitarian war. We saw in 
Chapter Two that, according to theorists, those conducting a humanitarian war 
should abide by the usual jus in bello criteria of avoiding unnecessary harm to 
civilians at least as sc
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war would be that intervening powers would take all possible precautions to avoid 
causing unnecessary casualties among the people on whose behalf they were 
supposedly fighting. 
      But in Kosovo, this does not seem to have been the case. It appears, when one 
compares Kosovo with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, that for all their pious 
rhetoric about human rights, Western powers are not prepared to go to the same 
lengths when fighting for other peoples’ rights as they are when fighting for their 
own national interests. Specifically, they  are not prepared to accept any costs to 
themselves. This did damage the ‘humanitarian’ character of the intervention in 
osovo, as NATO risked causing unnecessary civilian casualties among the 
s among its own 
K
Albanian population in order to minimise the chances of casualtie
forces. 
 
     5.2.5 Thoughts on the Failure of the Campaign within Kosovo 
The Kosovo campaign provides a very poor advert for the idea- promoted by some 
theorists, as we saw in Chapter Two- that humanitarian wars should be “short term 
and instrumental”, focused on achieving an immediate humanitarian objective. 
The evidence of Kosovo is that air power is of very little use in halting human 
rights abuses on the ground. Advocates of humanitarian war will argue that this 
does not invalidate the concept; it merely shows that future wars should be fought 
using ground troops rather than by high-level bombing. The problem with this is 
that, as we will see later, the war in Kosovo could never have been fought by any 
tactic other than air power. The reluctance of leading NATO members to take 
 - 193 -
manitarian war’ in Kosovo, then, it was air power or nothing; 
mbouillet, is usually regarded 
s having been successful. Certainly Milosevic did in the end concede. It is 
and there is no reason to believe that things will not be the same in any future 
humanitarian wars. 
     But it may be that air power, though it cannot provide immediate protection to 
civilians under attack, can be successful in forcing a recalcitrant regime to accept a 
humanitarian settlement. This is generally seen to have been the case in Kosovo. 
The other part of the campaign, which involved attacks on a wide range of targets 
throughout Serbia with the stated objective of putting pressure on the Milosevic 
regime to accept NATO’s demands as outlined at Ra
a
therefore to this aspect of the war that we now turn. 
 
      5.3 The Bombing Campaign II: The Rest of Serbia      
This section will deal with that part of the NATO bombing campaign that 
consisted of attacks on targets outside the borders of Kosovo. NATO’s decision to 
expand air operations to the whole of Serbia proved to be highly controversial, 
both at the time and since, since it involved attacks on many targets which did not 
em to be of much importance in helping NATO to achieve its stated 
saults on the Kosovo Albanians. 
se
humanitarian objectives of halting the Serbian as
 
      5.3.1 Aims of the Campaign outside Kosovo 
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52
med by leading NATO figures. The questions to be addressed 
incorporated into the planning process. General Shelton said that all targets were 
                                                
here are what tactics the Alliance pursued in attempting to force Milosevic to give 
in, whether these tactics was successful, and whether it can be viewed as a genuine 
humanitarian war. 
     Critics of the war have argued that targeting policy in the campaign outside 
Kosovo was based on a desire to hurt the civilian population of Serbia, in the hope 
that they might then put pressure on their leaders to give in. Throughout the 
bombing, NATO leaders consistently insisted that “we are not at war with the 
people of Serbia”. Then and ever since, there has been an official insistence that 
NATO never deliberately attacked civilians, and indeed took all possible 
precautions to avoid causing civilian casualties, in accordance with international 
law. According to NATO, consideration of civilian casualties was fully 
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“looked at in terms of their military significance in relation to the collateral 
damage or unintended consequences that might be there.” Wesley Clark was said 
ategy of directly targeting civilians- which would of course be illegal- 
but rather one of putting pressure on them indirectly by making life inconvenient 
54
to have spent “hours of his day dealing with the allies on issues of collateral 
damage.” 
      However, the charges of the critics are given credence by remarks by General 
Michael Short, who was in charge of targeting policy, to the International Herald 
Tribune in May 1999; “I think no power to your refridgerator, no gas to your 
stove, you can’t get to work because the bridge is down- the bridge on which you 
hold your rock concerts and on which you all stood with targets on your heads- 
that needs to disappear at three in the morning.”53 Admiral Schmaling, the head of 
German Military Intelligence, said that “the plan was to first put pressure on the 
civilian population and second to destroy the Yugoslav economy so deeply that it 
would not recover.” The fact that certain areas of Serbia that had historically been 
major centres of opposition to Milosevic- such as the city of Novi Sad- were 
singled out for particularly heavy bombing may also provide evidence of the 
existence of this strategy. People who had protested against Milosevic before were 
presumably viewed as likely to be more willing to do so again. This does not 
suggest a str
for them.  
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      Criticism during the bombing focused largely on a series of individual 
mistakes by NATO pilots which resulted in civilian casualties. For example, at 
least ten people were killed on April 12 when NATO bombs hit a railway bridge 
near Leskovac just as a passenger train was crossing it. There were various other 
similar cases; on April 28, a stray bomb hit a house in Sofia, the capital of 
Bulgaria; and on May 1 and 3, NATO bombs hit buses, killing at least 56 people.55  
      However, since the campaign ended, criticism has come to focus less on these 
individual cases- which can be dismissed as the sort of regrettable accidents that 
always occur in war- to the targeting policy that made some of them possible. For 
example, in the case of the bombing of the passenger train, there is no evidence 
that NATO policymakers wanted their pilots to hit bridges just as trains were 
crossing them. The claim made at the time- by General Wesley  Clark-  was that 
the presence of the train was merely a “freakish coincidence”, and that rockets had 
already been released when the pilot saw the train. This assertion has been 
disputed; the passengers said that the first bombs had hit a road bridge above the 
train and that the falling concrete had cut the railway’s power cables, immobilising 
                                                                                                                                      
spared a taste of the suffering that he (Milosevic) has inflicted on their neighbours,” (Cit. in 
Chomsky (1999) p.93) and also by Stacy Sullivan in the New Republic (‘Milosevic’s Willing 
ioned, Vojvodina- a province with a large 
 8 May 1999 
Executioners’, 10/5/99). 
      This argument, however, rests on a series of dubious assertions. Sullivan argues that “the 
relative absence of effective Serbian protest and, especially, the silence of intellectuals on the 
matter of war crimes raise disturbing questions about the culpability of Serbs as a whole in the 
actions of the authoritarian government that rules them.” (p.26) This begs all kinds of questions; 
how many people have to protest against any given action before a people are judged not to be 
collectively culpable? Besides, a considerable proportion of the population of Serbia was made up 
of people- children, the infirm, national minorities- who could not be regarded in any sense as 
being collectively guilty, yet these people presumably suffered just as much as others from the 
bombing campaign. Indeed, as has already been ment
minority population- was bombed particularly heavily. 
55
 ‘The Attacks that Went Wrong’, The Guardian
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the locomotive; the plane had then fired a second rocket into the train.56 But 
whatever the exact truth of what happened in this instance, it was  NATO’s policy 
of attacking bridges- even where these were of little or no obvious military value- 
that made such a mistake possible. Although NATO- unlike the Serbs- was not 
actually setting out to attack civilians, its targeting strategy in the campaign 
utside Kosovo made it more likely that a significant number of such casualties o
would occur accidentally. 
 
      5.3.2 Targeting Strategy: Attacks on the Infrastructure of Serbia 
 NATO seems to have pursued a strategy of attacks on targets which could under 
some circumstances be seen as having military value, but which in this case only 
really made sense as part of what Human Rights Watch describes as “a 
psychological warfare strategy of harassment” - aimed at both the Milosevic 
regime and the civilian population. This is seen most clearly in the frequent attacks 
on road bridges. The British Ministry of Defence report on the war claims that 34 
road bridges were destroyed during the bombing (as well as 11 railway bridges).  
The Independent International Commission on Kosovo raises this figure to 59 
bridges, seven of which were on the Danube.  Many of these attacks took place 
during the daytime, greatly increasing the chance of civilian casualties. NATO did 
eventually change its policy in this area, 
57
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directing its pilots not to attack bridges 
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during daylight hours, on weekends, on market days or on holidays- but only on 
May 30, when the war was nearly over.60 
      Where they are being used by enemy vehicles, road bridges can be highly 
important military targets. However, during the Kosovo war NATO attacked 
bridges which could not conceivably have been of any use to the Serbian military: 
for example, the Danube bridges in the city of Novi Sad, at the opposite end of 
Yugoslavia from Kosovo- and, as it happened, a major centre of opposition to 
Milosevic. (One of these bridges was reportedly barely strong enough to support 
buses.) Novi Sad suffered particularly badly during the bombing, with its water 
and electricity supplies quickly devastated.61 This was not the only case where 
opponents of the regime bore the brunt of the destruction, as will be seen below. 
This strongly suggests a strategy of making life as difficult as possible for the 
as again adversely affected. In this case, the 
                                                
civilian population of Serbia in the hope that this would lead to increased 
opposition to the Milosevic regime. 
      NATO also conducted what it described as “Raids on Serb Elite’s Property”- 
for example the Zastava car plant, whose director was the Minister of Privatization 
in Milosevic’s government. The idea behind this was “to instill fear in those whose 
economic standing depends on Mr. Milosevic- and therefore, presumably, to lead 
them to lobby him to change his stance. This tactic might seem easier to justify 
than coercion of the population in general, since it concentrated on those who 
might be argued to be directly complicit in the actions of the Serbian government. 
However, the wider population w
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workers at the plant- who had carried out a major strike with anti-regime 
overtones- lost their livelihoods.62 
      The bombing caused serious damage to the civilian infrastructure of Serbia. In 
addition to the bridges, nine major highways and seven airports were destroyed; 
most of the main telecommunications transmitters were damaged, and two-thirds 
of the main  industrial plants were nearly destroyed. NATO claims that 70% of the 
electricity production capacity and 80% of the oil refinery capacity was knocked 
out. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo notes that “the 
                                                
consequent suffering of the Serbian civilian population contradicted initial NATO 
assurances that the war was not aimed at the Serbian people.”63  
      Also controversial was the bombing of oil refineries. Every oil refinery in 
Yugoslavia was either destroyed or damaged during the campaign and, according 
to official NATO figures, 57% of Yugoslavia’s petroleum reserve capacity was 
destroyed.64 Oil refineries can undoubtedly be of military value in certain 
situations, but Brownlie argues that in this case the bombings “could not involve 
military objectives because nowhere in Yugoslavia were NATO troops on the 
ground and in a position to benefit from the destruction of fuel sources. NATO 
official statements were very frank in admitting that the purpose of the targetting 
policy was to cause hardship to the civilian population.”65 These attacks- along 
with those on chemical plants- were controversial mainly because of the 
environmental damage that they caused. The bombing of refineries in Belgrade 
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and Novi Sad caused oil slicks 12 miles long in the Danube66, and chemical tanks 
ruptured by bombing contained major pollutants such as naphtha and vinyl 
chloride monomer (VCM), which can induce vomiting, unconsciousness, liver and 
kidney damage.67 Anderson states that “to target such facilities is effectively to 
wage chemical warfare on the civilian populations”- and not only the population of 
200 vessels from these countries were still trapped upstream from 
erbia; direct losses to Romania, Bulgaria, the Ukraine and Moldova totalled £125 
Serbia, since the health-risks also existed for people living in the states downwind 
and downriver from the bombing sites.68 
     These problems- both economic and environmental- did not disappear when the 
bombing ended. The Danube remained blocked for months afterwards by the 
remains of the bombed bridges, resulting in ‘collateral damage’ to the economies 
of the other states which relied on the river for their trade; In November 1999, 
more than 
S
million.69  
 
     5.3.3 Attacks on Media Facilities 
Perhaps most controversial of all were the attacks on Serbian TV and radio 
stations, which began on April 8 and culminated on April 23 with an attack on the 
headquarters of Serbian Radio and Television. Sixteen civilian technicians were 
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killed and another sixteen were wounded in this attack.  These attacks are of 
importance since, controversial as they were at the time, they seem to have 
constituted the start of a trend. The Iraq war has been charac
70
terised by numerous 
election, as it made no direct contribution to the 
nce’s justification for the attacks rested 
                                                
(and allegedly deliberate) attacks by American forces on journalists- the most 
famous example being the bombing of the Palestine Hotel. One might also 
mention the bombing of Al Jazeera’s offices in Afghanistan. 
      NATO spokesmen argued that the Serbian media facilities were a “legitimate 
target which filled the airwaves with hate and with lies over the years.”71 But a 
Human Rights Watch report was particularly critical of these attacks, arguing that 
“there is no evidence that the radio and television headquarters meet the legal test 
of military necessity in target s
military effort in Kosovo. In this case, the purpose of the attack again seems to 
have been more psychological harrassment of the civilian population than to 
obtain direct military effect.”72  
      Attacks on media facilities could probably be justified if these were being used 
for military purposes- or else aiding a campaign of genocide by  inciting violence, 
as was the case with some radio stations in Rwanda. However, though the charges 
levelled by NATO at Serbian Radio and Television were somewhat vague, they do 
not seem to have amounted to an accusation of direct complicity in the actions of 
the Serb forces in Kosovo. Rather, the Allia
on charges that the Serb media were spewing out propaganda for the Milosevic 
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regime- meaning that the TV stations, at most, were only aiding the military effort 
in a very indirect way.  
      Accusing the other side’s media of propaganda and distortion is virtually 
compulsory in modern warfare, and such allegations are often justified, 
particularly in the case of a country which is directly under attack. NATO did not 
help its credibility in this case by saying that the media might “escape further 
punishment” if Milosevic “gave six hours of air space to Western news broadcasts 
each day.”73 This would indeed seem to indicate that the bombing was motivated 
ate targets 
ecause of the political content of their broadcasts rather than because they are 
irectly inciting atrocities, and the civilian population are regarded as legitimate 
                                                
by NATO’s objections to the political content of broadcasts on Serbian TV rather 
than any real military advantage, and that therefore the main aim of the TV station 
bombings was to split the Serbian civilian population off from their leadership 
rather than to directly aid the effort to protect the Kosovars. 
      Given the civilian deaths caused by these bombings, and their lack of success 
(the broadcasters were easily able to move their operations to new, makeshift 
facilities,74 and in fact Serbian TV was back on air just a few hours after the 
destruction of its HQ), NATO’s tactics here seem disproportionate to say the least.  
      Taken together with the strategy of coercion of the population of Serbia, 
attacks on the media seem to indicate an erosion of the principle of noncombatant 
immunity which has historically been the basis of the theory of jus in bello and of 
international humanitarian law. When journalists are viewed as legitim
b
d
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targets for indirect attack in the hope that they will put pressure on their leaders, 
the line between combatants and noncombatants does become blurred. 
 
 
      5.3.4 Smart Bombs, Dumb Bombs, Uranium Bombs and Cluster Bombs 
Much play was made during the bombing of the great accuracy of NATO’s new 
precision-guided weapons. TV stations showed video footage of bombs hitting 
their targets.  Indeed, NATO’s original intention- at least as it was expressed 
publicly by George Robertson on the day the campaign began- was that only 
precision-guided weapons should be used.  This did not in fact prove to be the 
case. Although the Kosovo operation used a higher percentage of precision-guided 
munitions than any other conflict in history , the majority of the munitions 
dropped by NATO were still old-fashioned ‘dumb’ bombs. This led to some 
strange contortions by Alliance military spokesmen in the aftermath of the 
conflict, as they attempted to justify the use of
75
76
 ‘dumb’ bombs by asserting that 
damage’ even when they hit the correct targets. Military targets often harbour 
                                                
they were in fact less likely to cause civilian casualties than ‘smart’ bombs, since 
there was less to go wrong with them. This claim, however, was contradicted by 
the admission that only 2% of the ‘dumb’ bombs dropped during the campaign 
could be confirmed as having hit their targets.77 
      As Dobson has pointed out, the talk about the tremendous accuracy of modern 
‘smart bombs’ serves to hide the fact that bombs can still cause serious ‘collateral 
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harmful substances which are released into the air when they are hit, and 
“whatever gains... ‘smartness’ might promise in principle are lost as soon as the 
two instances in which this 
. s
h will 
range of targets is widened to include civilian targets. Car factories containing 
large amounts of asbestos (were) attacked, for example, and this toxic substance 
(was) spread across wide areas of relatively dense population.”78 
     Hence it would be unwise for advocates of humanitarian war to argue that 
modern technology can- either now or at some time in the future- make it possible 
to fight a genuinely ‘clean’ war. Even if future humanitarian wars are fought only 
with precision-guided weapons, and even if the reliability of these weapons is 
improved in order to reduce the possibility of casualties caused by stray bombs, 
the problems of casualties caused by targeting strategy will still remain. In any 
case, the issue of reliability can be overstated; relatively few of the civilian 
casualties in the Kosovo campaign seem to have been caused by malfunctioning 
weapons. The Pentagon has admitted to only 
occurred 79 Most ca ualties were either due to targeting strategy, or else to human 
error (eg bombing a refugee convoy in mistake for a military convoy)- whic
be a lot harder to eliminate in any future conflicts. 
     Two types of weapons used by NATO in Kosovo caused particular 
controversy: cluster bombs, and shells tipped with depleted uranium (DU).  
      The stated reason for using DU in shells is its extremely high density, which 
gives greater armour-piercing qualities than any other available material. Officially 
the health risks of depleted uranium are considered to be “low”; its toxicity is 
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similar to lead.80 Though there has been a good deal of concern expressed about 
the use of depleted uranium, such evidence that exists of any harmful effects to the 
environment or human health caused by these munitions is purely anecdotal. A 
report for the European Parliament Directorate-General for Research concluded 
that “the dose rate in the vicinity of DU is very low and orders of magnitude too 
small to induce acute radiation damages... if a protracted direct skin contact with 
penetrators/fragments is avoided, the effects of external irradiation by DU are 
negligible.”81 This report also states that “in view of the low mobility of uranium 
in the soil and the small transfer factors into biological material  neither 
intermediate nor long-term effects on the environment are expected.”82 However, 
while one might give a provisional clean bill of health to DU weapons, there are 
far firmer grounds for concern over the use of cluster bombs.  
     As their name suggests, cluster bombs are weapons containing a large number 
of individual ‘bomblets’, which in theory are all supposed to explode on impact 
with the ground. However, at least a few of the bomblets invariably fail to explode 
and remain in the soil, becoming landmines in all but name. Cluster bombs, then, 
can be a highly indiscriminate weapon, especially when used in populated areas. 
This fact has been recognised by international courts; the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia indicted the Croatian Serb military 
commander Milan Martic for- among other charges- using cluster bombs in an 
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attack on civilian areas of Zagreb.83 (although the bombs themselves have not 
specifically been declared illegal). Unexploded bomblets pose a serious risk to 
civilians, particularly since the fragments are brightly coloured and therefore 
attractive to young children.84 NATO countries reject the comparison with 
landmines; the MoD, in defending Britain’s use of cluster bombs in Kosovo, 
are customarily used for ‘area denial’ (that is, 
ere dropped 
                                                
argues that these bombs “should not be confused with anti-personnel type weapons 
that are specifically designed to lay dormant and detonate once disturbed”.85 But 
nevertheless, designed or not, that is the effect that they have.  
      The fact that cluster bombs 
killing an enemy within an area and then preventing subsequent entry to that area 
by the enemy) shows that the existence of a ‘failure rate’ is acknowledged and 
taken into account by strategists. 
      There are various different figures given for the failure rates of cluster bombs. 
The British Secretary of State for Defence claimed that this was “of the order” of 
5%.86 However, the UN Mine Action Coordinating Committee in Kosovo 
estimates a failure rate of 11-12%.87 Whatever the exact figure, this is a significant 
failure rate given that each cluster bomb dropped on Kosovo (1100 w
by US forces88, and 531 by British forces) contained 147 bomblets and over 2000 
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pieces of shrapnel.89 Even taking the lower figure, this would indicate that seven 
or eight bomblets from each bomb could be expected not to explode.  
      Cluster bombs are not precision-guided; only 31% of those dropped on Kosovo 
could be confirmed as hitting their targets.90 Landmines are notorious for the way 
                                                
they continue to cause casualties among civilians long after the particular conflict 
that led to their being placed has ended, and in Kosovo, cluster bombs proved to 
have the same effect. In early 2000, leftover bomblets were still killing two people 
a day.91 This is in addition to the 90-150 civilian casualties (the Human Rights 
Watch estimate) that were caused by cluster bombs during the campaign itself.92 
      The effects of cluster bombs did lead the US government to temporarily stop 
using them. After an incident in Nis on 7 May, when a malfunction led to sub-
munitions falling on a hospital and on the town centre, killing 14 civilians and 
injuring 28, US forces were stopped from using the weapons.93 British forces, 
however, continued to use them- an act against which the Americans made no 
protest94- and the American weapons were returned to service shortly 
afterwards.95  
      Certainly the use of such a weapon by an intervening power should raise some 
questions about the power’s humanitarian intentions and the humanitarian 
character of the operation. But knowledge of their effects in Kosovo has not led to 
any reluctance on the part of NATO states to continue to use cluster bombs. On the 
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contrary: during the war on Iraq, US and UK forces dropped almost 13,000 of 
them, often in populated areas, killing or wounding over 1000 civilians.96 
       The long-lasting after-effects of the bombing- casualties caused by cluster 
bombs, environmental damage and the economic effects of the destruction of 
                  
Serbian infrastructure and the bombing of the Danube bridges-  provide 
considerable evidence for the argument that, even in these days of precision 
weapons, military force is too destrustive an instrument for the use of it ever to be 
termed ‘humanitarian’- at least, if the intervening authorities are not prepared to 
commit sufficient resources to clean up afterwards. This is why the Jus Post 
Bellum is so important, as we will see in the next chapter.  
      Against all this, supporters of the war can point out that- despite the above 
concerns over NATO’s targeting strategy, weapons used and over the 
unwillingness of the intervening forces to take casualties- whichever of the 
estimates you take, the level of civilian casualties directly caused by the NATO 
bombing was much lower than those caused by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
This could be taken to show that the war in Kosovo was fought in a more 
humanitarian manner than other recent conflicts. However, the difference in 
casualty levels may be more due to the fact that the war in Kosovo was far more of 
a limited conflict both in terms of the objectives sought and the type of fighting 
that occurred. In the case of the Kosovo conflict, unlike those in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the intervening power did not seek a regime change in the target 
state; it only sought to remove an area of territory from the regime’s effective 
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control. Equally, in Kosovo the intervening forces were never involved in any 
battles on the ground, and their own forces were never put under any serious 
threat. In judging any war, one’s assessment as to whether a certain number of 
civilian casualties can be considered proportionate has to be made not merely 
according to absolute levels of casualties- important as that factor is- but according 
nvention) that 
ivilian facilities can only be attacked if they “make an effective contribution to 
ly permissible when the attack that 
d these norms. 
 
to such factors as military necessity, the possible alternatives and the nature of the 
objective sought.  
      Human Rights Watch, in its report on the campaign, found no evidence that 
NATO had committed war crimes in Kosovo. But it did find evidence that NATO 
had violated international humanitarian law, by (among other things) attacking 
targets of questionable military legitimacy and failing to warn civilians of 
impending attacks. This seems an appropriate conclusion. 
     We saw in Chapter One that, according to theorists, a humanitarian war should 
abide closely by the accepted criteria of jus in bello. These state (in the 
formulation given in the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Co
c
military action”. ‘Collateral damage’ is on
causes it is not “indiscriminate”- ie one which “may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated.”97 In its targeting strategy and in the nature 
of the weapons used, the intervention at times violate
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      5.3.6 The End of theBombing Campaign 
 There were increasing worries, as the bombing failed to produce the quick 
concession by Milosevic that some expected, over how long NATO unity could be 
maintained. The Independent International Commission’s Report on Kosovo states 
that “at the end of April, the question floating nervously around many NATO 
capitals was ‘how are we going to end the war?’”   
      Although a majority of the public in the UK and USA continued to support the 
bombing, by May some Alliance members were becoming worried about grow
98
ing 
as probably these worries about continued Alliance unity that prompted 
                                                
popular opposition. In Italy, for example, the proportion of people believing that 
the bombing was justified fell from 43% at the end of April to 35% in May, while 
the proportion believing that it was unjustified rose from 33% to 42%.99  The 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo concluded that “it is a moot 
question whether the Alliance could have maintained its cohesion if Milosevic had 
held out for very much longer”100  if Milosevic had not conceded when he did. 
      It w
NATO leaders to take the steps that they had been so reluctant to take before the 
bombing- ie, dropping some of NATO’s more extreme demands, and, most 
importantly, involving Russia more closely in negotiations for peace. As the 
bombing campaign dragged on, many sensed that, as Robert Skidelsky put it, 
NATO had got itself into a hole “from which we now rely on Russia to rescue 
us.”101 
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      Publicly, NATO maintained the same stance to the very end: that there was to 
be no negotiation on the Alliance’s demands, and that the bombing would continue 
until Milosevic accepted them in full. But there were already signs of a minor 
retreat from the provisions of Rambouillet in the very first of the diplomatic 
for the 
by the US and UK because they wanted a NATO force, and indeed the US 
overnment officially dismissed the G8 peace plan for the same reason.103 
rly June, when Chernomyrdin and EU 
    5.3.7 Was the Campaign Successful?
initiatives. In April, the German government promoted a plan which stated that the 
UN should have some role in the post-conflict administration of Kosovo. 
     This plan became the basis for the 7-point peace plan produced at a G8 meeting 
in Cologne on May 8, which itself was to become the framework 
subsequent discussions between Milosevic and Russian envoy Viktor 
Chernomyrdin in Belgrade on May 19.102 
      Milosevic had already met Chernomyrdin on April 22, and at that meeting had 
agreed to an “international presence in Kosovo under UN auspices”- this was 
rejected 
g
     The end of the campaign came in ea
envoy Martti Ahtisaari brought a proposal to Belgrade based on the G8 principles. 
The Serbian parliament formally approved the peace plan on June 3, but the 
bombing continued for another week while a technical agreement was worked 
out.104   
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Whether the campaign can be judged to have been a success depends on the extent 
to which the bombing was instrumental in forcing Milosevic’s eventual 
concession. Unfortunately, any investigation into what was going through 
peculative. A 
 
es within the region, which may have led 
                              
Milosevic’s mind when he gave in must of necessity be highly s
number of possible explanations have been suggested for why he gave in: 
 
1) The effect of the bombing, particularly on Serbia’s infrastructure and its
economy, and the likelihood that continued destruction would lead to 
mounting internal criticism of the regime;105 
2) The continuing unity and solidarity of the NATO alliance;106 
3) The buildup of ground forc
Milosevic to expect an invasion;107 
4) Fears of a KLA breakthrough on the border with Albania (Tim Judah).;108 
5) The role of the Russian government, firstly in making clear that its support 
for Yugoslavia had reached a limit, and secondly in leading Milosevic to 
hope that a Russian role in the peace implementation force might result in a 
de facto partition of Kosovo; 
6) The gains for the FRY in the proposed final settlement relative to the 
Rambouillet Accords. Most importantly, the NATO occupation of Kosovo 
was now to take place under UN auspices. The Peace Accords do not in 
fact even specify a NATO-led force, merely “an international security 
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presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
participation”.109 Russian troops would form a significant proportion of the 
peacekeeping force; NATO was no longer proposing for its troops to have 
access to the whole of the territory of Yugoslavia. In the final settlement, 
there was no longer any reference- even implicit-  to a referendum on the 
future status of Kosovo, nor to any timeframe for a permanent settlement 
resulting from the campaign 
ns conducted during the bombing and 
on Kosovo’s status (Rambouillet had specified three years).110 In the long 
term, these concessions proved to be largely cosmetic- though Kosovo 
remained in theory a part of Serbia, Milosevic lost control of it as 
completely as he would have done if he had accepted the Rambouillet 
Accords. However, at the time these changes did enable him to save face. 
 
      Of these six possible explanations, only the first relates directly to the bombing 
campaign. It is doubtful whether popular opposition 
played a significant part in Milosevic’s concession. True, in the long term his 
defeat in the war did weaken him greatly, and he was overthrown little more than a 
year afterwards. But for as long as the bombing was actually going on, a ‘rally 
round the flag’ effect seems to have taken place. As stated above, the economic 
effect of the bombing, with the resultant prospects for a weakening of his rule in 
the future, is likely to have been more significant.      
      The differences between the negotiatio
those conducted before it- which was already noted in Chapter Four- must have 
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had an impact in encouraging Milosevic to be more accommodating. In contrast to 
the events of Rambouillet, the months of May and June saw real, serious peace 
negotiations; NATO made an effort to involve actors who would be acceptable to 
Milosevic, and concessions were made by both sides (though those made by 
Milosevic were of far greater magnitude). 
      The role of the Russians was also very important. Ignatieff states that “the 
decisive event that made Milosevic fold his cards” was not the bombing but “the 
effective way in which American diplomacy worked to isolate Serbia from 
Russia.”111 The Foreign Affairs Committee report concludes that “it is not 
osovo Accords, though they did 
ot succeed in doing so. NATO’s victory, then, may well have owed as much to 
g itself. 
                                                
unreasonable to believe that” the Russians promised Milosevic that they would get 
a sector of their own in Kosovo, which could have led to partition, “and that this 
was one of the key reasons for Milosevic agreeing to withdraw his troops from 
Kosovo.”112 The Russians certainly did attempt to deliver on this promise in the 
days immediately following the signing of the K
n
post-war intrigues as it did to the bombin
     If it is the case that diplomatic pressure applied via Russia played a bigger role 
in forcing Milosevic to concede than the bombing did, then this serves to reinforce 
the point made in Chapter 4 about the need for theorists to pay more attention to 
the potential value of non-violent methods- in particular, the old-fashioned virtues 
of diplomacy- in resolving humanitarian crises.  
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      5.4 Possible Alternative Strategies 
So what were the alternative strategies that might have been pursued by NATO? 
Throughout the campaign, much of the criticism of the operation in the 
mainstream media came from those who favoured the use of ground troops. 
Ground war advocates argued for their position on both moral and tactical 
grounds. They insisted that the war could not be won by air power. Some of  them 
t be stopped by smart bombs. They can only be 
In evidence to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, journalist 
Jonathan Steele suggested that the best option would have been a ground operation 
                                                
maintained this position until very late in the campaign; in an editorial printed on 2 
June, even as the final peace negotiations were being conducted, the New Republic 
continued to insist that “victory is vital; (and) it will take ground forces, including 
a large component of American ground forces, to win.”113  Michael Walzer 
criticized NATO for its “fetishisation” of air power, and stated that “the truth 
remains... soldiers with guns... can’
stopped by soldiers with guns.”114 
      Like a number of theorists of ‘humanitarian war’, Walzer argued that  NATO 
was putting too high a priority on avoiding casualties among its own troops, and 
wondered whether “countries with armies whose soldiers cannot be put at risk 
(are) morally qualified to intervene.” Though believing that military action was 
“entirely justified, even obligatory”, he added the corollary that “you can’t kill 
unless you are prepared to die.”115 
      Theoretically, there were a number of possible options for a ground campaign. 
 
113
 Editorial, ‘The Peacefaker’, The New Republic 21/6/99, p.11 
114
 M. Walzer, Editorial, Dissent, Summer 1999, p.5 
115
 Ibid pp.5-6 
 - 216 -
focused purely on Kosovo: “we should never have got into bombing Belgrade... 
the whole operation should have been limited entirely to Kosovo, bringing in 
will in most NATO governments for a groung invasion led to 
forces rapidly to protect the Albanians quickly, and the only bombing that might 
have been outside the borders, strictly, of Kosovo would have been on some units 
that were particularly involved in air defence, but not bridges, power stations and 
the like.”116 The most hawkish figures favoured the occupation of the whole of 
Serbia. 
      In fact, a ground attack of any variety was never a realistic option. This was 
true throughout the period of the bombing. A ground force would have required 
150,000-200,000 troops.117 At the start of the bombing, NATO had only 8000 
troops in Macedonia (there to provide support and extraction capability for the 
OSCE peace monitors). There were also 27,000 NATO troops in Bosnia, but they 
were already fully occupied and not authorised to serve elsewhere. NATO 
planners worked on the assumption that, once the decision to launch a ground 
assault had been taken, it would take no less than three months for NATO forces in 
the region to be built up to the required levels for an attack to go ahead. At NATO 
HQ, planning for a ground war did not even begin until April- largely because the 
lack of political 
inhibitions being placed by politicians on the military staff from even planning for 
one.118 General Wesley Clark said that for an invasion to begin in early 
September- which was considered to be the last possible date before the onset of 
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winter- the orders to begin preparations would have needed to be given in the first 
week of June.119 
      Moreover, a ground operation would have been politically impossible in 
March 1999. The opposition of the US administration to the use of ground forces 
is well known.  The fact that political considerations forced US Defence Secretary 
William Cohen to publicly rule out the use of ground forces in October 1998, and 
that the US Administration continuously reaffirmed this position throughout the 
months leading up to the war, even though it was obvious that this would 
entry into Kosovo without the 
                                                
encourage Milosevic to believe that NATO was not serious about its threats120, 
indicates just how improbable it is that US support could have been gained for a 
ground war. Indeed, as late as January 1999, Cohen and Joint Chiefs Chairman 
Hugh Shelton favoured a continuation of the KVM mission rather than making the 
demand that Milosevic should allow a NATO force in Kosovo.121 
     This attitude was unsurprising given the attitude of the American public 
towards ground troops as expressed in opinion polls; in April 1999, 54% of the 
population supported air strikes, but the same percentage opposed the use of 
ground forces.122 US opposition was crucial since “to most if not all nations, it 
would have been inconceivable to engage in forced 
participation of US ground forces.”123 Anderson states that Kosovo “reinforced 
dramatically the USA’s post-Somalia doctrine: that American forces will only 
engage in ground operations in Europe, or indeed anywhere, prior to the 
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conclusion of hostilities, in contexts where vital goals of US foreign, defence or 
economic policy are perceived to be threatened.”124 
      What is less well known is that even in the UK, generally viewed as the most 
hawkish of all the members of NATO; the country whose Prime Minister was 
determined, in the words of one anonymous US military figure, to fight “to the last 
American”125- there was a great deal of opposition in government circles to the 
ground option. One Permanent Secretary told the House of Commons Defence 
Committee that “the casualties (from an opposed ground force operation) would 
have been enormous and we would have been rightly criticised for that sort of 
                                                
carnage.”126 On 24 March, Defence Secretary George Robertson said that “it is a 
pretty unanimous view of the military commanders that we should not get 
involved in a land campaign.”127 Also, most of Serbia’s neighbours opposed the 
use of their territory for a ground war; Greece, for example, made clear that it 
would not countenance the use of the port of Thessaloniki.128 
       In the end, such discussion as did take place about a ground invasion seems to 
have been aimed largely at putting pressure on Milosevic by creating the 
impression that such an invasion might well happen, when in fact “it was 
understood from the start that ground troops were only a distant possibility, and 
that the necessary political consensus would be difficult to achieve.”129 
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     The hawks argued that the ethnic cleansing could be stopped only by putting 
soldiers on the ground, and even after the war many held to the view that a ground 
invasion would have been the best option. However, even if the use of such tactics 
had been politically feasible, it has to be doubted whether the results would have 
been any better. According to some estimates made at the time, an invasion, had it 
met determined Serb opposition, might well have led to a bloodbath far worse than 
the one that in fact occurred. In May 1999, John Hallen of the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies advocated a ground war aimed at establishing 75% of 
Kosovo as a haven, using Macedonia and Albania as bases. He estimated that the 
campaign would take a month or two and could cost NATO 1000 killed and 
wounded (the report I read does not include any estimate of the number of civilian 
casualties). Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution argued that Serb forces 
“may well be extremely motivated to fight us very hard”, so suggested letting the 
not seriously considered by the policy makers is an illustration of one major 
Serb troops know that they could keep a slice of northern Kosovo in order to give 
them an incentive to surrender.130 If such would have been the consequences of a 
ground war, we should be thankful that NATO stuck to bombing. All this is highly 
speculative; more concrete reasons for being wary of the idea of ground invasion 
as an ideal form of humanitarian war are provided by the experience of the 2003 
Iraq war, where troops were used, and the level of civilian casualties proved to be 
much higher than in Kosovo. 
      The fact that a ground operation, though widely advocated by outsiders, was 
‘lesson of Kosovo’; that, as Robert Falk put it, liberal democracies... are unwilling 
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to accept the costs of conducting a humanitarian war in a humanitarian 
manner.”131  It is clear that it was only by placing the highest priority on keeping 
casualties to an absolute minimum that the political will could be found for the war 
to be fought at all. The remarkable success of the high-level bombing strategy in 
Kosovo in terms of avoiding Alliance casualties makes it  likely that any future 
humanitarian wars will be fought by the same methods- methods which Falk 
describes as “forms of interventionary violence that are themselves illegal, and 
achieve a genuinely humanitarian 
utcome. But the evidence indicates that, if humanitarian wars are fought at all, 
by the least costly option available. In the case of Kosovo, that 
anti-humanitarian.”132 Geostrategic wars which masquerade as humanitarian- eg 
Afghanistan and Iraq- are, it is true, another matter altogether. But the bad 
experience of Iraq may make the US even more reluctant to commit ground troops 
in future conflicts, and Europe is no closer today than it was in 1999 to being able 
to fight such wars without American assistance. 
      Advocates of the idea of humanitarian war would no doubt prefer it if states 
were prepared to risk casualties in order to 
o
they will be fought 
meant air power, despite its drawbacks. It is also unlikely that humanitarian 
warriors will voluntarily restrict themselves from using distinctly anti-
humanitarian weapons such as cluster bombs. 
 
     5.5 Conclusion 
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The Kosovo campaign, then, points up a serious problem with the idea of 
humanitarian war. To the extent that the campaign was directly focused on an 
immediate humanitarian objective- ie impeding the Serb forces in Kosovo from 
carrying out ethnic cleansing- it was a failure. Indeed all the evidence indicates 
that the bombing made the situation far worse than it would have been had the 
monitors remained in place.  Although Kosovo has been described as the first war 
ever to be won by air power alone, the campaign provides no evidence that air 
power can be useful in achieving immediate, as opposed to long-term, 
humanitarian objectives. Ignatieff concludes that “the Kosovo war, far from 
ilosevic’s 
concession, compared to other factors such as pressure and promises from Russia, 
cannot be assessed with total confidence, but it seems likely that it was a 
significant factor. But, as we have seen, air power as used for coercive ends is not 
a humanitarian instrument. The nature of the campaign, with NATO’s willingness, 
                                                
proving that the American military can stop human rights violations with military 
power, shows that there is a dangerous lack of effective tactics, strategy and 
doctrine that will accomplish that aim.”133 It may be responded that these 
objectives can be achieved by the use of ground troops. But, as we have seen, from 
a self-interested point of view there are great advantages to intervening states in 
relying on air power in a war where fundamental national interests are not 
involved, and this creates a strong temptation in favour of using it.  
      To the extent in which air power can be successful, in achieving humanitarian 
ends, it was as a coercive instrument, as used in the bombings of targets in Serbia 
proper. How big a part the bombing campaign played in forcing M
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not to attack civilians directly but rather to bomb essentially non-military targets in 
a strategy of harassment of the civilian population of Serbia, leads to serious 
doubts over whether it can be regarded as truly humanitarian in nature.  
 Chapter Six 
Kosovo: the Jus Post Bellum: The 
Aftermath 
 
This chapter focuses on events in Kosovo since the end of the NATO bombing in 
early June 1999, up to the time of writing. The aim is of this chapter is to assess 
whether the conventional understanding of humanitarian intervention as a short-
term matter is tenable in the case of a full-scale humanitarian war; and, if not, 
whether it would be possible to construct a concept of jus post bellum that is both 
realistic and legitimate given the principled and pragmatic objections to military 
occupation outlined in Chapter One. 
      As we saw in Chapter One, the question of what happens after a conflict is 
over is neglected in most theoretical accounts of humanitarian war. The only 
theorist so far to have specifically defined a concept of jus post bellum is Michael 
Walzer in his recent book Arguing About War. Therefore, after an introductory 
section detailing the nature and mandate of the post-conflict missions in Kosovo 
(UNMIK and KFOR), this chapter will be split into two main sections, broadly 
reflecting Walzer’s two criteria for the jus post bellum: ‘Closure’ and 
‘Legitimacy’. ‘Closure’ encompasses responsibilities to think seriously about post-
victory actions and to expend sufficient resources on reconstruction; ‘Legitimacy’ 
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concerns democratic principles such as self-determination, popular consent, civil 
rights, defence of minorities and the idea of the common good.1 These criteria will 
be fleshed out through the use of works on post-conflict reconstruction by such 
authors as Roland Paris, William Bain, Simon Chesterman and Richard Caplan. 
      As for the timeframe to be used in this chapter, detailed coverage in will go up 
to the ‘fifth anniversary’ riots of March 2004 and their immediate aftermath; the 
period since then will be covered more briefly as comment on such recent events 
must of necessity be more impressionistic and hence perhaps of limited use in 
contributing to the central aim of this project (which is, of course, to analyse the 
theory of humanitarian war rather than to speculate on the future of Kosovo). At 
the end of the chapter there will be a brief analysis of the fall of the Milosevic 
government in Serbia in October 2000, which was claimed in some quarters as a 
vindication of the Kosovo intervention, even though the removal of Milosevic had 
never been among the stated objectives for the bombing. 
      The jus post bellum should not necessarily be seen as a charter for prolonged 
military occupation of an area where an intervention has taken place. As those who 
ran the Iraq war have learned, occupation has all kinds of serious drawbacks- most 
importantly, even if its intentions are fundamentally benign, by its very nature it 
creates resentment amongst the occupied. Each individual case is likely to be 
different, but the presumption should clearly be for intervening forces to leave as 
soon as is practicable. If, for example, a humanitarian war has been waged against 
a brutal regime in a state where there are no serious internal ethnic conflicts and 
which does not seem likely to collapse into civil war,  the best option will surely 
                                                 
1
 M. Walzer, Arguing About War, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2004  
 - 224 -
be for the military forces to ‘declare victory and get out’ as soon as the 
intervention has achieved its basic objectives, with post-conflict assistance 
confined to economic reconstruction and the cleaning-up of the damage caused by 
the war. However, in the case of Kosovo, an international security presence was 
clearly required in the aftermath of the conflict, otherwise fighting would have 
started up again. The problem is that such occupations have a tendency to take on 
attributes of semi-permanence. This has been the case not only in Kosovo, but also 
in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq. 
      The most important lesson of the aftermath of Kosovo is that military 
intervention, while it may seem in the short run to provide a neat and effective 
solution to humanitarian crises, cannot deal with the underlying causes of conflict. 
Intervention in Kosovo did not end the conflict; at most, it produced a temporary 
stability in the province. What it did do was alter the power structure within which 
the conflict over the future of Kosovo was being played out, decisively shifting the 
advantage from Serbs to Albanians. Essentially, it turned a tyranny of the minority 
into a tyranny of the majority, which might be viewed as an improvement but 
cannot be regarded as a just outcome (unless one takes the view- as a few people 
did- that Serbs were collectively guilty of war crimes- but the weaknesses in this 
argument have been explored in Chapter 5, and it is not one that fits readily with a 
genuinely humanitarian worldview).  
      The other thing that the intervention in Kosovo did was to further entrench the 
absolutist positions on both sides. As we saw in Chapter 4, a peaceful agreement 
between Serbs and Albanians on the status of the province might just have been 
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possible before 1998, if there had been enough impetus from outside to encourage 
the parties to negotiate; it became much less likely as the prospect of military 
intervention grew more clear. After the war- and despite far greater efforts by 
NATO governments to promote negotiations- it has so far proven impossible for 
Pristina and Belgrade to reach any agreement on the ‘status issue’. Apart from a 
few brief flare-ups, most notably in March 2004, the violent conflict in Kosovo 
has now subsided, largely because of a de facto separation of the province into 
various discrete ethnic units. But the potential remains for conflict to resume at 
any time. Meanwhile, the strategy pursued by the international community- 
essentially one of putting off the issue of Kosovo’s final status for as long as 
possible in the hope that passions would cool with time- has encouraged the 
parties involved to maintain their intransigent attitudes. 
      It will be argued that the issue of motive is highly relevant to the jus post 
bellum. As we have seen in earlier chapters, some theorists maintain that the 
motives of intervening states need not be purely humanitarian- or even, 
necessarily, all that strongly humanitarian- for them to launch and conduct a 
successful humanitarian war. But strong humanitarian motivation is 
unquestionably necessary for the jus post bellum. The process of rebuilding after a 
conflict is long, difficult and somewhat unglamourous. Public scrutiny will be far 
less intense in the post-war period as the media move on to other stories- unless 
the occupying forces suffer significant numbers of casualties, as in Iraq. Kosovo, 
which dominated the newspaper front pages during the period of the bombing 
campaign, has rarely rated more than the occasional brief piece on the 
 - 226 -
‘international news’ pages of the broadsheets since then, except during the ‘fifth 
anniversary’ violence in March 2004- The same has proven to be true in 
Afghanistan. Therefore governments will be under far less pressure of 
accountability.  
 
      6.1 UNMIK and KFOR: Nature and Mandate 
Bain states that in the aftermath of the intervention, “the people of Kosovo, 
Albanian and Serb alike, (were) forcibly deprived of their independence and... 
made wards of the United Nations.”2 Certainly the postwar settlement, contained 
in UN Security Council Resolution 1244, gave KFOR- the security force, drawn 
from NATO countries and from Russia- and UNMIK- the UN-run civilian 
administration- exceptionally wide authority in Kosovo. KFOR’s main 
responsibilities included: 
1) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and enforcing a ceasefire and 
ensuring the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces 
2) Demilitarising the KLA 
3)  “Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced 
persons can return home safely” 
4) Ensuring public safety and civil order and supervising demining until the 
international civil presence (UNMIK) could take over.3 
 
UNMIK’s main responsibilities included: 
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1) “Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial 
autonomy in Kosovo” 
2) “Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and for as long 
as required” 
3) Organising and overseeing development of institutions for self-
government in Kosovo 
4) Transferring administrative responsibilities to these institutions as they 
were set up 
5) Facilitating a process for sorting out Kosovo’s final status 
6) “Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic 
reconstruction” 
7) Maintaining civil law and order sand establishing local police forces 
8) “Protecting and promoting human rights” 
9) Assuring safe and unimpeded return of refugees.4 
 
In essence, KFOR was there to provide security, while UNMIK had an open-ended 
mandate to operate as a colonial administration.5 UNMIK also had the authority to 
engage in international bargaining, for example by negotiating the international 
sale of commodities to firms in Europe and Asia, and establishing partnerships 
with European firms in Kosovo6- perhaps in fulfilment of the ‘free-market 
principles’ section of the Rambouillet Accords. UNMIK was headed initially by 
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Bernard Kouchner, a former humanitarian worker for Medicins Sans Frontieres- 
which would seem well in keeping with the principles of humanitarian 
intervention, indicating a genuine effort to provide a civilian face to the occupation 
as well as a military one. 
 
      6.2 Closure 
This section of the chapter will deal with those aspects of the post-bombing history 
of Kosovo that relate to Walzer’s criterion of ‘closure’: for example, the question 
of whether NATO had thought seriously about its post-victory actions and whether 
the international authorities provided sufficient resources for reconstruction. 
 
      6.2.1 Planning for the Post-Victory Phase  
There have been accusations that the nature of the post-conflict operation in 
Kosovo showed “slow learning” on the part of the planners, as with generals 
fighting the last war. “UN officials now acknowledge that, to varying degrees, 
Kosovo got the operation that should have been planned for Bosnia... and East 
Timor got the one that should have been sent to Kosovo.”7 
      However, the main area to which NATO states undeniably did not devote 
enough thought was the question of the future status of Kosovo. The long period 
of uncertainty over what this is to be illustrates the problem of starting a 
humanitarian war without a clear idea of what is to happen afterwards. 
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      It was noted in Chapter Five that whereas the Rambouillet accords had 
specified a final settlement on the future status of Kosovo in three years (and this 
was generally understood to mean a referendum, although the Accords themselves 
did not actually say this), the settlement that ended the bombing did not contain 
these provisions. The problem for the NATO states was that the positions they had 
adopted before and during the war left them in an impossible position afterwards, 
since they had either explicitly or implicitly ruled out any conceivable future status 
for Kosovo other than that of a semi-permanent international protectorate. After 
the war, it was plain for anyone to see that Kosovo could no longer be part of 
Serbia in anything more than a formal sense- any move by the international 
community to allow Serbia to regain control of Kosovo, or any attempt by the 
Serbs to regain the province by force, would have led to a renewed civil war. 
Equally, after the rhetoric of saving the Kosovars from genocide that had been 
used to justify the war, NATO could hardly have allowed the Serbs to retake 
Kosovo and still maintained its credibility. Given this, logic would seem to suggest 
that Kosovo should have become independent; but for a variety of reasons- most 
importantly the risk of setting a precedent that could lead to the disintegration of 
states like Bosnia and Macedonia- the international community had consistently 
and specifically ruled out this option both before and during the bombing. And 
again, the rhetoric used during the bombing meant that NATO had to remain 
committed at least in principle to a multi-ethnic Kosovo, as doing otherwise would 
have meant effectively admitting that the war had been a failure- so independence 
could not be allowed unless it could be credibly asserted that the rights of 
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minorities would be proteced in the new Kosovo, which so far has clearly not been 
the case. In essence, then, the international community could not allow Kosovo to 
remain part of Serbia; but nor could it allow it to become independent. All the 
possible compromise options- partition, cantonisation, population transfer- had 
even more serious drawbacks (as will be shown in more detail later in the chapter). 
The result was that Kosovo was left in a kind of limbo- in which, more than six 
years later, it still remains. 
 
      6.2.2. Resources 
One consistent theme running through much of the literature on the immediate 
aftermath of the Kosovo intervention- and one which links directly with Walzer’s 
jus post bellum criterion of ‘closure’-  concerns the insufficient resources given to 
UNMIK by the international community, especially when compared with the large 
sums of money that NATO governments had been so willing to spend on the 
bombing. Bernard Kouchner told the UN Security Council on 7 March 2000 that 
the lack of resources given to UNMIK was appalling given the resources allocated 
to the bombing, and complained that he had had to go round EU member states 
begging for funds to pay UNMIK staff8; a complaint justified by the fact that 
UNMIK had a budget shortfall of $25 million in 1999.9  
      The deficiency in resources was reflected in manpower as well as in money. 
The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee noted that “the international 
community has conspicuously failed to provide the numbers of police necessary to 
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bring the UNMIK force to the strength of 4718 requested by the UN Secretary 
General in November 1999.... Fewer than half this number were in post on 2 
March 2000” (the actual total was 2361).10 Travers notes further that “some of the 
personnel have been of such poor quality and lacking in basic skills (such as 
driving and use of firearms) that they have had to be returned home.”11 This 
shortfall was particularly serious given that in the aftermath of the conflict Kosovo 
faced a serious problem with organised crime, with the KLA and criminal gangs 
from Albania having filled the vacuum left by retreating Yugoslav forces12, so an 
infusion of police forces was clearly necessary. 
      Baskin states that in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, those working for 
UNMIK “were overwhelmed with the enormity of the many tasks” before them; 
“there were too few international officials; those who did arrive generally lacked 
expertise in handling the prosaic issues of administration; and few knew anything 
about Kosovo.”  Hence, when groups of Kosovars started visiting UNMIK’s HQ 
to ask for the redress of grievances- as they began to do as soon as UNMIK arrived 
in Kosovo- the staff “generally put off local petitions by forming committees to 
explore the matter.... Consequently, few substantive demands were addressed with 
the necessary urgency and dispatch to build genuine UN authority in Kosovo.” 
This allowed “’hardliners’, including various strands of the KLA”, to fill the void 
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by “taking direct action” and building “their own institutions in a provisional 
government.”13 
      It should be pointed out that despite these serious shortcomings, the operation 
in Kosovo was actually unusually well-resourced for a post-conflict reconstruction 
effort, certainly compared to the one that followed the next US-led intervention- in 
Afghanistan. A 2003 report by Care International showed that Kosovars were  
receiving $288 per person in aid from the West, while over the next five years, 
people in Afghanistan were scheduled to receive just $42 per head. In Kosovo, 
there was one international peacekeeper for every 48 people; in Afghanistan, the 
ratio was 1:5380. This was so despite the fact that Afghanistan had suffered from a 
civil conflict that had been far longer in duration and far more destructive than the 
one in Kosovo- indeed, it was still going on in parts of the country. By any 
measure, its security and economic needs were far greater.14 Despite the fact that 
President Bush had likened the commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan to the 
Marshall Plan, “just over 12 months later... the White House apparently forgot to 
include any money for reconstruction in the 2004 budget that it submitted to 
Congress.” This fact makes Chesterman note that “the ephemeral nature of 
international interest in post-conflict operations is, unfortunately, a cliché.”15 
     Some might ascribe the difference between the resources given to post-conflict 
reconstruction in Afghanistan and those given to Kosovo to the change from the 
liberal-interventionist Clinton administration to the neoconservative Bush 
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administration. But the real reasons seem more likely to be found in the differing 
objectives of the two wars. In the case of Afghanistan the strategic objectives of 
the reconstruction were centred on ensuring the security of the West (from al-
Qaida terrorism) rather than the security of the Afghan people. According to 
Chesterman, “when  interventions are justified by the national interest... this may 
lower the standards to which post-conflict reconstruction is held. The level of 
physical and economic security required in Afghanistan to prevent it from 
becoming a terrorist haven, for example, is not the same as that required for the 
basic peace and prosperity of the general population. This was reflected in the 
methods used by the United States to pursue its objectives in Afghanistan.”16 
     The above- the inadequacy of the resources provided for the post-conflict 
period in Kosovo, and the even greater inadequacy of those given to Afghanistan- 
provides strong evidence that humanitarian motives matter a great deal to the 
achievement of a humanitarian outcome in the jus post bellum.  Herring points out 
that providing the resources for war but not for peace in Kosovo was irrational if 
the war was truly fought for the rights of the ethnic Albanians- but it “makes sense 
if it was a war fought for NATO’s credibility at Kosovo’s expense.”17 The 
objective of ‘protecting NATO’s credibility’ was achieved as soon as FRY troops 
left Kosovo; it did not require any commitment to the jus post bellum.  
       The strongest evidence for the importance of motive, however, lies in the 
several ways in which the most minimal (and least controversial) condition of the 
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jus post bellum- the repair of damage directly caused by the war- was not met. The 
US government  refused to allow American weapons disposal experts to remove 
unexploded cluster bombs, instead leaving the problem to “underfunded civilian 
teams”- the head of the UN civilian demining team explained that “NATO doesn’t 
want to create a precedent for cleaning up in post-conflict situations.”18 To an 
outsider, this would seem to be the sort of precedent that should be set as quickly 
as possible. This is especially so if states are determined to keep using cluster 
bombs in their humanitarian crusades, given the reputation that these weapons 
have for continuing to cause casualties long after the conflict in which they were 
used has ended- as indeed they did in Kosovo (see Chapter 5). 
     The decision had long-term consequences. In 2002, the Halo Trust alleged that 
the UN had stopped its landmine clearance programme too early, with thousands 
of unexploded bombs still left lying around in Kosovo.19 As late as March 2005, a 
report by Landmine Action listed Kosovo as one of 90 countries contaminated by 
unexploded weapons, saying that 75 areas of cluster munition contamination still 
remained in the province six years after the war.20 
      NATO also proved reluctant to repair the damage caused by the bombing in 
Serbia proper: for as long as Milosevic remained in power, the responsibilities of 
reconstruction were sublimated to the attempt to give Serbs incentives to 
overthrow him. Hence funds for reconstruction were withheld from Serbia, and- 
for example- the Danube bridges in Novi Sad that were destroyed by the bombing 
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still remained in ruins in June 2001.21 The grudge held by NATO leaders against 
Milosevic was suggested as a motivating factor for the bombing, and in this aspect 
of the post-war settlement it seems to have eclipsed the responsibilities of the jus 
post bellum. 
 
      6.2.3 Long-term Economic Reconstruction 
Perhaps the most serious problem of all in Kosovo today is the continued 
economic stagnation. When the war ended, it was clear that international-led 
economic reconstruction was just as necessary as peacekeeping; after a decade of 
hidden and open conflict, Kosovo was, economically speaking, a mess. Public 
services had been run down, Albanians had been deprived of work in key 
industries, and the Albanian population had lost the sense of civic responsibilities 
and the obligation to pay taxation. To this had been added the damage caused by 
the bombing and sabotage by the retreating Yugoslav forces. Robin Cook 
described Kosovo as “an impoverished province... further ravished by the 
conflict”22 (presumably he meant to say ‘ravaged’?). However, six years of 
‘peace’ has failed to bring about any discernable improvement in the province’s 
economic situation. 
                                                
      This has not been helped by the fact that, just as before 1998 the lack of open 
military conflict in Kosovo led to the developing crisis in the province being 
ignored as the international community concentrated on more urgent problems in 
places like Bosnia, in the aftermath of the bombing Kosovo has gradually drifted 
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down the international community’s priority list as new crises have arisen in other 
places. The predictable result has been a dramatic decline in the level of aid given 
to the province; from €2 billion in 2000-2003 to €400,000 in 2004-2006.23  
      Economic reconstruction rivals the protection of minority rights as the greatest 
failure of the post-war era in Kosovo. The repair of war damages in housing and 
infrastructure has been completed (although more than four years after the 
bombing had ended, Kosovo was still suffering from daily power cuts)24, but 
Kosovo shows no signs of any substantial economic development. Today, the 
unemployment rate in the province is approaching 60%25- an even higher rate than 
when the war ended. Van Meurs writes that there has been “a continuous 
slowdown in economic growth, a corresponding increase in unemployment, and a 
huge disproportion between import and export. What remains is a region with no 
major assets for sustainable economic development, but crippling historical 
legacies and cultural deficits.”26  
      Support for economic reconstruction should be regarded as a central part of the 
jus post bellum, since it may well be crucial in the avoidance of renewed conflict. 
The recent history of the Balkans indicates the enormous importance of economics 
as a factor in causing or preventing ethnic conflict; it was the collapse of the 
Yugoslav economy in the 1980s that provided the initial spark for the civil wars by 
setting the republics against each other in competition for diminishing federal 
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funds.27 Tim Judah, writing in the immediate aftermath of the March 2004 
violence in Kosovo, stated that “everyone I spoke to said that the poor shape of the 
economy in Kosovo was a major factor in creating discontent”28; the previous 
week, an official in Pristina had complained that “no-one in UNMIK is even 
thinking about the economy. They don’t even have any economic experts here.”29 
Given all this to be true, the cutting of economic aid to Kosovo is a very short-
sighted policy. 
     The international community should certainly have been prepared for the fact 
that Kosovo would not be economically viable without support from outside. The 
province was always one of the poorest parts of Yugoslavia- it had an average 
income just one-third of the Yugoslav average30- and in the Tito era it relied 
heavily on subsidies from other republics.  
      A further reminder that economic and ethnic issues should not be treated as 
separate is provided by the impact that the continued ethnic polarisation of the 
province has had on economic reconstruction; Kosovo’s mining industry, formerly 
quite lucrative, was based on an area around Mitrovica that now straddles the 
ethnic divide, and hence it has so far proven impossible to revive it.31 
      The prospects for future conflict- and the difficulties of economic 
reconstruction- are further fuelled by the fact that Kosovo has what is effectively a 
third-world demographic structure, with half of the population under 20 and 70% 
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under 30. The riots of 2004 were led by young Albanians, and the structure of the 
population means that 45,000 young people come onto the job market every year- 
a very high number relative to Kosovo’s total population.32 
      Economic reconstruction emphasises the long-term nature of the jus post 
bellum. Any former conflict zone is likely to need serious and prolonged support 
before it can fully recover economically- particularly one which, like Kosovo, had 
required subsidies to keep it afloat even in better times.    
 
      6.3 Legitimacy 
This section will deal with those aspects of the post-bombing history of Kosovo 
that relate to Walzer’s criterion of ‘legitimacy’: these, as stated above, include 
such matters as self-determination, civil rights, popular consent and defence of 
minorities. 
 
      6.3.1 Popular Consent: Accountability 
 Overall, the structure of the post-conflict operation in Kosovo broadly parallels 
the ‘Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation’ strategy set out by Roland Paris, 
which we encountered in Chapter 1 as an example of a ‘maximalist’ interpretation 
of the jus post bellum. Paris does criticise the Kosovo operation for not going far 
enough in certien areas- for example, for not taking over political and judicial 
power sufficiently quickly in the period immediately after the bombing33, and for 
moving too quickly to hold elections- but he states that overall, “since their 
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deployment, KFOR and UNMIK have been considerably more assertive and 
interventionist in constructing functioning governmental institutions, and in 
managing the liberalisation process, than earlier peacebuilding missions- with 
substantial success.”34  
      The idea- or, as some would have it, the contradiction- at the heart of the IBL 
agenda is that of  “creating a legitimate and sustainable state through a period of 
benevolent autocracy.”35 In the case of Kosovo, the implementation of this 
strategy led to some interesting ironies. First of all, UNMIK regulations provided 
that all KFOR and UNMIK personnel should be immune from any form of arrest 
and detention, and that all KFOR and high-ranking UNMIK officials should be 
“immune from local jurisdiction in respect of any civil or criminal act committed 
by them in the territory of Kosovo.”36 This meant, as the Kosovo Ombudsperson 
has noted, that “as a consequence of living under UNMIK’s rule, Kosovars lack 
the protections that derive from Belgrade’s increasing acceptance of international 
human rights instruments (in the period after the fall of Milosevic).... The UN, the 
self-proclaimed champion of human rights in the world, has by its own actions 
placed the people of Kosovo under UN control, thereby removing them from the 
protection of the international human rights regime that formed the justification for 
UN engagement in Kosovo in the first place.” 37 
      There are certainly grounds for accusing the Kosovo missions of being 
insufficiently accountable to the people on whose behalf they were meant to be 
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acting. Aside from the legal immunity given to international officials, the Kosovo 
Ombudsperson was not permitted to investigate complaints of human rights 
violations or abuse of authority by KFOR personnel, nor any complaints to do with 
actions occurring before July 2001.38 Also, despite a provision in the very first 
UNMIK regulation to the effect that all future regulations would be published in 
Albanian and Serbian, three years later many were still only available in English.39 
      It was noted in Chapter 1 that one of the potential arguments against the IBL 
strategy- or any similar formulation of the jus post bellum- is that it could be 
abused by major powers with an imperialist agenda, seeking to conduct an 
occupation in their own interest rather than that of the local population. The wars 
pursued in the era of the ‘war on terror’ provide strong evidence for this. 
Chesterman writes that “recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have shifted the 
terms of th(e) debate (on post-conflict reconstruction); the state-building agenda in 
such operations has been determined less by the needs of the post-conflict society 
than by the strategic interests of the United States.”40 
     This danger would be expected to arise less strongly in the case of Kosovo; as a 
small and rather impoverished province with no oil reserves, it does not offer 
opportunities for the kind of grand-scale corruption seen in occupied Iraq. There 
have nevertheless been problems, however. Complaints have grown about 
corruption by UN officials; for example, in 2003 a German bureaucrat was 
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imprisoned for embezzling €4.5 million while he was chairman of the supervising 
board of the Kosovo Electric Company.41  
      The UN administration has also been accused in various ways of neglect and 
of abuse of power. To take one example, a 2002 report by the organisation Mental 
Disability Rights International (and endorsed by Human Rights Watch), stated that 
patients in UN-run mental institutions in Kosovo had been “raped and and 
physically attacked under the eyes of UN staff, held in ‘filthy and degrading’ 
conditions, and threatened with punishment if they report the abuses.”- and that 
evidence of this had been ignored by the UN. MDRI’s founder commented that 
“the rule of law simply does not apply within these psychiatric facilities. We found 
extreme, inhuman and degrading treatment, arbitrary detention and the physical 
and sexual assault of women, and we received a blanket denial from the 
authorities.”42 
      The weakness of institutions is a characteristic of states which are left for too 
long under international occupation; in this case, allegations such as those detailed 
above provide ammunition for Kosovar nationalists, who insist that these problems 
would be cured by independence. Adem Demaci said in 2003 that “as long as none 
of us is politically accountable for our own institutions, they will remain weak and 
corrupt.”43 
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      6.3.2 Popular consent II: Elections in Kosovo 
The victory of Ibrahim Rugova in the November 2000 elections in Kosovo- with 
58% of the vote for his LDK compared to 27% for former KLA commander 
Hashim Thaci’s PDK- was interpreted in the Western media as a sign of hope- a 
triumph for a “mainstream moderate”, opening up opportunities for dialogue with 
Belgrade.44 What this interpretation failed to note was that Rugova, though he had 
favoured different tactics during the 1990s, was just as committed to independence 
for Kosovo as were the leaders of the KLA. It also glossed over the fact that the 
election had been boycotted by the Kosovo Serbs.45 
      The ‘Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation’ blueprint for post-conflict 
reconstruction advocates that peacebuilders should delay holding elections until 
there is a good chance that “moderate”, peace-oriented candidates will triumph- 
and that when elections are held, they should be managed to maximise the chances 
of such an outcome, for example by banning extremist parties and giving financial 
aid to moderates.46 This approach was only partially followed in the case of 
Kosovo. The international authorities did use various methods to ‘manage’ the 
elections in the province: political parties and candidates were prohibited from 
using language or symbols “likely to incite hatred towards others” and were 
required to be “publicly outspoken in the condemnation of violence, threats of 
violence or intimidation.” Candidates and parties could only participate if they had 
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been certified by the internationally-run Central Election Commission as 
complying with the above code of conduct.47 
      However, the first set of elections were held relatively soon after the end of the 
bombing campaign- within 18 months, in fact. For this reason, Paris criticises 
UNMIK, saying that the authorities “may have moved too quickly to hold 
elections, reinforcing the power of those politicians who are committed to 
Kosovo’s separation from Yugoslavia,” and that “it is difficult to understand how 
the empowerment of Kosovo separatists through democratic elections serves the 
interests of achieving a long-term peaceful solution to the Kosovo problem.”48 
(Paris notes that there is a strong temptation for authorities to hold elections 
quickly, for reasons of publicity- a peaceful election can be held up as evidence 
that the mission is working. “Speedy democratisation is one way of creating the 
appearance of a peacebuilding ‘success’ without resolving difficult issues and 
underlying sources of conflict.”49) 
      The problem with Paris’s argument is that virtually all Kosovo Albanian 
politicians are separatists, differing only in the tactics they advocate for achieving 
it- so there is no reason to suppose that delaying the holding of elections for a few 
years would have produced different results. Indeed, it seems just as likely that 
delaying elections might have increased popular resentment of the international 
presence, thereby benefiting extremist parties. After all, the stated aim of the IBL 
strategy is to produce a stable libera democracy, so elections must surely be held 
eventually.  
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      Experience in Bosnia also creates potential doubts over the effectiveness of 
another aspect of the IBL election strategy: that of trying to ensure victories for 
“moderate” candidates by providing financial aid. In the 1998 elections there, 
pledges of additional financial assistance appear to have contributed to the defeat 
of reformist candidates, as some voters resented the intrusion.50 And of course, if 
the international authority becomes unpopular with the local inhabitants, any 
support that it gives to certain parties or candidates is likely to be 
counterproductive. 
 
      6.3.3 Minority Rights 
The major success in the immediate aftermath of the conflict was the exceptionally 
quick return of the great majority of those who had been forced to leave Kosovo 
during the intervention- 800,000 of the 850,000 refugees had returned by March 
2000, making this, in the words of Robin Cook, “the fastest refugee return... seen 
in post-war Europe.”51 Indeed, the bulk of the returns took place so quickly that 
they were largely unorganised. Depending on what view one takes on the question 
of whether the bombing provoked the expulsions (see Chapter 5), this represents 
either a vindication of the intervention or merely a reversal of some of  the damage 
caused by it. 
      However, the irony of the occupation of Kosovo is that, while the intervention 
itself was justified on the grounds of protecting the Albanian population, ever 
since international troops actually entered Kosovo their main role has been to 
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protect every group in Kosovo except the Albanians. In the immediate aftermath of 
the bombing, the swift return of Kosovo Albanian refugees was paralleled by an 
equally swift exodus of most of the Serbian population. Out of about 200,000 
Serbs who lived in Kosovo prior to the bombing, only around 70,000 remained by 
October 1999.52 Even more dramatic were the figures for the capital Pristina, 
where the number of Serbian inhabitants declined from 20,000 before the war to 
just 1000.53 Judah states that the Serbian population was “winnowed out” after 
June 1999, with hardly any left in the major cities apart from an enclave in the 
northern part of the city of Mitrovica, separated from the Albanian section of the 
city by the Ibar river.54 The proportion of the Serb population who left or were 
expelled in the June-October period was in fact very similar to the proportion of 
the Albanian population that had been expelled from Kosovo during the bombing. 
      The exodus was prompted and accompanied by a campaign of violence 
directed mainly against Serbs but also against other groups who, for one reason or 
another, had offended the KLA fighters who effectively controlled Kosovo in the 
aftermath of the bombing. In her memoirs, Madeleine Albright glosses over the 
violence, merely noting that “as expected, there were some instances of retaliation 
directed by ethnic Albanians against Serbs”55, but independent sources are less 
sanguine. The Kosovo Report states that “after the summer of 1999, Kosovo was 
characterised by a high level of crime and aggression, much of which was directed 
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against the minority population, especially Serbs.”56 For the six month period 
immediately after the intervention, killings of civilians (mostly Serbs) were 
running at an average of 30-40 per week- not much lower than in the 12-month 
period before the bombing, and considerably higher than in the period between the 
Holbrooke Agreement and the beginning of the bombing. In total, around 300 
Serbs were killed and a similar number abducted in the period June-October.57 
KLA hit squads burned, looted or demolished 85 Orthodox churches and 
monasteries.58  
      The OSCE report Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, as Told describes the violence as 
having been motivated by revenge against those who were believed to have 
participated in atrocities during the NATO bombing, or who were thought to have 
actively or tacitly collaborated with the Serbian authorities. However, not all 
victims fell into these groups; they also included “those individuals and groups 
who were persecuted simply because they had not been seen to suffer before,” and 
indeed “the entire remaining Kosovo Serb population”- including the elderly and 
vulnerable- who were all seen as collectively guilty.59 The report also concludes 
that the violence was, at least in part, planned: “although many incidents were 
disparate, individual acts of revenge, others... assumed a more systematic pattern 
and appear to have been organised. The evidence in part points to a careful 
targeting of victims and an underlying intention to expel.”60 
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        The violence should not have come as a surprise, given that the KLA had a 
record from before the bombing for attacking Serb, Roma and Albanian civilians- 
and the fact that something similar, albeit on a much smaller scale, had happened 
in the aftermath of the signing of the Holbrooke Accords, when the KLA had 
taken advantage of the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces to re-occupy territory. In 
1998, “together with Serb civilians, Albanian civilians who were perceived by the 
KLA as refusing to cooperate... were targeted for imprisonment, violence and 
murder.”61 
      Other minorities also suffered, in particular the Roma. Many Kosovo 
Albanians viewed the Roma as “collaborators”, accusing them of having carried 
out the Serbs’ dirty work, such as disposing of bodies, during the bombing62; and 
collective punishment was carried out in a similar manner. By July only about 
6000-7000 Roma were left in Kosovo, compared to a population of 30,000- 40,000 
recorded by the 1991 Yugoslav census.63 
      Smaller minorities such as Slavic Muslims- who were suspected merely 
because they spoke Serbo-Croat-64 and others were also targeted, and many of 
them also fled the province; a mass exodus of the Croat community occurred in 
Ocrober, and in November the President of the Pristina Jewish community left for 
Belgrade, complaining of “a pogrom against the non-Albanian population.”65 
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       A certain amount of violence in the aftermath of the intervention was probably 
inevitable given the inflamed sensibilities caused by the war, but the OSCE 
concludes that “it is clear that the deficiency in the law enforcement capacity 
provided by the international community and the lack of sufficient assistance in 
the administration of justice has fostered the climate within which the human 
rights violations... have taken place; impunity for the acts committed has resulted 
from failures to conduct serious investigations and this impunity, in turn, has 
perpetuated the violence.”66  
     The violence continued to the end of the year; in December 1999, Amnesty 
International reported that “violence against Serbs, Roma, Muslim Slavs and 
moderate Albanians in Kosovo has increased dramatically over the past month”, 
including “murder, abductions, violent attacks, intimidation and house burning... 
on a daily basis.”67 In early 2000 Jiri Dienstbier, the US Special Investigator for 
the former Yugoslavia, calculated a total figure of 330,000 for minorities and “pro-
Serb Albanians” either made refugees or internally displaced in Kosovo- meaning 
that most of the province’s minorities were no longer in their original homes.68 
      Although NATO governments continued to insist that it was “certainly not the 
official position” that Serbs should not return to Kosovo, in the early months after 
the conflict the policy of the UN was not to encourage returns. UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan’s report of 3 March 2000 stated that the return of minority 
refugees “cannot be promoted or facilitated by UNHCR at the present time, as the 
necessary preconditions, in particular a safe and secure environment, are not yet in 
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place.” 69 More recently a policy of encouraging returns has emerged, but as will 
be seen later, it has found few takers. 
      It may be said, then, that what the bombing achieved in the short run was 
merely the replacement of one ethnic cleansing campaign with another- albeit on a 
smaller scale, because the population to be targeted was smaller.  
      Though most of the violence in the immediate aftermath of the bombing was 
directed against minorities, Albanians were also included among the victims- 
specifically, those Albanians who were seen as not sufficiently supportive of the 
KLA. The OSCE notes that “a disturbing theme (of the period after the 
bombing)... is the intolerance, unknown before, that has emerged within the 
Kosovo Albanian community.... opposition to the new order, particularly the 
[former] UCK’s dominance of the self-styled municipal administrations, or simply 
a perceived lack of commitment to the UCK cause, has led to initimidation and 
harassment.”70 Aid worker Tony Vaux wrote of a visit to Kosovo in September 
1999 that “all paid jobs were being reserved for supporters of the KLA, and 
employers who did not contribute to the KLA would find themselves in deep 
trouble. It was not the victory of the Albanian people but of a new elite, which 
began to create its own apartheid under the protection of Western power.”71  The 
OSCE’s characterisation of this “intolerance” as “unknown before” is surprising, 
however, given that before the war the KLA had made a practice of targeting 
perceived Albanian ‘collaborators’.  
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      This indicates that despite the principled objections that may be made to 
military occupation, the idea of humanitarian intervention as a short-term matter- 
which, as we saw in Chapter One, has historically been the prevailing view among 
theorists- is not realistic, at least in cases like Kosovo, where outsiders intervene in 
an internal territorial conflict. In the case of Kosovo, if there had been no military 
occupation of the province in the aftermath of the intervention, the result would 
most likely have been an even bigger exodus of non-Albanians and the creation of 
an effectively mono-ethnic state under the control of the KLA. 
     The longer-term aftermath of the intervention has been characterised by a 
general decline in the level of violence directed against minorities (with the 
exception of the riots of March 2004, which we will come to later). In an interview 
given in early 2004, Bernard Kouchner- the former head of the UN administration, 
said that “after six months in Kosovo, I was still dealing with 40 assassinations a 
week. Today there’s only one or two.”72 
      However, this decline has occurred less because of any reconciliation than 
because almost all of Kosovo’s minorities had either left the province by the end 
of 1999 or were confined within ethnic enclaves under the protection of KFOR 
troops. Although the violence has subsided, the population remains segregated, 
and the freedom of movement of the remaining minority populations is still 
extremely limited. Serbs now constitute “a locally concentrated minority of about 
7% in Kosovo”, and “continue to live in scattered, isolated enclaves... lacking the 
minimal preconditions for normal life.” Efforts to facilitate the return of Serb 
refugees have produced meagre results, despite the “abominable circumstances” in 
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refugee camps in Serbia- just 9000 had returned to Kosovo by early 2004. Some 
reports in 2003 suggested signs of a “nascent trust” appearing between Serbs and 
Albanians- Serbs had begun to venture out of their enclaves without KFOR 
protection- but these were destroyed by the riots of March 2004.73 Meanwhile, 
outside the borders of Kosovo there have been periodic outbursts of guerrilla 
action by Albanian nationalists in the neighbouring regions of the Preshevo Valley 
and Macedonia.  
      In an ironic echo of the situation in the early 1990s, Serbs have responded to 
official discrimination by setting up their own set of ‘parallel’ public institutions- 
including courts, security structures and medical facilities- supported and 
maintained by the government in Belgrade. This has caused resentment among 
Kosovo Albanians, who fear that Belgrade is aiming to create a de facto 
cantonisation of the province- and some have accused UNMIK of failing to do 
enough to challenge these structures. But in truth, UNMIK has effectively been 
forced to tolerate the parallel structures since, due to discriminatory practices, 
Serbs find it almost impossible to get access to Albanian-dominated public 
services.74 
       In essence, then, the current situation in Kosovo is a kind of mirror-image of 
the situation in the province in the first half of the 1990s, with one ethnic group in 
control and the other systematically excluded from power. It is merely that the 
identities of the controlling and the excluded group have changed. As was stated in 
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the introduction to this chapter, Kosovo has changed from a tyranny of the 
minority to a tyranny of the majority. 
     Not much progress has been made with regard to dealing with offences 
committed against minorities. UNMIK was forced to allow the appointment of 
international judges and prosecutors in early 2000 after its early insistence that 
these posts should be filled by locals produced unfair trials; Serb judges were 
intimidated while Albanian judges delivered peverse and biased verdicts. KFOR 
officers admitted that “no fair trials were possible for inter-ethnic crimes, while 
mono-ethnic crimes were very difficult to investigate.”75 Successful prosecutions 
of ethnic Albanians for violent acts against minorities remain fairly rare; this has 
created a climate of impunity, which was one factor that helped spark the riots of 
March 2004.76 
 
      6.3.4 Minority Rights II: The Violence of March 2004 
The continued potential for renewed conflict in Kosovo was dramatically  
illustrated in March 2004, when, according to figures from Human Rights Watch, 
19 people died and 954 were injured in two days of riots that marked the worst 
outbreak of inter-ethnic violence since 1999.77 The riots were sparked off by a 
series of seemingly minor events: first, on March 12, a grenade exploded at the 
home of Ibrahim Rugova, causing damage to the house but no injuries; then on 
March 15 an 18-year-old Serb was shot, causing local Serb villager to put up 
roadblocks, which angered the Albanian public; finally on 16 March three 
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Albanian boys were drowned in the Ibar river. Rumours were immediately spread 
that they had been chased into the river by Serbs, although later investigations cast 
doubt on these claims.78  However, it is clear that the violence also reflected the 
various deeper frustrations outlined above, which had left the province ripe for 
unrest of this sort.  
      In the rioting on March 17 and 18, 36 Orthodox churches, monasteries and 
other important sites were set on fire or damaged during the violence, and the UN 
reported that 4366 people had been forced to flee. Of these, about 360 were 
Albanian and a similar number were Roma; the rest were Serbs.79 Some 2000 
people still remained displaced in July. The report by Human Rights Watch on the 
riots notes that “in many of the communities affected by the violence, in attacks 
both spontaneous and organised, every single Serb, Roma, or Ashkali home was 
burned.”80  
      In addition to showing the extremely fragile nature of the ‘peace’ in Kosovo, 
the March 2004 riots demonstrate several other things. Firstly, they showed the 
error of what the International Crisis Group describes as the international 
community’s “naive assumption that delaying the decision (on Kosovo’s final 
status) would allow passions to cool.”81   Secondly, they showed that UNMIK and 
KFOR do not have the capacity to protect Kosovo’s minorities against any really 
determined assault. KFOR troops were unable to halt the riots, and in some cases 
did not even attempt to intervene; for example, French KFOR troops refused to 
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come to the aid of the Serb residents of Svinjare, and all 137 of their homes were 
burned, even though the troops’ base was located only a few hundred metres from 
the village. Human Rights Watch has accused the international community of 
being “in absolute denial about its own failures”, stating that figures in UNMIK, 
KFOR, NATO and the UN have been happy to criticise Albanian leaders for their 
response to the riots, but have been unwilling to discuss the inadequacy of their 
own response- so there is a serious risk that the lessons of the riots will not be 
learned.82 
     Secondly, the response of many Kosovo Albanian politicians to the riots did not 
provide much reason to expect that minority rights would be protected in an 
independent Kosovo. While some made real and creditable attempts to halt the 
violence- for example, the then Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi made a visit to the 
town of Caglavica on March 18 and succeeded in persuading the rioting crowd to 
go home- many initially made statements that seemed to legitimise it. Nexhat 
Daci, the Speaker of the Parliamentary Assembly, described those Kosovo 
Albanians who were killed in the riots as “people [who] died fighting for 
democracy and freedom”.  Ibrahim Rugova, often described as the voice of peace 
and moderation in Kosovo, “repeatedly failed to condemn attacks against Serbs 
and other minorities” (though he did condemn attacks on UNMIK police and 
KFOR soldiers).83 Whether the politicians concerned made these responses out of 
genuine conviction or because they believed that it would be politically 
disadvantageous for them to express sympathy for Serbs, it still does not bode well 
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for Kosovo’s future. The International Crisis Group states that the incidents of 
March 2004 “revealed Kosovo Albanian society to be deeply troubled, lacking 
institutions, leadership and the culture to absorb shocks and contain its violent, 
criminal minority. In its current state, this society will continue to push out 
minorities and ultimately consume its own wafer-thin layer of liberal 
intelligentsia.”84 
 
      6.3.4 Self-Determination: the ‘Status Question’ 
In 2000, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee concluded that, 
because all the potential options for Kosovo’s future status seemed to have equally 
major disadvantages, “the current ambiguity about the future may well be the best 
course of action to follow.”85 It is hard to dispute this conclusion- in the short 
term. However, ambiguity cannot be maintained forever without incurring serious 
risks. Those who favour a strategy of ambiguity may hope that, over time, passions 
may cool, memories may fade and former antagonists may feel more able to deal 
with each other. But this can take a very long time- in the case of Cyprus, for 
example, an international security force has remained on the island for 40 years, 
waiting for a more conciliatory political elite to emerge.86  However- particularly 
in a situation as charged as that in Kosovo- it is perhaps more likely that ambiguity 
maintained for an indefinite period may cause a buildup of frustration and 
resentment on all sides, with the risk of a resumption of  conflict. 
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                  This is in fact what has occurred in Kosovo. The UN authorities, initially 
welcomed by the Albanian population as liberators, are now increasingly seen as 
an occupying force. Resentment has grown up against international officials who 
are believed only to be in Kosovo for “their fat-cat salaries and CVs”.87 This 
experience has also occurred with a number of other post-conflict stabilisation 
missions, for example that in East Timor, where little more than a year after the 
establishment of the UN administration- which, as with that in Kosovo, was 
initially welcomed by the bulk of the population- local leaders were already 
becoming frustrated and calling for the UN to leave.88  
      The violence of March 2004 provided a warning of what might happen in the 
future if the ‘status question’ is not sorted out to the satisfaction of the various 
parties. But finding an acceptable solution has proven to be extremely difficult. 
The complexity of the situation in Kosovo is indicated by the fact that, by my 
count, at least ten different options have been seriously put forward for the future 
status of the province: 
 
1) Unconditional independence 
2) Independence with federalisation or cantonisation, either into two entities 
(one Albanian, one Serb) or a number of small ethnically-defined units 
3)  ‘Conditional independence’ based on guarantees of state functionality and 
protection of minority rights 
4) Union with Albania 
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5) Autonomy within Serbia 
6) Reintegration as the third constituent part of the Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro 
7) Permanent international protectorate 
8) UN trusteeship (this differs from the protectorate option in that full legal 
sovereignty would be transferred to the UN via a new Security Council 
resolution) 
9) EU integration- some argue that the transfer of sovereignty rights in EU 
integration would render the sorting-out of rights between Belgrade and 
Pristina superfluous 
10) Partition, with part of the province joining Serbia with the rest either 
becoming independent or joining with Albania89 
 
Yet other options, less often mentioned, include such possibilities as population 
exchange. 
      Every one of these options has serious drawbacks. In fact, it is probably best to 
deal with these in another list: 
 
1) Representatives of Kosovo Serbs, and the government in Belgrade, have so 
far refused to consider even conditional independence, let alone full 
independence; also, giving independence to Kosovo carries the risk of 
encouraging Albanians in Macedonia and extreme nationalists in Bosnia to 
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pursue similar demands.90 If independence was allowed without a genuine 
commitment among Kosovo Albanian leaders to respect the rights of the 
remaining Serbs, it might even potentially lead to an invasion by Serbia, 
whose military and police are said to have “contingency plans” to exploit 
new violence against Serbs in Kosovo by intervening in support of 
partition.91 
2) Federalisation into two entities would be virtually impossible because of 
the way the Serbian population is presently scattered in numerous small 
enclaves; cantonisation is seemingly a more practical option, but it would 
still most likely produce the same problems that have resulted from 
federalisation in Bosnia- ie “a political system deadlocked by ethnic 
loyalties... and the multiplication of public institutions without a 
corresponding increase in the functioning and output legitimacy of the 
‘state’.”92 
3) This was the option suggested by the Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo- the international community would provide an 
initial security guarantee, oversee the protection of minority rights and 
integrate Kosovo into a stability pact.93 Potential drawbacks include the 
determination of independence ex ante as the final status, giving Serbs an 
incentive to obstruct the process, and the fact that “logically, independence 
once awarded cannot be revoked and sovereign rights once transferred 
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cannot be withdrawn”94- meaning that guarantees of minority rights might 
not be worth very much once international oversight had ended 
4) Unification with Albania has little support among Kosovo Albanians and is 
rarely discussed today- historical differences and a lack of recent contact 
have led to splits between the two populations95 
5) This and 6) are the only acceptable options for the Serbs- but restoration of 
anything more than nominal Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo would 
assuredly produce a new civil war. Autonomy for Kosovo would also 
provoke demands for equal status from Vojvodina 
6) See 5) – no.6) disappeared from the list of practicable options in 2006 
when the people of Montenegro voted for independence 
7) The protectorate option is the one that, by default, has been adopted ever 
since the bombing- but for reasons that have already been explored, it is 
not a good long-term option 
8) Trusteeship is effectively the same option as 7), and would suffer from the 
same problems 
9) This is described by van Meurs as “largely utopian”- Kosovo plainly does 
not meet the basic criteria for EU membership, and will not do so for many 
years- and the sovereignty rights that would be transferred to the EU are 
not those that are in dispute96 
10) There is little support for partition inside Kosovo, and because of the 
scattered nature of the remaining Serbian population it would be very 
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difficult to work out a logical border. Partition would also encourage 
nationalists to demand the same treatment for the Preshevo Valley (a 
majority-Albanian area of Serbia near the eastern border of Kosovo), 
Bosnia and Macedonia, and would provide explicit  endorsement for the 
idea of the mono-ethnic state- something that Western policy for the whole 
of the Balkans has been specifically aimed at avoiding.97  
 
      Other options, such as population exchange- which would be a form of 
officially-approved ethnic cleansing- are more unacceptable still. 
      Yet further options have been suggested which would deliberately leave the 
final status of Kosovo unclear, giving the province “independence without full 
sovereignty” or “full sovereignty without independence”. There are precedents for 
this: for example the case of Taiwan, which is a de facto independent state but is 
not a member of the UN and is legally still a province of mainland China; and that 
of northern Cyprus, which has existed as a de facto state for 30 years but has never 
received international recognition, except from Turkey. In each of these cases the 
outcome, though not perfect, was at least reasonably stable and the parties 
involved have generally chosen to respect it. However, neither in Taiwan nor in 
northern Cyprus is there the same potential for internal conflict within the disputed 
province- as opposed to conflict between the states or state-like entities- that exists 
in Kosovo, so it is doubtful that a similar solution would prove sustainable.98 
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      6.3.5 Self-Determination II:. “Why should I be a minority in your country if 
       you could be a minority in mine?”99 Albanian and Serb Attitudes Towards 
       the Status Question 
 
Since the international community- for reasons stated in the section on ‘closure’- 
could not come up with a workable imposed solution for Kosovo’s final status, the 
only option was to encourage negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina in the 
hope that an agreed settlement might result. This hope has not, however, been 
fulfilled, despite some initial hopeful signs (or at least, signs that were interpreted 
as hopeful). 
     In fact, the positions of the two parties have remained every bit as entrenched 
after the war as they were before it. Van Meurs writes that “as national sovereignty 
is indivisible from an Albanian-Kosovar perspective and as Belgrade is ready to 
consider any option but independence, room for compromise seems to be non-
existent.”100 The lack of any willingness to compromise on either side has meant 
that negotiations have been a zero-sum game, since any change in the status of 
Kosovo would be disadvantageous for one of the sides- a situation which could 
sow the seeds for future instability.101  
       The near-absolute split in attitudes on the status question exists among the 
people of Kosovo as well as among the politicians. A UNDP opinion poll 
conducted in 2004 found that 100% of Kosovo Albanians wanted all links with 
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Serbia to be dissolved (86% desired independence for Kosovo, 14% preferred 
union with Albania), while 95.5% of Serbs wanted the link maintained (82% 
thought that Kosovo should be an autonomous province within Serbia, 13.5% 
favoured partition).102 
      The fall of the Milosevic regime after electoral defeat in October 2000 raised 
hopes that some willingness to compromise might emerge, at least on the 
Yugoslav side; but Milosevic was replaced not by pro-Western liberals but by rival 
Serbian nationalists who were committed to ensuring that Belgrade retained its 
sovereignty over Kosovo. Any ‘window of opportunity’ after the fall of Milosevic- 
if one had existed at all- was finally closed by the results of the Serbian elections 
of December 2003, in which the nationalist Serbian Radical party- led by the war 
crimes indictee Vojislav Seselj, who at the time of the vote was in a remand cell at 
the UN detention centre in the Hague- became the largest single party in the 
parliament, gaining 81 out of the 250 seats.103 This result “tied the hands of even 
the most liberal politicians in Belgrade”- accepting the loss of Kosovo remains a 
taboo there, and reformist politicians go no further than advocating partition or 
federalisation of the province.104 
     When Serbian and Kosovan leaders finally met for talks in Vienna in October 
2003- even with the status issue explicitly excluded from the agenda- there was 
still no real dialogue; the two sides merely read out prepared statements.105 The 
negotiations were characterised by brinkmanship beforehand by both parties- the 
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Kosovo parliament threatened to declare independence, and then Prime Minister of 
Kosovo Bajram Rexhepi withdrew from the delegation at the last moment, while 
the Orthodox Church in Belgrade epithetised Kosovo as “Serbia’s Jerusalem”. The 
meeting did produce an agreement to set up four working groups, meeting 
alternately in Pristina and Belgrade, to deal with outstanding “non-status” issues: 
the electricity supply for Kosovo, transport and telecommunications, refugee 
return and missing persons. But, according to van Meurs, “the conclusion from the 
Vienna meeting is that the political leaders in Belgrade actually had no master plan 
for a sustainable and domestically acceptable solution for Kosovo. Nor had their 
interlocutors from Pristina a concept for the Serb minority in the envisaged 
independent Kosovo.”106 In other words, more than four years after the war, the 
positions on both sides had shifted not one inch. 
     The possibility that negotiations may not produce agreement on the final status 
of Kosovo has led to speculation that the international community will have to 
impose an outcome. The problem with this is that any imposed outcome which 
leads to independence for Kosovo- conditional or otherwise- and does not have the 
consent of Belgrade, will suffer from a legitimacy deficit; and it might well prove 
impossible to pass a UN resolution endorsing such a settlement. (This is so even 
though some  politicians in Belgrade would actually prefer an enforced settlement, 
since this would get rid of the ‘Kosovo problem’ without them having to take 
personal responsibility for the loss of the province.)107 
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      Just as in the period before the bombing, the international community has been 
criticised in some quarters for not being sufficiently imaginative in its tactics in its 
attempts to encourage a negotiated settlement, particularly with regard to gaining 
Belgrade’s consent. Just as it has been suggested that a few more carrots to go with 
the sticks might have helped in persuading Milosevic to at least negotiate seriously 
over Kosovo before March 1999, the offering of inducements- for example, in the 
form of removal of visa restrictions, debt reduction or cancellation and increased 
development assistance- has been suggested as a strategy for keeping Belgrade on 
board today- and it is an option that the international community has not yet really 
explored. The inducement of EU membership has been offered, but given that this 
almost certainly could not happen for another 15-20 years, and then only after the 
many painful reforms that would be necessary to meet the EU’s accession criteria- 
it is not perhaps as glittering a prospect for the politicians in Belgrade as the EU 
would like to think it is.108 
      Walzer’s criterion of ‘legitimacy’ in the jus post bellum includes the idea of 
‘self-determination’. One of the more obvious lessons of the aftermath of the 
Kosovo war, however, is that ‘self-determination’ is a meaningless concept if no-
one can agree on who the ‘self’ is that should do the determining. Both Serbs and 
Albanians believe that they have a legal and moral claim to the province (each 
basing their legal claim on the old Yugoslav constitution, and their moral claim on 
past atrocities committed by the other side). 
      The same fact also constitutes a problem for some other theoretical ideas. Frost 
argues that the future status of places where an intervention has occurred should be 
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decided by “the civilians in the region”.109 The problem with this in the case of 
Kosovo is that there is no way of arriving at a definition of ‘the region’ that would 
be accepted by both sides. 
 
      6.3.5 Self-Determination III: ‘Standards Before Status’ 
In an effort to sort out the status question (or to find a new way of avoiding the 
issue) in April 2002 the UN announced a strategy of “standards before status” for 
Kosovo, making the opening of negotiations on the final status of Kosovo 
conditional on the fulfilment of the following eight benchmarks: 
 
1) Functional state institutions 
2) Enforcement of the rule of law 
3) Freedom of movement 
4) Right of return for all Kosovars 
5) Market economic development 
6) Clarity of property title 
7) Normalised dialogue with Belgrade 
8) Reduction and transformation of the Kosovo Protection Corps110 
 
All of these except no.5 are related either directly or indirectly to the question of 
minority rights. 
                                                 
109
 M. Frost, ‘The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention’, in K. Smith & M. Light, eds. Ethics and 
Foreign Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.777 
110
 van Meurs loc.cit. p.8 
 - 266 -
      One major problem with the ‘standards before status’ idea is that it provides an 
incentive for Serbs- whether in Kosovo or Belgrade- to obstruct progress on the 
fulfilment of the listed objectives, since without such progress there can be no final 
status negotiations and therefore no independence for Kosovo. Equally, just as the 
Kosovo Albanian representatives in the Rambouillet negotiations required extra 
assurances on the prospect of a referendum on independence for Kosovo before 
they accepted the text of the Interim Agreement, under ‘standards before status’ 
they only have an incentive to meet the conditions on minority rights if it is 
indicated to them that independence is to be the likely outcome of the negotiations. 
Van Meurs concludes that “the fundamental flaw of ‘standards before status’ is 
that it can unfold its incentive function for one party only and only if it prejudices 
the final status outcome.”111 
      This links with the principled criticism of military occupation mentioned in 
Chapter One: that it denies those subject to it the status of fully responsible human 
beings. Have the Serbs and Albanians refused to compromise because they are 
chronically incapable of doing so, or because they have been put into a situation of 
dependence on outsiders?  It might be replied to this that when the two sides were 
essentially left to themselves- in the period up to 1998- they showed little more 
wish to compromise than they have done since the war. 
      In the aftermath of the 2004 violence, any hopes for a revival of the ‘nascent 
trust’ of 2003 were made still more forlorn by the appointment of Ramush 
Haradinaj, a former KLA commander, as Prime Minister of Kosovo in December 
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2004- which called Serbia to pull out of talks.112 Haradinaj had to resign in March 
2005 after he was indicted for war crimes; a year later, another former KLA 
commander, Agim Ceku (who has also been accused by Belgrade of committing 
war crimes in both Kosovo and Croatia) was nominated as Prime Minister.113 The 
rise of figures like Haradinaj and Ceku, alongside the nationalist victories in 
Serbian elections of 2005- and the death in January 2006 of Ibrahim Rugova, 
which has led to fears of a power vacuum in the Kosovo Albanian leadership that 
could be exploited by hardliners- indicates a worrying possibility; that, in the 
words of van Meurs, “the opening of a negotiation process more readily invokes 
the forces of the past than peaceable visionaries”.114   
      Having failed to produce any real progress, the ‘standards before status’ 
strategy  has effectively been dropped in recent months in favour of a push to final 
status negotiatons. In June 2005, US Under-Secretary of State for political affairs 
Nicholas Burns pre-empted the UN review on whether the conditions set out in the 
‘eight points’ had been fulfilled when he said immediately before a visit to Kosovo 
that  “it’s the view of my government that sufficient progress has been made to 
start final status talks. Kosovo was put on the backburner for years. We have to go 
back and complete the job.”115 
     However, the ‘final status talks’ originally scheduled for late 2005 were 
delayed by several months, and up to the time of writing the positions of both sides 
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remain as entrenched as ever. Within the past year or so, given the unlikelihood of 
a negotiated agreement between Belgrade and Pristina, momentum has been 
building up behind the idea of an imposed solution based around ‘conditional 
independence’, and as of the time of writing (Autumn 2006) it looks increasingly 
likely that this will happen. However, even when the ‘final status’ question is 
settled, the idea of Kosovo becoming a fully self-governing, multi-ethnic 
democracy still seems a somewhat distant prospect.  
 
      6.4 The Fall of Milosevic 
The fall of Milosevic in October 2000 has been claimed in some quarters as 
providing retrospective justification for the war in Kosovo- and hence, perhaps, for 
the idea of humanitarian war. 
      This is a very difficult issue to evaluate. Milosevic was overthrown not by the 
war directly but by a popular revolution; and it should be remembered that he had 
come close to being overthrown on more than one previous occasion (see Chapter 
3). Some accounts of humanitarian war specifically rule out the idea of ‘regime 
change’ as a legitimate objective. Equally, though a wish to weaken Milosevic has 
been widely cited as one of the factors which motivated NATO to launch the war, 
toppling his regime was never one of the Alliance’s official objectives. And, given 
that virtually all of the Kosovo Albanians expelled during the bombing had 
returned to the province long before Milosevic fell- and that from June 1999 on, 
Serbia’s continued sovereignty over Kosovo amounted to no more than a legal 
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fiction- it is clear that his overthrow was not necessary for the achievement of the 
war’s stated humanitarian aims.   
      Though his defeat in the war undeniably weakened Milosevic, his fall did not 
reflect any support in Serbia for NATO’s actions.116 He was replaced by fellow 
nationalists who had opposed the bombing and made clear that they were 
determined to hold on to Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo. 
     Again, there were some questionable aspects about Western policy towards 
Serbia between the end of the bombing and Milosevic’s fall. The issue of 
reconstruction funds has already been touched upon; it has also been alleged that 
the CIA encouraged rebellion by Albanians in the Preshevo Valley area of 
southern Serbia in order to undermine Milosevic- but then lost control of the 
guerrillas, who continued fighting for their own cause after he fell.117 However, 
although the West did certainly attempt to encourage Serbs to overthrow 
Milosevic in the period between June 1999 and October 2000, the means adopted 
were mainly peaceful- for example, funding opposition groups- and thus fall 
outside the scope of this thesis. It is, however, worth wondering what might have 
happened if there had been a similar effort by the international community to 
encourage- by purely peaceful means- the overthrow of Milosevic during, say, the 
period between 1996 and 1998. 
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      6.5 Conclusion 
The experience of the aftermath of the Kosovo intervention shows the fallacy of 
demonising all members of an ethnic group while exalting those of another as 
spotless victims. Crimes are committed by individuals, not peoples, and no ethnic 
or national group is morally superior or inferior to any other. As we saw in 
Chapter 5, some pro-war pundits justified the bombing of Kosovo on the grounds 
of the unique perfidy of the Serbian people, who were ‘Milosevic’s willing 
executioners’. However, as soon as the bombing was over, members of the KLA 
began to behave in much the same way as Milosevic’s thugs had done before and 
during the bombing; the violence was on a far smaller scale, but this was largely 
because the KLA did not have the same level of weaponry and there were fewer 
Serbs for them to expel.       
      An important lesson of the aftermath of the Kosovo intervention is that it 
should be incumbent on theorists of humanitarian war to be realistic about what 
military force can and cannot achieve. The NATO bombing campaign did not deal 
with the underlying causes of the conflict, nor did it bring it any closer to a 
resolution. The ideal of a peaceful multi-ethnic Kosovo is probably further away 
from being achieved today than it might have been in the first half of the 1990s 
had the international community been prepared then to make the same kind of 
efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement that it has made  over the past five years. 
The same thing should be said about military occupation in the aftermath of an 
intervention. By itself, occupation can never serve to do any more than postpone 
future conflict, and even while doing so it creates tensions of its own; even when 
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they are initially welcomed, occupying forces tend to become less and less popular 
with the people they are occupying the longer they stay. 
      The most that can be expected from a military intervention is that it might 
create an atmosphere in which it is possible for a final resolution to a conflict to be 
achieved. But this requires a strong commitment to the jus post bellum, 
particularly in the form of economic reconstruction; and this is only likely to exist 
if the intervening states truly are motivated by humanitarian concerns. 
 Conclusion 
This project has attempted to use the case of the NATO intervention in Kosovo to 
evaluate and inform the theory of humanitarian war; to check the arguments of 
both proponents and critics of the concept against this real-world example of what 
is generally agreed to be a reasonably good case of humanitarian war. 
      Plainly one cannot draw absolute conclusions from a single case. In the future 
we may see humanitarian wars that are more straightforwardly legitimate in their 
conception and less ambiguous in their effects than the war in Kosovo. But an 
examination of the history of the Kosovo conflict, before, during and since the 
NATO intervention, does provide good reasons to be cautious about the idea of 
using military force for humanitarian ends. 
 
      C.1 Jus ad Bellum 
To begin with the matter of the jus ad bellum, we have seen that there are 
problematic aspects to a number of the established criteria: most of all, that of the 
‘last resort’. It is here that the realist charge that the concept of humanitarian war is 
too open to abuse seems to have the greatest backing. It is easy for states to either 
sin by omission, failing to pursue the diplomatic track with sufficient commitment 
in the early stages of a crisis; or by comission, pursuing the diplomatic track 
cynically with the aim of showing that the last resort has been reached. In the case 
of Kosovo, a mixture of these two problems led in the end to a war that might have 
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been avoided with greater commitment to addressing the crisis in the province 
during the period (probably before the spring of 1998) when there was still the 
possibility of a peaceful resolution. However, in practice outside action with 
regard to the Kosovo crisis was all too often characterised by lack of interest in the 
years before 1998 and lack of seriousness in the period immediately before the 
war. There is strong circumstantial evidence, contained mainly in the more 
unnecessary provisions of the Rambouillet accords, that the decision to go to war 
was effectively taken some time before the end of negotiations. 
     Some theorists of humanitarian war have tried to avoid the issue of motive, 
knowing that the motivations of intervening states are rarely pure.1 In some cases 
it may be true that this does not matter. But in the case of Kosovo, motives- 
particularly the perceived need to protect NATO’s credibility- strongly influenced 
the course of events in the months and years leading up to the war. The issue of 
motive, we have seen, ties in with the issue of ‘last resort’. The fact that ‘NATO’s 
credibility’ was at stake was an important factor in motivating the war, but 
‘credibility’ only became an issue because NATO had pursued a one-dimensional 
diplomatic strategy relying purely on the threat of force. It may also be remarked 
that perhaps stronger humanitarian motivations on the part of Western leaders 
might have led the search for a peaceful solution to be pursued with greater 
commitment in the early stages.   
      There is a need, then, following on from this, for a revival of interest in 
methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes. It has been seen that, if Western 
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nations had been more engaged and more imaginative in pursuing a diplomatic 
solution, there is at least a possibility- not a certainty by any means, but a 
possibility- that the crisis in Kosovo might not have reached the state it eventually 
did. In this respect, humanitarian war may indeed be a dangerous concept; the 
seductiveness and apparent neatness of the use of military force may lead to 
alternative strategies being ignored. Diplomacy, with its necessity sometimes for 
compromise with unattractive regimes, may appear a somewhat messy and dirty 
affair, but then so is war. 
      A further matter, not often noted by theorists but shown up by the development 
of the crisis in Kosovo, is the possibility that the prospect of a humanitarian war 
being launched may serve to inflame internal crises by giving members of an 
oppressed group an incentive to turn to violent tactics, thereby favouring extremist 
currents within that society and reducing the chances of a peaceful settlement. 
With regard to Kosovo, the nature of Western policy- focused as it was on dealing 
with whatever seemed to be the most urgent crisis at any given time- served to 
reward the violent tactics of the KLA while ignoring the earlier LDK-led peaceful 
resistance. 
     The case of Kosovo serves to illustrate the- widely acknowledged- selective 
nature of humanitarian war in practice. The human rights abuses that occurred in 
Kosovo prior to March 1999 were not exceptionally severe on a global scale; but 
they happened to be occurring within Europe, and were committed by a 
government which, for other reasons, had outlived its usefulness and had indeed 
become a nuisance as far as Western powers were concerned. If the doctrine of 
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humanitarian war is applied in future, it will surely be in the same selective 
fashion. This is not a reason for declaring the idea illegitimate- interventions 
undertaken selectively for only partially humanitarian reasons may still have good 
outcomes- but it is a reason to be sceptical about some of the more overblown 
rhetoric of a ‘new age’ of humanitarianism that accompanied and followed the war 
in Kosovo. 
 
      C.2 Jus in Bello 
To move on to the question of jus in bello, it may be concluded that, in the case of 
Kosovo, the term ‘humanitarian war’ did indeed prove to be a contradiction in 
terms. The means employed by NATO- high-level aerial bombing aimed at least in 
part at coercing the civilian population of Serbia to put pressure on their leaders- 
cannot be termed humanitarian. The war certainly did not succeed in preventing a 
humanitarian crisis in the short run, and the available evidence strongly suggests 
that, by inviting reprisals by Serbian forces against the only availiable targets- the 
Kosovo Albanian civilian population- the bombing made the situation a good deal 
worse. 
    The ‘coercive’ intervention was considerably more successful than the 
‘humanitarian’ one. It did succeed in forcing Serbian forces to withdraw from  
Kosovo and in allowing the refugees to return (although the reversal of this one 
wave of ethnic cleansing was immediately succeeded by a second wave in the 
reverse direction). The same pattern can be seen in the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, both of which had essentially ‘coercive’ aims- forcing regime change- and 
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both of which were successful in terms of achieving those aims (although whether 
they can be considered successful in a wider sense is another matter).  In the case 
of Kosovo, however, it is doubtful whether the bombing itself actually played the 
decisive role in forcing Milosevic’s capitulation. Other factors, such as pressure 
from Russia, and the face-saving concessions in the final settlement (cosmetic as 
they proved to be in the long term) may have been just as significant.  
      There were alternative strategies available to NATO, and it must be said that 
we will never know what would have happened if NATO had sent in ground 
troops, as was advocated by many proponents of humanitarian war. It is possible 
that a ground invasion would have led to a swift Serbian capitulation; but if there 
had been resistance, the result might have been more bloodshed than in fact 
occurred. Ground troops were used in a more recent alleged humanitarian war in 
Iraq, and this did not lead to a bloodless victory or to long-term stability. We have 
seen, however, that the use of ground troops was never a serious option in the case 
of Kosovo in the mind of any of the main decisionmakers, so the question is 
somewhat academic. The fact that an exclusive reliance on air power greatly 
reduces the risk of casualties on the part of intervening powers- as witnessed by 
the Kosovo war, casualty-free on the NATO side- is likely to create a strong 
temptation in favour of using it in future crises. It is instructive to note the contrast 
between Kosovo, a humanitarian war where the use of ground forces- though 
widely advocated- was not seriously considered by governments- and the war in 
Iraq, where the US and UK, with vital economic and power interests at stake, were 
prepared to use ground forces from the beginning.  
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      What this does confirm is that at present, for all the talk about humanitarian 
war, Western governments have yet to find a politically feasible immediate way of 
halting human rights abuses on the ground by military means. Interventions with a 
coercive intent are more likely to succeed by weight of force, but on the evidence 
of Kosovo- and other recent wars- it is very doubtful whether such interventions 
can be considered humanitarian. 
 
     C.3 Jus Post Bellum 
To turn finally to the jus post bellum, the case of Kosovo shows that the traditional 
understanding of humanitarian intervention- as a short-term matter focused on 
restoring the status quo ante any humanitarian crisis- is inadequate for dealing 
with modern humanitarian wars. If the intervention in Kosovo had been treated as 
a purely short-term matter, and NATO had left along with the Serbian forces, the 
result would have been a total exodus of the non-Albanian population of the 
province and the creation of a mono-ethnic state- precisely what the war was 
supposed to prevent (to a partial extent this happened anyway, despite the 
occupation). The Kosovo war shows that military intervention by itself cannot deal 
with the underlying causes of an intra-state conflict; at best, by altering the power 
structure of the conflict, it may provide a better opportunity for a long-term 
resolution (at worst, by inflaming passions and creating grievances on the part of 
the ‘losing’ side, it may make a conflict even harder to resolve). In such cases 
postwar commitment is required to obtain a sustainable settlement. One may of 
course imagine a case of a humanitarian war occurring in a state where there are 
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no major internal ethnic or religious cleavages, no potential for internal conflict 
and violence is instigated purely by the government. In such a case, post-conflict 
involvement by outsiders- except for economic reconstruction- would be 
unnecessary- indeed unwelcome- and the traditional view of humanitarian 
intervention would hold. However, we have seen no such cases in recent times. 
Iraq (if one discounts the Kurdish regions) had no major internal conflicts before 
the 2003 war, but it has certainly acquired some since then. 
      So it seems that a concept of jus post bellum is necessary for the full 
understanding of modern humanitarian wars. Given the growing recognition of the 
problems of post-war settlements in places like Kosovo and Iraq, it is very likely 
that, in coming years, the issue of the jus post bellum will gain a higher profile in 
discussions surrounding the idea of humanitarian war. However, it will be very 
difficult for theorists to formulate an appropriate set of criteria for this concept- 
certainly far more difficult than is the case for the jus ad bellum. Adopt too 
maximalist a position on the postwar responsibilities of intervening states, and one 
risks justifying a reborn Western imperialism; some have in fact called specifically 
for this, but there is no evidence that states of today are any better equipped than 
the imperial powers of old to rule over people for their own good.2 However, 
adopt too minimalist a position and one risks allowing unwilling governments to 
cut and run, leaving people theoretically ‘liberated’ but with their country in ruins. 
                                                
      Regardless of whether one accepts the principled objections to people being 
ruled over by outsiders ‘for their own good’, for purely practical reasons this is a 
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situation that should be avoided wherever possible. Occupation creates 
resentments of its own, that become more difficult to deal with the longer it goes 
on- and the problem is that occupations in the aftermath of recent wars have shown 
a disturbing tendency to become permanent.  The cases of Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and Iraq have not yet shown that the modern model of trusteeship can 
be successful in creating functioning states, though at present the timescale is still 
too short for any firm conclusions in this area. So far, the long-term outcome of 
the recent spate of humanitarian wars has been the creation of one failed state after 
another. Indefinite occupations of the type existing in all four of the cases 
mentioned above carry major problems, one of the most important being that they 
risk creating perverse incentives. In the case of Kosovo, for example, the Serbian 
side (whether in the form of Kosovo Serb leaders or the government in Belgrade) 
has been well aware that it is only likely to lose from any successful negotiated 
solution. Since a resumption of more than nominal Serbian sovereignty over the 
province remains unthinkable for the majority Albanian population, the likely 
outcome of negotiations would be some form of independence; and, for Serbs, the 
current situation of permanent trusteeship has so far seemed preferable to that.  
 
     C.4 A Final Word 
In conclusion, then, there is a need for theorists to display a more realistic attitude 
about what can actually be achieved through the use of military force, and to be 
more cautious about advocating and endorsing its use. Praiseworthy as the ideals 
behind humanitarian war may be, one must always remember that going to war is 
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never a neat or a simple affair, and it is no good ‘doing something’ about a 
humanitarian crisis if the ‘something’ that we do just makes matters worse. The 
historical legal and theoretical barriers to the legitimate use of military force 
should not be lowered without good reason.  
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